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AN EPISODE OF JEWISH ROMANTICISM

Franz Rosenzweig's *The Star of Redemption*

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For Paul,
my classicist companion
on life's way

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Judaism and Romanticism

Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) lived through two of the most extreme periods of modern German history: World War I and the Weimar Republic. Even in a national history beset by extremes, these two relatively short time spans stand out, the first for the cataclysmic destruction that occurred during it, and the second, which immediately followed, for the creative brilliance of its cultural life. Students of modern German history must confront the alternatively terrible and sublime reality of contradiction. It should therefore come as no surprise that, in the case of the relatively small part of that history we propose to study here, namely Rosenzweig's *The Star of Redemption*, prima facie contradictions in the secondary literature assault us from the start. One writer calls Rosenzweig "one of the most sublime manifestations of the greatness and religious genius of our [i.e., the Jewish] people."[1] Another tells us that "Rosenzweig yachol leheichashev bedin lenetsigah shel haromantikah betechuma shel hayahadut"[2] (Rosenzweig may justly be considered a representative of romanticism within the context of Judaism). And a third pronounces that romanticism belongs to "ways of thought out of sympathy with Judaism."[3] How can a sublime representation of Judaism manifest in a current of thought out of sympathy with Judaism?

Perhaps this could only happen among what Hannah Arendt called that "altogether unique phenomenon" of German Jewry.[4] It has been said of romanticism that, next to the Reformation, no other cultural movement has had so profound and definitive an impact on

Germany's spiritual identity.[5] At the same time, students of Jewish diaspora history have noted the particular fervor with which German Jews especially, among all the different nationalities of European Jewry, sought to appropriate their host culture. A notable instance is Hermann Cohen, whose essay, "Deutschtum und Judentum," boldly declares the points of identity between these two thought-worlds.[6] Jacques Derrida calls this essay a "strange text . . . whose extravagance, indeed delirium," reflects what even Cohen himself might admit was a "psyche which is itself a reflexive delirium."[7] One cannot read Gershom Scholem's own reflections "On the Social Psychology of the Jews in Germany: 1900–1933" without feeling quite wrenchingly the force of Derrida's interpretation. Scholem depicts a self-delusive community, "strangely smitten with blindness," whose understanding of its own mission was to disappear as a distinct community.[8] Scholem implies that the German Jews purchased their German identity at the terribly high price of their own self-division and even self-sacrifice. But if German identity was romantic, then self-divisive and vanishing movements were not the price of it; they were that identity, itself.

But then, what was German romanticism? "The bewildering plethora of heterogeneous concepts, attitudes and images associated with the romantic,"[9] is so great that "one may easily begin to doubt whether there was such a 'movement' at all."[10] In a scattered sampling of recent articles from the cultural review sections of the *New York Times*, romanticism is associated with despondency, madness, escape and vampires.[11] But German romanticism in particular is typically confined to a family of ideas that flourished in Germany at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. By one reckoning, these years extend from 1796 to 1830, and are divided into stages: 1796–1804 was the period of early German romanticism; 1804–1815, the middle period; and 1815–1830 the late period.[12] If we confine ourselves still further to the early period, then romanticism becomes the ideas of a small group of people writing over a few years, and consisting minimally of the Schlegel brothers, Schleiermacher, Novalis, Tieck and Schelling[13]—the so-called Jena romantics, or *Fruehromantiker*.

The secondary literature on these writers and their romantic friends is vast; even a cursory review of it is beyond the scope of this slight introduction. But what must, from the start, impress any student of religion, is the patently religious character of the early German romantics. If this were not already obvious from Schleiermacher's important place among them, from works of their

circle bearing such titles as *Effusions of an Art-Loving Friar*,[14] or from Lacoue-Labarthe's and Nancy's index to key concepts—such as Christianity, God, mysticism, religion—in Schlegel's works,[15] it could be gleaned by reading what one critic has called "the supreme creation of German romanticism,"[16] namely Novalis' *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*.[17] Despite Friedrich Schlegel's later conversion to Catholicism, the identification some critics make between Christianity and romanticism,[18] and Novalis' own "Christendom oder Europa,"[19] which pleads for a revival of the church universal, the religion that shows through the works of the early romantics is not normative or institutional Christianity. Some critics have preferred to distinguish a distinctive "romantic religion,"[20] or at least a "romantic view of religion."[21] Most would find in this religion a preoccupation with the idea of the infinite,[22] and an acute feeling for the interrelatedness of things. It is particularly over seeming opposites that the romantics find connections,[23] as of part to whole,[24] nature to history, death to life, past to future.[25] A configuration of linked oppositions constitute *das Ganze*, or the whole.[26] But these two pillars of romantic religion, the infinite and the whole, are themselves an opposition, since the whole implies a closure or self-enclosure, that the unbounded infinite disrupts. That, in building its structure of ideas, romantic religion simultaneously illustrates them, is the first of its vanishing movements, performed here on the space between form and content.

The space does not entirely vanish. Where opposition occurs as a content of romantic religion, as a belief in the relations that span opposites, the space between the opposites is closed over in the whole. But where opposition occurs as the form of romantic religion, in the space between the opposed doctrines of the infinite and the whole, the space is not completely closed. And here romantic religion performs another movement characteristic of it. It will not choose between the systematizable whole and the system-bursting infinite, but unsettlingly hovers between them. "It is equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have none," says Schlegel. "It will simply have to decide to combine the two."[27]

If the simultaneity of opposites is a darkness to human understanding, then, says romantic religion, so much the worse for the understanding. The understanding, as Kant presented it, was the categorizing component of human reason, which actively determined the objectivity of what would otherwise be blind, sensual intuition. Where the understanding fails to combine opposites, feeling and the imagination succeed. According to Schlegel's famous phrase, the

romantic was "was uns einen sentimentalen Stoff in einer phantastischen Form darstellt"[28] (what represents an emotive subject matter in a fantastic, or imaginative, form). A sentimental subject matter is a content of feeling; a fantastic form is one that the imagination "can raise . . . again and again to a higher power . . . in an endless succession of mirrors."[29]

The endlessness of the succession of mirrors itself mirrors what we posited as the first pillar of romanticism, namely the lure of the infinite. Schlegel here implicitly identifies the infinite with form. If the other originary concept in our construction of romantic religion, namely the whole, can be taken for content, then Schlegel's remarks reinterpret the opposition between the infinite and the whole as one between form and content. And if, by illustrating opposition in its very self-construction, romanticism reduces the distinction between form and content, it now reaffirms the distance between them by relating them, analogously, with the overtly oppositional infinite and whole. The instated distance inverts or reverses the vanishing one, as though the two were reflections in a mirror. And this, after vanishing and hovering, is the third characteristically romantic movement, namely inversion or mirroring.

The three movements are interrelated. The reflection of an object in a pool of water mirrors its object, but only as a hovering illusion that any disturbance to the pond's quiet surface will cause to vanish. If these movements are applied to the infinite and the whole, the religious mechanics of romanticism becomes clear. Romantic religion sanctifies a vision of the whole. But the whole is infinitely mirrored throughout its parts. The whole is the object and the myriad of particulars, its hovering reflections. The attuned romantic who disturbs the reflections causes them to vanish, at least momentarily, before the soteric vision of the whole.

The disturbance that reveals the reflections for the hovering concealments they are is, principally, art. Art structures reflection. By itself reflecting particular things, it mirrors what the particular things themselves reflect, namely the whole. Art is the organon of romantic religion, as prayer is of institutional religion, in the sense of being the means of passage from premise (in the world of particulars) to conclusion (in visionary wholeness). Indeed, the art-loving friar specifically compares art appreciation to prayer. Schleiermacher hoped that the religiously insensate might be brought to religious feeling through art, and Schlegel, who pictured the arts disconsolate on Mount Parnassus, ever since the departure of Apollo, offered them in Christianity a new religion to serve. Theodore Ziolkowski rightly

notes that romantics did not so much substitute art for religion, as propose to fulfill religion by means of art.[30]

Under the aegis of art, the last pieces of romantic religion fall into place. These are self-consciousness and irony on the one hand, freedom and individuality on the other. Irony is a product of romantic hovering. The romantic's resolution of the tension between opposites is to hover between them. The constant awareness that any declared stance is balanced by its opposite, and, most especially, any stance of completion, by the breach of the infinite, is romantic irony. Irony keeps romantic religion from becoming too self-serious. The infinite punctures holes in self-satisfied visions of the whole, and returns any romantic who thought to forget himself there, to the self-conscious awareness of his own finitude. Romantic art, strung as it is between finite content and infinite form, is ineluctably ironic, and wishes to string its viewers between a similar opposition of finite self and consciousness of self raised "again and again to a higher power." To accomplish his revelatory feats, however, both the artist and viewer must not be trammeled by custom or convention. The romantic suspicion of the laws of categorial thinking, which obstinately insist on their so Aristotelian $-(p \& -p)$, negatively mirrors the romantic's indulgence of the category-defying individual and his freedom.

If we can take irony, self-consciousness, individuality and freedom as mere implications of the ideas that preceded them in our construction of romantic religion, then that religion comprises in the main: a form, a content, three movements and an organon. (The form is the infinite, the content is the whole, the movements are vanishing, hovering, and mirroring, and the organon is art.) If a religion so constructed seems little different from a recipe for stew, that only goes to confirm how much this religion tastes of romanticism, which loves simultaneously to illustrate the ironies it describes.

With its subject heading, "Jewish Wit and Humor," the Library of Congress, responsible for cataloging, ideally, all books published in the United States, lends its most unironic but considerable authoritative weight to the idea of a distinctively Jewish brand of humor.[31] It has been called an ironical humor. And if it is, then the Jewish sensibility might seem highly receptive to romanticism. And yet, a writer on Gustav Mahler who, by asking whether that composer was "German romantic or Jewish satirist," implies that these are disjunctively opposed, observes that "it would be hard to imagine a Jew as a whole-hearted romantic."[32] His claim might be assessed from two different angles: the theological, and the historical.

Judaism foils any straightforward comparison with romantic religion by coming in so many shapes. If Arthur Lovejoy insisted that romanticism could only be discussed in the plural,[33] it is Jacob Neusner who repeatedly insists that Judaism is really Judaisms.[34] And yet, insofar as Judaism is, as it is sometimes called, a moral monotheism, it must resist almost all the principal traits of romantic religion. Monotheism does not aspire to a vision of the whole but, to the extent that it is visionary at all, of God. And God is quite pointedly distinguished from the whole, insofar as this includes the particulars of the world. This God is not infinitely mirrored in the world, but primarily in only one distinct part of it, which is thereby raised above the rest of it, namely the human. Neither vanishing nor hovering are characteristic movements of moral monotheism, but rather obedience is, to the divine commands. The aptly named *luftmensh*, from the Yiddish, meaning air-person, who inclines to vanish or hover in the midst of the world's concretions, is simply a figure of fun, never of normative behavior. Indeed, individuality as such, even of the saintly type, raises suspicions in the so communally oriented daily life of traditional Judaism.[35] The freedom that Judaism commends is for the sake of obedience, not the untrammeled unfoldings of art. If any one organon furthers the Jewish movement from finite soul to God, it is prayer, understood in the broadest sense as ritual observance, study, and good deeds.

The one clear point of affinity between Jewish and romantic religion is the idea of the infinite. Both religions agree that the infinite imposes limitations on human understanding, though romanticism makes more than Judaism does of the resulting darkness. The multiple literatures of Judaism—the biblical, rabbinic, philosophical, and mystical—all insist on the infinity of God. This tenet is popularly expressed in the liturgy, in proclamations of God's oneness and incomparability, and in day-to-day ways of circumventing the specific naming of God. The only style of Judaism that would stretch this one affinity into a broad congruence with romantic religion is the mystical; and it would do so precisely by compromising the otherwise so relentless monotheism in the direction of pantheism. Indeed, the congruences between German romanticism and kabbalah have been noted,[36] as has the romantic nature of mysticism generally.[37]

The turn to history at first blush seems to offer more promise of meeting between Jew and romantic. Writers on Jewish history single out several periods that reflect what they characterize as romantic tendencies in the surrounding culture. Ralph Marcus finds a "romantic

political bent" showing equally in the utopian literature of ancient Hellenism, and in the apocalyptic literature of the ancient Jews, and additionally deems "romantic types" those Jews who were drawn to Zoroastrianism, dualism, angelology, and eschatological speculation.[38] In the Middle Ages, it is sometimes Judah Halevi who is singled out for romantic, on account of the so atypical (for the time) antirationalism he advanced. In modern times, romantic interest in the past is said to have fueled the rise of *Wissenschaft des Judentums*,[39] and two such polar opposites as Martin Buber and Samson Raphael Hirsch are thought to have sprung from the same German romantic ground.[40] The nineteenth century thinker, Joseph Wolf, is shown indebted to the "romantic notions" of Schleiermacher;[41] and several modern German-Jewish movements, Habonim and "Blau Weis", to the romantic teachings of the German Volkish movement.[42]

Of course, across these diverse attributions of romantic tendencies to Jewish thinkers and movements, no one meaning of romanticism prevails. The term conveys a diversity of traits: escapist longings for the ideal; nostalgic love of the past; antirationalism; mysticism; nationalism. Certainly all of these have marked important periods of Jewish history. But what seems unbridgably to divide Judaism from historical romanticism in general is the antisemitism commonly associated with its specific German expression. There is indeed ample ground for respecting this divide. Even apart from such sweeping claims as Heine's that "hatred of the Jews begins with the Romantic school,"[43] the antipathy of some German romantics towards the Jewish people is well documented. In a formidable study of middle romanticism, Guenter Oesterle examines the antisemitism of Clemens Brentano, Achim von Arnim, Adam Mueller, and their friends in the Deutsche christliche Tischgesellschaft.[44] At the same time, it must be respected that the early romantics—Schelling, Novalis, Schleiermacher—do not evince the same harsh animus. As Oesterle observes, it would flatly contradict Schleiermacher's *Geselligkeitsideal*, Schlegel's posited need of the complementary "other" (*der Fremde*) for self-fulfillment,[45] to say nothing of the whole tenor of the "progressive universal poetry,"[46] to exclude Jews from literary society. And of course, they were not excluded, but were, through the salon life that flourished at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany, at its very center. The antisemitism to be found in Schleiermacher, Novalis and Schelling is the standard European kind, dating back to the church fathers, that burdens Judaism with the role of superseded harbinger of Christianity,[47] although Novalis, commenting on the dispersion of the Jews, is more

struck in at least one passage by the reconciled opposition of East and West it illustrates, than by any "lesson" it might teach about the rejection of Christianity, and the late Schelling reproves Christians for their neglect of Hebrew Scripture and praises the acuity of Jewish listeners at his lectures.[48]

It is perhaps of merely coincidental interest that two important middle romantics, the Grimm brothers, did much of their work in Kassel, Rosenzweig's birthplace, and that what one writer has called the romantically motivated "Second Emancipation" of the Jews began with Nathan Adler (1741–1800) in Frankfurt, Rosenzweig's burial place.[49] For Otto Poeggeler, Rosenzweig had distinctly "romantic tendencies" that were related to his translation of Judah Halevi's poems, and his late appreciation of Hoelderlin.[50] So far as Halevi is concerned, Dorit Orgad goes so far as to interpret *The Star of Redemption* as the rational-poetic outcome of a centuries-spanning dialog between Rosenzweig and that rational antirationalist of the Middle Ages.[51] If the romantic line can be stretched from Rosenzweig to as far back as Halevi, perhaps it is less of a stretch to Pascal and Kierkegaard.[52] To the extent that the existentialists descend from the romantics, especially on the issue of feeling, these proto-existentialists may be taken for at least spiritual kin of the romantics, and of Rosenzweig, too. But the most interesting "romantic" precedent of all may be Hoelderlin. Though Rosenzweig himself acknowledges his debt to that poet,[53] it is Scholem who linked the two most memorably by prefacing his essay, "Franz Rosenzweig and his book *The Star of Redemption*," with an extensive quotation from Hoelderlin's poem, "Patmos".[54] The verses describe a multiple vanishing of life, beauty, and speech in which nonetheless a consummating end is reached. The German Jews as a body wanted too much to vanish. But vanishing is never a proper goal. The goallessly attained end does not vanish in its end but leaves a living trace. *The Star of Redemption* is part of Rosenzweig's trace.

Romanticism and Idealism

If Judaism and romanticism are already, themselves, too pluralistic to admit of easy comparison, idealism, at least in its absolute German form, confines itself to a few works of, principally, three philosophers: Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling. Like romanticism, idealism was relatively short-lived, and as Germany's reigning philosophical system, died with Hegel in 1831. Nonetheless, in its time it exercised great influence beyond the bounds of philosophy, and continued to do so even afterwards through the multiple and ongoing responses to it.

Rosenzweig is one of several German Jewish thinkers who lived under Hegel's spell. Though after writing his dissertation on Hegel's political theory, Rosenzweig grew to reject Hegel's idealism, he continues to write in response to it, even up through *The Star of Redemption*. In the early pages of that work, in a short section titled "Hegel," Rosenzweig discusses the resolution Hegelian dialectic effected between the claims of reason and faith. But Hegel is an unnamed presence in many other places throughout the work, as the index references under "Hegel," at the back of both the Notre Dame and Suhrkamp editions of the book, to pages on which the name does not specifically appear suggest. Part of the problem of interpreting the romantic features of the *Star* is determining their relation to the idealist ones. Romanticism and idealism are complexly interrelated. The early romantics, especially Novalis, built on Fichtean idealism. Schelling's esthetics borrows heavily from the Schlegels. But Hegel, according to one of the now classic works on German romanticism, *The Literary Absolute*, wrote largely in "opposition to the romantic gesture."[55]

In some ways, idealism and romanticism are simply different projects. Idealism's is largely epistemological: it rose in answer to what were perceived as troubling limitations and incompletions in Kant's theory of knowledge. It sought simultaneously to overcome all theoretical restrictions on human knowledge and to systematize the whole of it. Romanticism, by contrast, was in the main an esthetic movement, concerned with philology, criticism, and art history.[56] What blurs the bounds between them is that early German romanticism was theoretical and, in constructing its theory of literature, inevitably epistemological; while idealism just as inevitably included within its comprehensive reach the philosophical foundations of art. Any adequate account of these mutual trespassings and subsumings is out of the question here; we must confine ourselves to their bearing on a romantic interpretation of *The Star of Redemption*.

Idealism, like romanticism, generates a noninstitutional religion of its own. Rosenzweig himself specifically names the theoretical entity of "idealist religion,"[57] but others, too, have commented on the "religious self-consciousness of idealism."[58] As in all monistic religions, the central passage in idealist religion is from mistaken beliefs in the ultimacy of separation to knowledge of the one, undifferentiable

unity. Perhaps the most significant tracing of this passage occurs in Hegel's very variously interpreted *Phenomenology of Spirit*. A tradition of religious readings of this work, some of which explicitly claim it for Christianity, continues into the twentieth century, but even the casual reader (if Hegel may be read casually) of its opening pages must be struck by the religious tone of the text. Spirit, the Absolute, and indeed God are the principal player(s) in Hegel's prefatory words. If, to all these terms, Hegel himself prefers "the Subject," that only shows how much God's principal business is knowing. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* follows what ultimately shows itself for the divine consciousness as it moves from its simplest claims to know something to its final awareness that what it knows absolutely, without any residue of an outstanding unknown, is simply itself. Hegel presumes to follow this process without importing any "of our own bright ideas." But this essentially epistemological journey becomes religious when the reader, far from importing ideas into it, is himself imported into it, so that what began with his private opening of the text ends in convergence with the traced consciousness' own divine and absolute self-knowledge. The organon of this passage is dialectic, a movement of reasoning that Hegel characterizes as the "transition of one opposite into its opposite." It is the very limitations of language that fuel the dialectical process, for no sooner has a description of the purportedly known been offered than it shows itself to apply to the very opposite of what was intended. The first such dialectical passage occurs over the word "this," used by consciousness to denote in the simplest way whatever sensation it is immediately having. For consciousness soon wakens to the fact that "this" not only fails to reach that specific sensation, but applies indiscriminately to any sensation it might have. A term employed to reach a particular winds up reaching, in precise reversal of intention, a universal. For Hegel, this inversive quality of language is "divine," for the simple reason that it leads both consciousness and reader to the ultimate awareness of its/their monistic allness. That ultimate awareness dawns at the point where language finally rests on, or indeed in, the object for which it reaches.[59]

It well serves the religious nature of Hegelian idealism that that resting point lies so very far from the originary "this." For as Hegel traces the repetitive course of dialectical inversion, consciousness pretty much traverses the whole of purported knowledge, leaving the fused consciousness/reader at the end with an organic vision of all there is to know. That the religious claims of such historical religions as Judaism and Christianity are mere, albeit late, stages on

the dialectical course, points up how much idealist religion is indeed, as Rosenzweig suggests, an entity in and unto itself. If it has historical precedents, they are probably the religiophilosophical traditions of self-sufficiency, whose God is closer to Aristotle's or Spinoza's, than to the Bible's, and whose spokesmen include Kant who, in his famous essay, "What is Enlightenment?," pleaded for reason's self-sufficiency in religious matters, and entitlement to release from all "self-incurred tutelage."[60]

It is on this point of reason's self-sufficiency to its religious task of embracing the whole, that idealist and romantic religion may be most instructively and differentiably compared. For otherwise, the two religions are very similar: we encounter in idealism the same movements that characterize romanticism—the hoverings, vanishings, and mirrorings. Consciousness hovers when for a time it indecisively wavers between what it means and what it says until, having chosen, it momentarily collapses the distinction between the two. But the distinction has no sooner collapsed than it emerges again in a new guise; until, at the end of many repetitions of the same process, consciousness gazes restfully into what finally shows itself to it as the identically opposite mirror-image object of its own subjectivity. Certainly the two collapsed distinctions, between art and criticism (within romanticism), and between subject and object (within idealism), follow the same movement of two becoming one over a mirroring divide. We find in idealist religion the same longing for wholeness that romanticism shows, and, if we include under the rubric of idealist religion, the sixth chapter of Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*, we can say that, like romantic religion, it is also able to take art for the organon of its progress[61] (though Hegel does not).

The "minute" difference between idealism and romanticism, say Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, is over the issue of "a supplementary complexity, hesitating, hovering, or *schweben*, to use a word that these [romantic] texts are immoderately fond of."[62] It is not the mere act of hovering that divides them since, after all, the idealist hovers too, but a "supplementary" hovering that occurs in romanticism over and above idealism's. Nor is the division over whether philosophy or art ultimately resolves the hovering, since the idealist Schelling already decides in favor of art, but whether the hovering ever wholly resolves at all. The same fundamental division appears over the issue of the infinite. We took the intractability of the infinite, its never wholly appeasable disruptions of the whole, for the first defining mark of romantic religion. Romantic religion hovers irresolutely between the infinite and the whole. The role of the infinite in

Hegelian dialectic is to be the "beyond"[63] that appears over the horizon of every claim to know that consciousness makes, except for the very last one. For where, in that last claim to knowledge, consciousness finally indicates its own act of indicating, all distance between subject and object has vanished without residue.

It was the romantic's claim that "there is nothing in philosophy that can provide the subject with access to itself."[64] The infinity of the Hegelian subject can never be its own circumscribed object. Rather, the infinite can only be presented to consciousness in an indirect way, through an "exergue," Lacoue-Labarthe's and Nancy's term for that which stands outside a thing as simultaneously its end and completion. This is precisely the role the concrete artwork plays to the infinite or, indeed, that romanticism would claim to play to idealism. The exergue hovers between self-instatement and vanishing before the infinite. It exists precisely to vanish before what disrupts it or, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy put it, it is in its "not being there" that it is.[65] The exergue occupies that paradoxical space just on the other side of the infinite, like the never-reached limit on the infinitely decreasing space between a hyperbola and its asymptote. Idealism presumes to guide the curve of the hyperbola to its limit; romanticism hovers between the last-attained point of the curve, after which there is always another, and the line marking the limit the curve never touches. From a romantic point of view, idealism's claim is indeed hyperbole; the true completion of the idealist movement is the romantic's infinitely hovering postponement of completion.

The difference between romanticism and idealism is thus not merely minute, but actually infinitesimal. And yet even so great a smallness will help us differentiate the romanticism from the idealism within the *Star*. For we must not be misled by Rosenzweig's overt rejections of idealism. The existentialism associated with Rosenzweig has been traced back, alternatively, to both romanticism and idealism.[66] Much of what is romantic about the *Star* is also idealist. We shall be on special lookout for the differentiably romantic note.

Rosenzweig and Baeck

Both Franz Rosenzweig and Leo Baeck participated actively in Jewish communal life during the tempestuous years of the Weimar Republic—Rosenzweig as head of the Freies Juedisches Lehrhaus in

Frankfurt, and Baeck as rabbi in Berlin. Both were philosophically minded Jews steeped in German culture, sharing a common teacher in Hermann Cohen, and a common, concerned interest in Christian history and thought. In the secondary literature, they are sometimes grouped with Martin Buber as German Jewry's principal intellectual spokesmen during the years of the Weimar Republic. But, though Baeck and Rosenzweig were cordially acquainted—it was Baeck who carried out Rabbi Nehemiah Nobel's plan of titling Rosenzweig *morenu*, "our teacher" in the rabbinic tradition, a title that appears on Rosenzweig's tombstone, and who insisted that his Bnai Brith lodge buy 7,000 copies of the Buber-Rosenzweig Pentateuch translation[67]—and though the two wrote appreciatively of each other,[68] there can be no doubt that Rosenzweig enjoyed a closer relation to Buber.[69] It is not just their interpretations of Judaism that are more similar, or that they were more intimately connected by their shared, long-term project of translating the Bible into German, but their respective vocations were closer. Baeck was a professional rabbi; Buber and Rosenzweig were not. Buber was a university professor; but even this was too professionally compromising for Rosenzweig, who wanted the Lehrhaus he founded for educating adult Jews to be "non-specialist, non-rabbinical, non-polemical, non-apologetic," for its "personal features" would otherwise suffer;[70] as though the personal and rabbinical or the institutional of any kind were irremediably opposed. The *Freies* of Freies Juedisches Lehrhaus implied, in part, a spirit of free (nonapologetic) inquiry. Nonetheless, it should be noted that, despite the difference of vocation, Baeck did teach at Rosenzweig's Lehrhaus where, according to Glatzer, he "made a deep impression."[71]

It is probably on the issue of polemics that Baeck and Rosenzweig are so far separated that the very conjunction of their names rings incongruously, so much so that very little work comparing them can be found in the secondary literature.[72] If Rosenzweig was overtly antipolemical, Baeck's appreciative biographer, Albert Friedlander, concedes that an exhaustive survey of his subject's works "in the end identifies them with the literature of apologetics."[73] The gap between rabbinic and lay vocation no doubt informs these opposed evaluations of apologetics. That which seeks to be instituted, such as a structure of religious authority, may well require apologetic defense. Still, Rosenzweig was by no means as unsympathetic towards clerical office as was, say, Kierkegaard or even the less virulently anticlerical Kant. Though in his review of E. B. Cohn's book, *Judentum: Ein Aufruf an die Zeit*, he severely critiques the genre of the

sermon,[74] he held the Frankfurt rabbi, Nehemiah Nobel, in very high esteem.

In 1923, in an essay entitled "Apologetic Thinking," Rosenzweig reviewed two contemporary apologetic works: Max Brod's *Paganism, Christianity, Judaism*, and the second edition of Baeck's *Essence of Judaism*. By way of preface and conclusion to the reviews proper, Rosenzweig considers the nature of apologetics generally. It is in contrast to dogmatic theology that Rosenzweig is able, quite unexpectedly, to present apologetic thinking in a sympathetic light. Judaism is blocked from developing any equivalent of Christian dogmatics by the peculiar resistance one of its central beliefs shows to dogmatic articulation, namely the chosenness of the Jewish people. Chosenness is a presupposition of conscious Jewish existence that, directly and propositionally formulated, in isolation, can only be denied. So it is not formulated as an isolated proposition at all, but is always embedded in liturgical, narrative or mystical contexts (almost never, Rosenzweig points out quite interestingly, in philosophical ones). By contrast, there are never enough discrete proclamations of Christianity's central Christological teaching. It is precisely by shared acceptance of a dogmatically formulable teaching that Christian community builds; while Jewish community rests on a presupposition, stored protectedly for the most part beneath self-awareness.[75]

If Judaism does not formulate its own teachings to itself, it can and does articulate them for others. But the stimulus must come from without it. If the charge against it comes from philosophers, that the Bible is too anthropomorphic in its speech about God, Judaism can respond, with Philo and Maimonides, that the biblical pictures are allegorical figures; if the charge comes from Christians that Jews are too insular, the response comes from Mendelssohn that Jewish teachings are in fact universal. Because apologetics responds as the occasion demands, it is "occasional" thinking. And this kind of recorded thinking, by its unsystematic and timely nature, both refreshes and charms, even centuries after the occasions that stimulated it have passed.[76]

Apologetics is stimulated from without, but its movement is entirely from within. It proceeds by deflecting from the inwardness it defends all threats and attacks from without. According to Rosenzweig's epistemology, which we shall consider in the course of our study, such a movement can never issue in knowledge. Knowledge, as we shall see, is always a projection backwards from relation. It shows itself as the presupposition of relation. But the movement of

apologetics is precisely to deny relation, to negate the other that comes from without. Rosenzweig understands that, in the course of history, such self-defensive action is necessary. But one can have no illusion that it issues in anything more than self-defense. It does not yield self-knowledge, nor any insight into one's own individuality. On the contrary, the self-enclosed subject of apologetic defense patterns himself after the universal prototype of the human as such, which is the isolated, self-affirming self. Rosenzweig observes about the apologist, in a passage reminiscent of Hegel's reflection on the divine nature of language that, "although meaning himself, he speaks about man, about all men."[77] Self-knowledge admits into its realm a vulnerability that is foreign to apologetics. For the relationality that enables self-knowledge discloses an affectable self. What is known in self-knowledge incorporatingly receives, rather than deflects, movements from without, which help definitively to shape the self. So self-knowledge is not a matter of self-defense, but of suffering in the most literal sense, and of "the ultimate suffering of knowledge."[78]

After Baeck read Rosenzweig's review essay, he wrote to Rosenzweig asking whether, in the end, all philosophical thought was not apologetic. Was not all philosophical reflection, from Plato to Kant and Hegel, in defense of a goal? Baeck's subsumption of the whole history of philosophy under apologetics recalls Rosenzweig's corresponding judgment on the same history, that it was a continuum of presumptuous claims for monism (SR 12). Rosenzweig might well have agreed with Baeck about philosophy and added—so much the worse for philosophy. Instead, he develops the implication in Baeck's question, that apologetics is in fact so much the normal way of thinking that there seems no alternative to it. The alternative there is, namely the open-ended subjection of self to movements from without that condition actual self-knowledge, is too perilous ("lebensgefaehrlich") for everyday life. Rosenzweig admits that his review essay should have closed by qualifying the availability of self-knowledge, and credits Baeck with seeing the missing qualification written there, at the end, in "sympathetischer Druckerschwarze," i.e., invisible ink.[79]

Rosenzweig assigns the perils of self-knowledge to the decidedly unordinary liturgical context of prayer and repentance. Only there are the perils bearable. His reference to the "Buss- und Bettaegliches"[80] recalls the phenomenological analysis of sin and repentance that occurs in Hermann Cohen's *Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism*, which Rosenzweig knew well and taught at the Lehrhaus.[81] Cohen understood the distinct individuality of the I to

be born in its very awareness of having sinned.[82] What defines the I in this situation is the judgment it receives as coming from without, and that uniquely fixes it. Self-knowledge, in effect, precisely reverses the movement of apologetics.

Certainly the occasional quality that, for Rosenzweig, characterizes all apologetic thought, qualifies much of Baeck's work, too. *The Essence of Judaism* was written in response to Harnack's dismissive and subordinating judgment on Judaism in the *Essence of Christianity*. If Rosenzweig was tempted by Christianity for his personal, spiritual life and remained, even after his return to Judaism, a sympathetic interpreter of it, Baeck, the liberal rabbi and champion of Judaism in a largely Christian culture, found in Christianity an unremitting occasion for defensive critiques. There is an irony in that. One of Baeck's polemical categories was what he called romantic religion. But the occasional quality of much of his own work links it to the modern genre of the essay, that reflective string of fragmentary looks at diverse subjects—precisely the genre that, according to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, foretells the romantic movement of the early 1800s.[83]

Baeck and Schelling

In 1922, Baeck published an essay entitled "Romantic Religion." It was half of a projected, but never completed, study on "Classical and Romantic Religion." The essay illustrates Baeck's apologetic stance. Albert Friedlander calls it, perhaps unfairly, the "sharpest polemic possible."[84] In chapter two, we shall consider what Baeck means by romantic religion. Suffice it here to note that, in attacking it, Baeck was following a tradition of antiromantic polemics that was already established in Germany. The first documented uses of the word *romantisch*, applied by seventeenth century writers to the reality-stretching sagas and legends of the Middle Ages, already carried a negative connotation.[85] By the end of the eighteenth century, the romantic had come to be seen as a distinct literary category, about which writers like Schiller and Jean Paul could unpejoratively theorize. It was, however, in the Schlegel brothers that the category found its most ardent theorists. For them, the romantic was a literary category in two senses, chronological and typological. Chronologically, it referred to the "modern" literature of the Middle Ages

and after, especially Cervantes and Shakespeare, as opposed to the "classical" literature of antiquity. Typologically, it referred to certain marks of literary structure, composition and style—neatly summarized in Schlegel's formula, "sentimental material in fantastic form"—that came to clearest expression in the novel. August Schlegel, especially, pondered the typology of the classical and the romantic, calling it the "most essential" distinction for the interpretation of art. The classical for him was characterized by possession, harmony, completion in the present; the romantic, by division, incompletion, and longing for the past or future.

Already in the early nineteenth century, the designation *Romantiker* was applied pejoratively to proponents of the modern literary style. Parodies appeared of the group today sometimes known as the middle romantics: Brentano, Achim von Arnim, J. Goerres, and F. Creuzer. Hegel inadvertently contributed to the antiromantic polemic when, identifying the romantic with the largely medieval and Christian art of inwardness, he deemed it the highest expression of self-alienated subjectivity. Out of Kierkegaard's work, the romantic was identified with irresponsible longing for an appearance of self-dissolution, and out of Nietzsche's, with a symptom of cultural decadence. The polemic continued into the twentieth century. In his book *Political Romanticism*, Carl Schmitt characterized the romantic as "subjective occasionalism," i.e., undifferentiating acceptance of whatever could be turned to ironic or esthetic account, and deplored its vagueness and "dreadful confusion."[86]

Friedlander understands Schmitt's book to form part of the background to Baeck's.[87] Schmitt may be especially visible behind Baeck's comments on the Lutheran churches, which, according to Baeck, entered into irresponsible partnerships with the state.[88] But Baeck would have stretched Schmitt's own understanding of the romantic, which was exclusively esthetic and nonreligious.[89] A work that lies closer to Baeck's is Fritz Strich's *German Classicism and Romanticism*. Subtitled, "Completion or Infinity," the book assigns the classical to peacefulness, closure, organism, clarity, and the realizing powers of art; and the romantic to infinity, movement, openness, darkness and unrealizable ideas. For Strich, this typology results from the fundamental spiritual drive towards immortality, manifesting alternatively in terms of perfection or infinity, and applies to all areas of human culture, including religion. When the romantic manifests in religion, one of the forms it takes is Christianity.[90]

The understanding of the romantic as a category that subsumes Christianity is, as we shall see, Baeck's also. It is just because

Baeck's essay is locatable in a tradition of thinking about romanticism that, despite its polemical tone, it can be taken to represent a common understanding of romantic ideas. For his essay, "Romantic Religion," Baeck draws from the critical tradition of German writing on romanticism, as well as from the history of Christian thought. Paradoxically, these two sources for his essay infect it with the very romanticism he decries, since the two strands of the literary and the religious do not always harmonize, but divisively betray their distinct and to some extent opposed origins.

From the circle of the early romantics, Baeck names in his essay three of his sources: Schleiermacher, Novalis, and Schlegel. He does not name Schelling. And yet, Baeck wrote about Rosenzweig's essay, "The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism," which treats largely of Schelling, that it greatly influenced his understanding of romantic psychology.[91] Schelling might well prefer to influence from a concealed and unnamed station. On the other hand, the unnaming of Schelling in an essay on romantic religion may reflect an ambiguous position that philosopher holds in the history of romanticism. Schelling was associated with the romantics for only a short period of his life. *The Philosophy of Art*, written between 1802 and 1803, belongs to the end of this association, after the Jena group had begun to disperse. Still, Schelling himself expresses a debt to August Schlegel for the "empirical" examples of art that *The Philosophy of Art* illustratively employs.[92] Reciprocally, *The Philosophy of Art* is taken for a major influence in the German romantic movement.[93] "Schleiermacher was especially impressed by the early Schelling;"[94] and well he might have been, given their shared esteem for the religious import of art. On the other hand, Schelling "remains in many respects an 'outsider' of romanticism *stricto sensu*."[95] One respect in which he may differ from Schlegel and Novalis is that he seems, in *The Philosophy of Art*, finally to close the gap between infinity and finitude.[96] We shall explore, in chapter three, the extent to which this is true. But some would maintain, with Carl Schmitt, that any systematic philosophy is, by its very nature, opposed to romanticism.[97]

We do not wish to dispute over names. Schelling was certainly a systematic philosopher. But there is ample precedent in the secondary literature for distinguishing a particular type of systematizing as romantic philosophy, and for taking Schelling as one of its chief exemplars. Rosenzweig himself acknowledges that Schelling was "der Philosoph der Romantiker," and that he was so by virtue of the philosophy of art he conceived in the first years of the nineteenth century.[98] For Rosenzweig, the question is not over Schelling's romanticism, but over the major directions of influence between him and the other Jena romantics.[99] But even Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, who otherwise qualify Schelling's romantic credentials, allow for "'philosophical romanticism'" (albeit only in quotation marks).[100] Others quite openly concede that "romanticism was not only a literary, but also very consciously a philosophical movement."[101] Indeed, some sources go so far as to subsume all of philosophical idealism under "philosophical romanticism;"[102] Husserl, for example, took even the "anti-romantic" Hegel for a romantic philosopher.[103]

Schelling himself would be delighted to think he could simultaneously occupy two opposed positions, one within and one outside of romanticism. But let us recall Schlegel's famous pronouncement that "it is equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have none. It will simply have to decide to combine the two."[104] Our interpretation of *The Philosophy of Art* is that it does precisely that. It will erect a kind of metasystem that carves out spaces for nonsystem. In his polemic against romanticism, Baeck was probably right to omit Schelling's name. The systematized nonsystem too easily passes for a rigorously distinguishing classicism. But by blurrily hovering above typological boundaries, Schelling shows himself all the more romantic.

Schelling and Rosenzweig

The influence of the late Schelling on Rosenzweig's *The Star of Redemption* has received ample attention in the secondary literature.[105] Rosenzweig himself thought of Schelling as his "patron saint,"[106] and distinguished him sharply from the other two builders of idealist systems, Fichte and Hegel. But if the patronage is as real as Rosenzweig claims, it does not show itself in any abundance of overt references to Schelling's work. Xavier Tilliette observes that Rosenzweig wrote much more about, and with explicit reference to, Hegel than Schelling; and that the latter's discernible influence is largely "diffuse, atmospherique, poetique."[107] Schelling is differentiable from Hegel and Fichte on several grounds, including, among others, the degree of change his thinking underwent over time, and the supreme importance he assigned, at different stages of thinking, to nature, art, and mythology. Rosenzweig cites Fichte's dictum that a person's philosophy depends on what sort of person he is;[108] and it

may offer insights into Rosenzweig's own person that so far-ranging and changing a thinker as Schelling caught his imagination over the so focusedly will- and *Geist*-oriented idealist alternatives.

The temptation is to say that Schelling appealed to Rosenzweig because, of the three idealists, he was the only one to break so decisively with idealism, just as Rosenzweig did, and to begin to articulate a new way of thinking that, instead of equating thought with being, acknowledged its own dependence on a prior thought-resistance. But Rosenzweig was writing about Schelling already in 1914, three years before the so-called "Urzelle der *Stern der Erloesung*," where he first formulates, in a letter to Rudolf Ehrenberg, the philosophical importance of breaking with idealism. And the Schelling he wrote about so early on was precisely the young, idealist Schelling.

In 1914, while pursuing research for his doctoral study of Hegel, Rosenzweig came across a manuscript in Hegel's hand that he named "The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism." In a lengthy study of the manuscript, which examines it from orthographic, historical, and conceptual vantage points, he concludes that it is a copy of an original that Schelling wrote sometime between January and July 1796.[109] This hypothesis has been contested. Scholarship is still not agreed on the author of this work.[110] But the manuscript, which is available in print both in German and in English translation,[111] is of less interest here for its actual author, than for the occasion it provides Rosenzweig to write about Schelling with evident sympathy, and not a little feeling for the pathos of unfulfilled promise that seemed to haunt this longest-lived of the idealists. As Rosenzweig's own commentary on the manuscript has not been translated into English, a synopsis is provided here.

The commentary is divided into eight parts. In the first, Rosenzweig presents the case that the manuscript is written in Hegel's hand and, with reference to scholarship on Hegel orthography, dates it to sometime between April 29 and August 1796. Part two is a transcript of the manuscript. In the third part, Rosenzweig argues, on grounds of the tidiness of the work and several careless errors it contains, that it is a copy, but also, on stylistic, tonal, and philosophical grounds, that Hegel is not the author. Rather, the one proto-idealist writer of the time, of whom the rash projections of the manuscript are characteristic, is Schelling.

Part four is the heart of the commentary. Here, Rosenzweig divides the manuscript into five sections which, as the commentary proceeds, he refers to as the logico-metaphysics, the nature philosophy, the ethics, the teaching on art, and the religious philosophy, or

mythology. He successively analyzes each part. The analysis proceeds by locating the ideas of each section in relation to the known Schelling works of the mid to late 1790s, primarily, but not exclusively, *Of the I as a Principle of Philosophy* (1795) and *The Philosophical Letters Concerning Dogmatism and Criticism* (1795). The metaphysical part of the manuscript concludes with the claim that "simultaneously with the free, self-conscious being there emerges an entire world—from out of nothing—the only true and conceivable creation out of nothing."[112] Rosenzweig locates this claim in a progression of ideas he traces from *Of the I* to the *General Overview of the New Philosophical Literature* (1796-1797). Rosenzweig downplays Fichte's influence on the Schelling of this period, and accentuates Kant's. But the I of *Of the I* breaks with both Kant and Fichte. This I was an absolute being, conceived after the pattern of Spinoza's substance, and Schelling's presentation of it has, says Rosenzweig, mystical and irrational overtones. However, by the time of the *Philosophical Letters*, the I has become an active will, practical and creative. Rosenzweig understands this change of view about the I as indicative of a problem that was becoming increasingly pressing for Schelling, namely "wie das Absolute aus sich selbst herausgehen und eine Welt sich entgegensetzen kann"[113] (how the Absolute can step out of itself and set against itself a world). In *The General Overview*, the act of will is presented as the highest condition of self-consciousness, which is itself the one synthetic act that creates freely out of nothing, and in relation to which everything else, including our own system of sensual presentations, is analytic. By subsuming the sensual representations that, for Kant, were simply given and that had constituted the content of the categories of theoretical philosophy, under the free act of self-consciousness, so that the free consciousness is cast as producer of its own only seemingly given representations, Schelling effects the synthesis of theoretical and practical philosophy that had eluded Kant. The free self of the System-Program that simultaneously creates out of its own self-consciousness and, what amounts to the same thing, out of nothing, resembles the primal, synthetic act of the Schellingian self.

The nature philosophy of the System-Program centers, for Rosenzweig, on the claim that, for the new physics "philosophy provides the ideas and experience the data."[114] Once again, Rosenzweig traces an evolution in Schelling's thought, this time from the Fichtean view that nature is comprehensible only as the domain in which the infinite will exercises itself, to an enhanced respect for nature itself, quite apart from any contexts it provides for moral self-realization. Newly

dignified along with nature is the sensual experience that constitutes its content. When Schelling claims that nature is, in Rosenzweig's words, "das Anwendungsgebiet der theoretischen Philosophie"[115] (the domain of application of theoretical philosophy), he means to lift theoretical philosophy out from under its subordination to moral philosophy—the subordination Kant and Fichte had decreed for it—and fashion for it a new and independent integrity, alongside nature. Nature is invested, teleologically, and in opposition to Kant, with its own purposed progression "von der toten Materie zum lebendigen Geist"[116] (from dead matter to living spirit). Theoretical philosophy elucidates for nature its own rise to living consciousness.

The third section of the System-Program, on ethics, polemicizes against institutional religion and against the state, which will eventually disappear in subordination to a higher idea. Rosenzweig finds the same antistatist tendencies in *Of the I* and in the *New Deduction of Natural Law* (1796). Schelling demotes Kant's picture of a cosmopolitan constitution for world peace to the place of a mere condition for the complete cessation of statehood as such. The history of the state is to be perfected in its vanishing. *The Philosophical Letters* are as adamant in rejecting dogmatic religion, and in calling for humanity to find within itself what it previously sought outside.

In the fourth section of the System-Program, beauty is deemed the higher unity of truth and goodness, and esthetic acts, the highest acts of reason. Rosenzweig traces Schelling's fascination with art to one half of a two-part solution to Kant's problem of a common root for theoretical and practical philosophy. *The Critique of Judgment* hinted that the common root might be the natural organism and beauty. Schelling's famous claim for art, that it is the organon of philosophy, first appears in the *System of Transcendental Idealism* of 1800.[117] But Rosenzweig finds premonitions of this claim already in the *Philosophical Letters* of 1795, and in the treatises Schelling finished in the winter of 1796–1797: such claims as that esthetics is entrance to the whole of philosophy, and that the philosophical spirit can only be clarified in esthetics, which joins theoretical and practical philosophy together.

The last section of the System-Program calls for a new mythology of reason which, by sensualizing philosophy, and philosophizing myth, will unite philosophers and their non-philosophical neighbors together in one new religion. A similar call is sounded in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*,[118] but Rosenzweig dates Schelling's interest in myth to as far back as 1793, when he wrote *On Myths, Sayings, Philosophemes of the Ancient World*. Rosenzweig traces from there onward some reversals in Schelling's stance towards myth: first, that it is to be superseded by enlightenment; then, that it is to be preserved, but interpreted and communicated for the benefit of all; finally, that a new mythology will be demanded, but in a formulation that will baffle those unworthy of it and initiate those able to receive it into a new philosophy. Rosenzweig downplays the esotericism into which Schelling had grown by 1796, and which is so discordant with the optimistic universalism of the System-Program, and attributes it to Schelling's passing irritation over some negative reviews of his work.[119]

In the fifth section of his commentary, Rosenzweig considers the form of the manuscript and tries to date Schelling's original. Rosenzweig takes the manuscript for a fragment, the main body and conclusion of a piece whose preface is missing. It was possibly a letter, or an enclosure accompanying a letter, sent either to one or several friends. The Hegel copy sets a latest date of July 1796. Based on content analyses of *Of the I* and the *Philosophical Letters*, compared with the System-Program, and of a letter dated January 22, 1796, where Schelling describes himself undertaking the very project the System-Program proclaims, Rosenzweig concludes that Schelling wrote the program sometime between January and July 1796.

The sixth section reads as a defense of Schelling's philosophical integrity. Rosenzweig argues that the seemingly disparate stages of Schelling's thought, the nature philosophy, the esthetics, the mythology, form an organic whole that unfolded quite logically over time. In the System-Program, Schelling "die Mannigfaltigen Kraefte seines goettlichen Diebs-, Erfinders- und Virtuosenwesens gleichzeitig in einer kecken Tat offenbart" (reveals the manifold strengths of his divine thieving, inventing, and virtuosity, simultaneously in one bold act). By contrast, Rosenzweig also observes in this section that Schelling never did unite all the parts of his thought into a single system, much as he had hoped to, but "er ist sein Leben lang Praetendent geblieben, . . . das Wunderkind, das, alles versprechend, vieles haltend, doch nie zu der letzten resoluten Einfachheit des Mannes kommt, sondern in einem gewissen Sinne sein Leben lang bleibt, was es zu Anfang war: ein geniales Kind" (he remained his whole life a pretender, . . . the *Wunderkind*, who, promising all, bearing much, yet never comes to the last, resolved simplicity of the man, but in a certain sense remains his whole life long what he was from the start: a genial child).[120]

In the seventh section, Rosenzweig looks to Hegel, Hoelderlin and the early romantics for possible influences on Schelling. Here

the defense is of Schelling's originality. For by the dating Rosenzweig has assigned the System-Program, he takes Schelling to have preceded Hoelderlin and the early romantics in expressing ideas that were common to them all, e.g., that poetry completes philosophy and religion. Hegel, on the other hand, was preoccupied with different problems in 1796, largely historical ones, that led him almost unconsciously to the systematic projects that would occupy him in later years.

In the last section, Rosenzweig analyzes the idealist project to found a system. What distinguishes German idealism from its ancient Greek counterpart is that it sought the union of truth and reality, i.e., it sought to extract the content of reality out of the sheer form of truth. "Die Einheit des gesamten Seins nicht etwa bloss auszusprechen, sondern sie irgendwie durch Verknuepfung mit dem seienden zu bestimmen, ist seitdem Aufgabe aller Philosophie geblieben" (Not merely to express the unity of all being but somehow to determine it through a tie to becoming has since remained a task of all philosophy). Schelling's idealism was "aus dem Begriff der Absoluten Tat den ganzen philosophischen Kosmos entstehen zu lassen" (to let the whole philosophical cosmos originate out of the concept of the absolute act), which origination was understood as the counterpart in becoming to Spinoza's absolute being. At first, Schelling incorporated into his view of system that it could never be completed. The point of the system-ideal was to stimulate the act towards completing it which, only while it is still exercised, offers scope for the thinker's freedom. Rosenzweig understands this Fichtean idea to have been expressed in the first two words of the manuscript, "eine Ethik," which he takes, not for the end of a sentence whose beginning is lost, but for the title of the System-Program itself. Schelling had indeed understood himself to be formulating "ein Gegenstueck zu Spinozas Ethik" (a counterpart to Spinoza's ethics). But as Schelling grew away from Fichte, the idea of the completed system grew more compelling. Nearly a decade before the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Schelling "hat . . . den Begriff des 'Geistes,' der zugleich Subjekt und Objekt der Philosophie ist, gefasst" (conceived the concept of the "spirit" that is simultaneously subject and object of philosophy), and which, by proceeding out of itself in becoming, is able to return to itself in being. But it was Hegel, not Schelling, who, by building a dialectic around this concept, "jene Einheit des philosophischen Systems vollzogen hat" (perfected the unity of that philosophical system). Schelling himself would abandon idealism; but the task of coordinating being and becoming remained. For Rosenzweig, Schelling never diverted from

this self-understanding of his task. The irony is that he came closest to completing it in a System-Program that, by its very form, postponed completion.[121]

Rosenzweig delighted in the unexpected inversion. In the last year of his life, he read a report of a public discussion between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger. He was so struck by the play of inversion in this debate—between Cassirer, the seeming heir of Cohen's thought, and Heidegger, the true heir, who only seemed to defy what would be expected of one who held, as he did, Cohen's chair in philosophy at Marburg—that he titled his reflections on it, "Vertauschte Fronten,"[122] which might be translated, Reversed Positions. But then, if Fichte was right about philosophical preferences, that they are rooted in personality, Rosenzweig's affection for Schelling is only to be expected, for none of the idealists, and very few philosophers from any period, offer as much appearance of inverting or reversing positions as Schelling does. Indeed, there is so much appearance of reversal, between the competing claims to preeminence of nature, art, and mythology, or of thought, action, and being, that it can become a positive task, which Rosenzweig takes up, to show that the idea of a string of mutually contradicting Schellingian reversals must itself be reversed, that from start to finish of Schelling's philosophical life, a unified intellectual project unfolds. Schelling illustrates Rosenzweig's concept of love, according to which it acts by inviting the other's act. Schelling invites his philosophical descendants to systematize his thought in a way, for example, that Hegel does not. One accepts the perfect system or rejects it; one does not continue in its project. It is Schelling, not Hegel, who left a task that may be taken up again even, as Rosenzweig says, today.[123] If Heidegger was, at most, only a seeming reversal of Cohen, so is Rosenzweig, despite his anti-idealist protests, visibly continuing in Schelling's line.

Synopsis of The Star of Redemption

Relatively brief, critical overviews of *The Star of Redemption* are available in any number of secondary sources.[124] Of these, perhaps Norbert Samuelson's is most helpful for highlighting the systematic nature of the work. But the *Star* can also be read as a collection of essays or even short fragments on a broad range of

philosophical, religious, and esthetic topics. The poetic tone of the work, and its idiosyncratic use of language,[125] defy simple, summary presentation. The synopsis that follows introduces the basic structure of the book and some of its key structural terms.

The Star of Redemption was published in 1921. It is deeply imbedded in 150 years of German philosophical and literary history and is scarcely comprehensible apart from it. Its structural model, however, is visible even on the surface, through the part, book, and section titles. One commentator has suggested that the structural model is art,[126] but the *Star* could also be taken to be patterned after an organism, that repeats the whole of itself in its parts.

The work is divided into three parts, each of which is divided into three books. Each part begins with an introduction, and concludes with a transition to the next part. (The transition of the last part understands itself to be out of the book entirely and into life.) Part two, titled "The Course," is both the physical and conceptual center of the book. The other two parts are defined in terms of it. The course is the movement of meetings that, for Rosenzweig, constitute reality or the cosmos. What meets in reality are three conceptually separable, but in reality related, elements: God, human, and world. The first part of the *Star*, titled "The Elements," presents each of these three in their conceptual isolation. They must first be so presented before they can be understood to meet. But the separations are articulated purely for the sake of the cosmic meetings. So this first part, in its simultaneous priority and subordination to the second, is also titled "The Protocosmos."

The third part offers a vision of the three elements in their relationships of cosmic meeting. It does so in terms of the liturgical cycles of Judaism and Christianity, but also, climactically, in terms of a divine vantage point that surpasses these in a vision of the single, absolute truth. Human life is necessarily perspectival. So while we can momentarily glimpse the absolute truth, we cannot abidingly inhabit it. The point of the visions of the *Star*'s third part is to return us to the lived meetings of the second. Like the first part, the third also takes its name, Hypercosmos, from the second. Like Protocosmos, this name implies a simultaneous surpassing of and subordination to the cosmos.

The three books of part two are titled, in succession, Creation, Revelation, and Redemption. But these titles also expand, macrocosmically, out of part two into the whole of the book. The preliminary conceptualizations of part one constitute a creation; the meetings of part two, revelation; and the vision of part three, redemption. The

titles also contract, microcosmically, into the confines of single books, especially the first and second books of part three, which analyze the Jewish and Christian liturgical cycles in terms of creation, revelation, and redemption.

The definition of cosmic reality as movements of meeting takes its significance from a heritage of idealism that it rejects. Idealism has no place for meetings of separable elements, and understands reality after an ancient monistic model: the real is the one. Parts of the *Star* can only be understood against the backdrop of idealism. Idealism is not uniformly rejected. The forms of its conceptual movements have a place in the protocosmos, where the three elements are reasoned into three separate isolations; but also in the philosophy of art that accompanies the passage from part one to three. The esthetics of the *Star* is, perhaps, a prime example of a part of it that can be read in relative isolation from the rest.[127] In addition, the *Star* contains political theory, history of philosophy, philosophy of language, comparative religious analysis (these sections are very tendentious) and literary criticism (mostly of biblical passages but also, indirectly, of Goethe).

Rosenzweig understood the *Star* as a system of philosophy.[128] It has, however, been read as a testament of Rosenzweig's own Jewish religious life[129] as it evolved against the challenges of philosophy, art, and Christianity. Insofar as this reading pushes the *Star* into apologetics, Rosenzweig himself would probably reject it. The Jewish tone he admits the book to have follows, he implies, from his own inescapably Jewish perspective, and not from any apologetic stance towards Judaism.[130] But what shows just as naturally and unapologetically from behind Rosenzweig's work is a romantic sensibility, noticeably different from the Jewish in some respects, that was first self-consciously articulated in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. It is as an expression of romantic religious sensibility that we shall undertake to interpret the *Star*.

there, he would expect Schelling, as romantic, to linger longingly among them. But Schelling does not. The classical receives its due, as half the location of the epochally unfolded absolute, but no more. In a striking reversal of Baeckian expectation, the ethics of infinite striving is shifted out of the classical, where, for Schelling it did not significantly exist, and into the modern, where, allied with Christianity, it sets the modern mood. But the mood of infinite striving is, once again, in defiance of Baeckian romanticism, dark, unsettled, and irrational. Darkness is as much a presence in *The Philosophy of Art* as Baeck would predict. But its presence there owes not to adulation of feeling, but to the very ideal of the infinite that Baeck, following Kant, found enshrined in the free response to the infinitely commanding moral law. Baeck correctly notes a romantic discomfort with freedom. But he speaks too hastily for romanticism when, following Luther, he lets freedom transform to grace. No such metamorphosis occurs in Schelling. Modernity suffers honestly in its freedom, while waiting for a future indifference of necessity and freedom not yet epochally realized.

Art functions redemptively in the breach, at least for those few who can create and appreciate it. But art is much less self-enclosedly divorced from ethics than Baeck would predict. Schelling comments early on that "there is . . . no realm of study that is more social than that of art" (PA 10). The social nature of the particular genres of art comes to the fore in ancient comedy, which is art's most explicitly public moral act. If modern art is less explicitly social, that is because it, alongside all modernity, functions under such a heavy burden of individuality. In a sense, all modern art is comic[44] by virtue of inverting the definitive movement of modernity self-effacingly into the infinite; a triumph of inversion that the paradigmatic artwork of the modern age alludes to by its very title: *The Divine Comedy*. Dante's social act, like the social act of all modern artists, is to create an art-enabling mythology where one does not exist. These acts of creation function redemptively for those who are able to receive them until such time as the infinite, having returned to the finite, produces an epochal mythology once more.

CHAPTER 4

A Reading of *The Star of Redemption* through *The Philosophy of Art*

Introduction

In Rosenzweig's commentary on the "Oldest System-Program of German Idealism," the author of which he takes to be Schelling, he staunchly maintains that we may no longer name Schelling "the Proteus of Idealism."[1] This epithet fell to Schelling because of the seeming inconsistency of shapes his philosophy took over the course of his long life. Rosenzweig's point is that if Schelling really is the author of the "Oldest System-Program," then the lifelong unfolding of his three greatest tasks—to construct natural philosophy, philosophy of art, and mythology—is already anticipated there.[2] At the same time, the consensus among Rosenzweig scholars is that Schelling's late work, especially *Ages of the World*, profoundly influenced *The Star of Redemption*.[3] Rosenzweig himself asserts that his own *Star* need never have been written, except perhaps for a Jewish audience, if *Ages of the World*, which is only a fragment of a projected but never completed whole, had been finished,[4] and he additionally notes in the *Star* itself that "we are moving along the lines of the later philosophy of Schelling" (SR 18). But if Rosenzweig's own Schelling scholarship is correct, and the later Schelling is of a piece with the earlier, then traces of early Schelling works, like *The Philosophy of Art*, should show as well in *The Star of Redemption*.

If by Rosenzweig's own admission, *The Star of Redemption* descends most directly from the late Schelling, *Ages of the World* would surely provide the sharper lens for reading Rosenzweig's work. But part of what defines the late Schelling is the extent to which he had left behind the interconnected thought-worlds of romanticism and idealism; so that his late work, applied interpretively to the *Star*, will not directly uncover Rosenzweig's romantic leanings. Even so, of Schelling's early work, *The Philosophy of Art* is hardly the most distinguished. It lacks the rigorously reasoned development of the slightly earlier *System of Transcendental Idealism*, and its critiques of individual genres and works of art owe too much to the late eighteenth century, especially the Schlegels, to translate persuasively or engagingly into the late twentieth. For all that, in the philosophically and religiously climactic role the work assigns to art, it is undeniably romantic, and so may serve the romantic reading of the *Star*, and its forays into art criticism offer more scope than the *System of Transcendental Idealism* does, for interpreting the several pages of attention Rosenzweig lavishes on the theory of art, music, and poetry.

Both *The Philosophy of Art* and *The Star of Redemption* are systematic works. Neither builds linearly, on a progression of static syllogisms, but organically, on analogical movements and perceived correspondences between seemingly disparate things. It is tempting to relate the titles of the works analogously. Both titles are constructs of two nouns, the first in the nominative case, the second in the genitive, as appears more obviously in the German original. The temptation is to draw analogies between philosophy and the star, and between art and redemption. To succumb to temptation is not, in this case, any grave error. Art does function redemptively for Schelling. And the star does work for Rosenzweig somewhat the way philosophy does for Schelling. Rosenzweig presents the completed star as a figure he has "geometrically constructed" (SR 256). And construction is virtually synonomous with Schellingian philosophy. Philosophy, for Schelling, presents within its bounds the whole of the universe, as the star, for Rosenzweig, does the whole of reality. The star is of course a symbol, as Rosenzweig explicitly calls at least its inverted half (SR 256). It is even symbolic in Schelling's sense, for once the points on which it is built are understood, it shows itself as just the movement of meetings that Rosenzweig has been discussing all along. Further, Schelling's philosophy and Rosenzweig's star are both mirrors in which the human sees itself, in the first case indifferently identified with God, and in the second, related to God across a genuine difference.

It is across the difference between difference and indifference that the analogy breaks down. The inverted triangle within Rosenzweig's star symbolizes reality, which is simply the relations of creation, revelation, and redemption. The upright triangle, by contrast, builds on the points of the prereal, protocosmic elements, which can only be called ideal in a sense that, contra Schelling, is definitively distinguished from the real. The star is not an indifference of real and ideal, which is precisely what the climactic nodes of Schellingian construction are, but, in Rosenzweig's own vocabulary, a configuration. A configuration is an oriented joining of differentiable figures. The differentiable figures within the star of redemption are the upright triangle of "ideality" and the inverted triangle of reality. The orientation of the figure is supplied by God who, stationed at the top, dominates.

If the concept of indifference is analogously represented in *The Star of Redemption*, it is by the relation between relation and difference. Difference and relation are logical consequences of the shattered idealist All. Rosenzweig is antimonistic because he believes in the fundamental factuality of three, not one. The three factualities of God, human, and world are both different and, in reality, related. In *Bruno*, Schelling took the highest indifference to efface the distinction between difference and indifference.[5] Rosenzweig might respond that the highest relation relates difference and relation. Perhaps this relation even approaches indifference. Difference without relation closes in on itself and can no longer know itself as different from an other. Relation without difference loses the poles across which it is strung, and collapses into a point or, at best, a circle, precisely the shape idealism takes in the end. Relation can only be between differences, and differences are not knowable as such apart from relation.

If Schellingian indifference plays itself out in a host of analogies, relation in Rosenzweig assumes as many shapes as there are pairs of poles to connect. Such poles occur as the pairs of active and passive within each of the three protocosmic elements; as the emerged halves of each of the elements, each partnered with one of the other emerged halves; and as Judaism and Christianity, which only together figure the truth that God knows. These three sets of relations are represented structurally by the three parts of Rosenzweig's book. Schelling's book, too, breaks into parts: the abstract construction of art in general, and the specific constructions of the individual arts. The difference between three parts and two is significant. The protocosmic first part of the *Star*, philosophy's domain, corresponds to Schelling's construction of art in general. The application of philosophical construction to specific contents occurs in both the third part of the *Star*, and the second of *The Philosophy of Art*. For Judaism and Christianity function for Rosenzweig like

artworks do for Schelling, as both concretions of construction and locations of redemption. But Rosenzweig's intervening second part has no analog in *The Philosophy of Art*. That was, of course, the book of experience, a concept that goes unconstructed in Schelling's work. For Rosenzweig, philosophy is at least formally limited to the first part of the *Star*. That philosophy, unlike Schelling's, does not offer up an intuition of the real God, but only a concept of God that, on its own, fails to reach reality. Rosenzweigian philosophy is, as it stands, empty of reality, not indifferent with it.

Where reality occurs in the *Star*, philosophy has ended and theology begun; or better, the two are wedded as ground to grounded. Theology for Schelling is Christian allegory. It is the body of teaching that follows the effacement of finitude in infinity, which is the definitive Christian movement. Theology, for Rosenzweig, comes much closer to playing the role that philosophy does for Schelling: it is the understanding of experience as such, that is later, in the third part of the book, formed to the specific contents of Judaism and Christianity, just as philosophy, for Schelling, is the understanding of the universe as such that is, throughout *The Philosophy of Art*, formed to the specifics of art. If Schelling offers a philosophical religion that serves to elucidate genres and works of art, then Rosenzweig offers a theological "religion" that serves to elucidate Judaism and Christianity. The quotes around religion are indispensable: Schellingian philosophy offers a path to God through sheer ideas as they occur in nature, independently of mythology and art, and so functions as a religion, but Rosenzweigian theology, like Schellingian mythology, offers no path to God apart from what Schelling might call its "objective manifestation" in Judaism and Christianity. Here, the analogy between art and redemption breaks down. It is not just art, but philosophy also that functions redemptively within Schelling's *The Philosophy of Art*.

But Rosenzweigian redemption, for its part, also refuses confinement to analogy with Schellingian art. Redemption in one of its expressions is experiential and so belongs to the real world of the second part of the *Star*. Schellingian art, as the real potence of indifference within the ideal might, on the basis of a shared orientation towards reality, join up with this redemption in analogy. But then redemption has another, nonexperiential meaning for Rosenzweig. And in this meaning, redemption, in utter defiance of all idealist aspirations, refuses to be understood except, in analogy with the protocosmic elements themselves, as a darkness to all human noetic efforts.

So, much as the respective titles of Schelling's and Rosenzweig's books tempt us to analogize, we would risk what Rosenzweig reproves the fanatic for doing, namely succumbing to the temptation of correlating the as yet uncorrelatable. What Schelling's title may safely do is guide an interpretation of Rosenzweig's star: of first the upright triangle, then the inverted one, and finally the two configured together. These three figures correspond to parts one, two, and three of the *Star* respectively. Rosenzweig himself shows us this, in case we could not easily tell, by illustrating the title page of part one with an upright triangle, the title page of part two with an inverted one, and the title page of part three with the configured star—an unwitting parody, perhaps, of Schellingian architecture, which builds buildings out of newly and freely purposed natural forms, if not books out of geometric ones.

Schelling's title joins two terms, philosophy and art. Though the connective is the so intimate "of" of the genitive, ambiguously assigning both philosophy to art, as art's philosophy, and art to philosophy, as philosophy's art, the very sober Schelling divides the two so sharply as to suggest their intimacy is a paradox. Philosophy's objects are ideas, and art's are sensual realities. If we stop the movement of indifference short of the unity into which it would propel these two, and which would take us outside the relationality of the *Star*, then we would have two useful lenses through which to examine each part of *The Star of Redemption*. These lenses will focus the *Star* quite differently from the way Baeck's five-faceted romanticism did. Baeckian romantic art was the inversive alternative to religious authoritarianism. Read through "Romantic Religion," the *Star* shows the role of art on the Christian's eternal way. But now the *Star*'s esthetics, read through *The Philosophy of Art*, will appear in intimate relation with philosophy, a connection that Baeck's essay could not uncover. Schelling will both fine-tune what Baeck could teach us about Rosenzweig's understanding of art, and educate us, as Baeck could not, in the significance to the *Star* of philosophy.

Let us then read the *Star* through the concepts of philosophy and art, successively applied to each part of the work. We will read Rosenzweig's use of these concepts, and the additional concepts they subsume, against the backdrop of Schelling's use of them in *The Philosophy of Art*. Our concern is not to suggest, much less demonstrate, any historical influence of the one work on the other, but much more, in the spirit of Schellingian magic or Rosenzweigian miracle, to see to what extent the earlier work may serve as elucidating ground to the later.

Philosophy and the Protocosmos

The introductory first page of the first part of the *Star* is superscripted, "In philosophos!", literally: To the philosopher! "Down with Philosophy,"[6] better captures the intent, or, in the spirit of a call to arms: Into Philosophy! The translations are complementary: one must enter into philosophy if one wants to pull it down. Rosenzweig appears to move more deeply into philosophy in the *Star*'s first part than in either of the other two. The third part will show how Christianity and Judaism figure the reality of revelation. But that part cannot appear until the pretensions of idealism to, itself, reveal are exposed in all their errancy; hence, to the extent that philosophy is idealism, "down with it!"

Rosenzweig does identify philosophy with idealism (SR 4). But he also deems the postidealist thinkers, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, philosophers. In Neitzsche, the philosopher does not vanish into his thoughts, idealistically, but conversely, the thoughts vanish into the life of the philosopher (SR 9). Nietzsche continues an individualizing "philosophical period" that began with Schopenhauer, and "whose end has not yet arrived" (SR 8). Rosenzweig implicitly assigns himself and his own thinking to this still incompleted period, and to that extent he is as much constructing a new philosophy as deconstructing an old one.

Between idealism and Rosenzweig, Schelling might fall in any of several places. In light of what, judging from his commentary on "The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism," was Rosenzweig's own intimate knowledge of the early Schelling, it is striking that idealism is represented in the *Star*'s first part chiefly by Hegel. Schelling appears more often as either the romantic philosopher of nature (SR 45), or as the postidealist nonrationalist (SR 12) who, like Rosenzweig himself, sought a way of understanding God's existence prior to his being (SR 18). The implication is that the *Star* is not indebted to the idealist Schelling, the author of *The Philosophy of Art*, for its understanding of either idealism or the successor philosophy of the new philosophical period. And yet already ideas from *The Philosophy of Art* may be visible from behind Rosenzweig's words. Schelling was much exercised in his late work, *Ages of the World*, by a sense in which a God eternally past antecedently chose his own being or nature. But already the much earlier *The Philosophy of Art* sought to construct God's being as the product of an antecedent act of divine self-division. And we have seen what large a

role unresolved irrationality plays in *The Philosophy of Art*'s understanding of modernity. The late Schelling's post-rationalist thinking is incipient in the irresolutions of the modern.

On the other hand, *The Philosophy of Art* does allow the tension between thought and being to resolve, idealistically, in the artwork. And all such resolutions, esthetic or otherwise, are precisely the object of Rosenzweig's deconstructive work in the first part of the *Star*. When Rosenzweig insists about the "nonidentity of being and reasoning" that "it cannot be harmonized by a third party which is neither being nor reasoning" (SR 12) he could, at least theoretically, have had indifference in mind. So, contrary to what Rosenzweig's explicit references to Schelling might suggest, *The Philosophy of Art* may serve to clarify both the idealism Rosenzweig contests in the first part of the *Star*, and the new philosophy he begins to construct there.

What, for Rosenzweig, is the problem with idealism? It is that it is a "compassionate lie" (SR 5). It is a lie because there is no warrant for the passage idealism makes from self-conscious reason to the world. When reason takes itself for object, it moves in just the opposite direction of world-generation—it takes itself outside the world (SR 13). The idealist presupposition is that reason, in itself, is pure form. So, if reason becomes an object to itself, or content, then it must project itself outside itself, i.e., generate a world. But, says Rosenzweig, reason need not be taken to be pure form. If reason admits a content of its own, then the appearance of a content in it need not be world-generating. That content is precisely itself. Reason that doubles as subject and object simply wraps around itself (SR 12–13).

Of course, idealism's lie is that reason's self-projections generate the whole of the world. How is so abstract a lie compassionate?; because it rationalizes what to human beings is the most fearsome component of the world, namely death. Idealism comprehends death. Death is the passing of separate selves. But there are no separate selves in monistic idealism. So there is no death.

Schelling's *Bruno* could stand in for idealism here more successfully than *The Philosophy of Art* can. For *Bruno* examines at much greater length how the world unfolds out of self-conscious consciousness.[7] But the absolute self-affirmation, with which *The Philosophy of Art* begins, does also generate a world, and so stands, as well, under Rosenzweig's condemnation. Beautifully personified in the opening paragraphs of the *Star*, idealism-identified philosophy stands with "index finger outstretched" while "weaving the blue mist of its idea of the All" around the human being, trembling in terror of death, at its

feet (SR 3–4). The image sardonically inverts Boethius' much older picture of the savior philosophy, who enters the *Consolation of Philosophy*, also at the start, and in response to thoughts of death.[8] Boethian philosophy is honestly compassionate; Rosenzweig's, only falsely so. It is striking how alluringly philosophy has been portrayed by its informed detractors. Perhaps Rosenzweig's predecessor in this is the medieval Jewish philosopher, Judah Halevi, whose poems he translated, and whose book, *HaKuzari*, also opens with a beautifully presented, but soon to be rejected, account of philosophical salvation. Certainly his predecessor here is not the early Schelling, for whom philosophy "encompasses everything" (PA 13).

The personification of philosophy as a compassionate liar suggests that one who internalizes its claims deceives himself. And here the writer who shows through Rosenzweig's words is Kant, who pondered both theoretical reason's drivenness to self-deception, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,[9] and, in the more practically minded *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, the "innate guilt" of humans who take their evil dispositions self-deceivingly for good.[10] It was Kierkegaard who, building on the challenge sin posed to Kantian ethics, let sin disrupt ethics and dislodge it from its premier place among the philosophical sciences.[11] And it is in these footsteps that Rosenzweig follows when he lets death disrupt philosophy itself.

But death does not simply disrupt the old philosophy—it begins the new. For *The Philosophy of Art*, death was the completion that, joined to life, yields indifference in sculpture. In the protocosmic *Star*, death is the first among irrationalities. Joined to nothing but itself, death first stimulates honest thought about the human. The limitation of death to one among several irrationalities is significant. Idealism's lie begins back further than its denial of irrationality. It begins in the presumption to have only one irrationality to lie about, or at least only one at a time. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* generates an abundance of discrepancies between reason and being, but they all follow on the single one, presented at the start, between "this" and its actual object. Hegel's originary irrationality, which ignites the dialectical flame, is epistemological. This is one of Rosenzweig's irrationalities too. We have already begun to consider it. It is the world that remains when reason, taking itself for object, abstracts itself out of the world. Such a world is not necessarily bereft of reason. But the reason that remains to it cannot be generatively active. For reason's activity is focused on its world-removed self. Death is an entirely different kind of irrationality. The humanly significant death is what remains when all subsuming universals, typified by the moral commands of practical reason, are abstracted out of human life. There is a third irrationality, too. Kant unwittingly indicated it with his "ideal of reason," which sought, through a God it mistakenly took for objectively necessary, an objective guarantee that the natural world would finally harmonize with moral humanity. Idealism prematurely harmonizes the two by collapsing the present world into God. So the third irrationality is what remains of God when all worldliness is extracted out of him.

In "The New Thinking," Rosenzweig suggests that his new philosophy builds on the ending of the old.[12] The three "irrational objects" (SR 19)—God, human, world—are abstracted precisely out of the old idealism, and are barely comprehensible apart from it. The protocosmic world denies epistemometaphysical idealism; the protocosmic human denies moral idealism; and the protocosmic God, religious idealism. Except for esthetics, which we consider separately, Rosenzweig's denials span the breadth of what, "nach geheiligtem Brauche"[13] (according to hallowed custom), make up a system of philosophy.

Certainly *The Philosophy of Art*'s identification of God with the universe illustrates just the sort of religious idealism Rosenzweig rejects. Rosenzweig thanks Kant for "showing the way" to the multiplicity of irrationalities (SR 21), as though the rejection of idealism must bypass the idealists themselves for its inspiration. But *The Philosophy of Art* already moves to undermine idealism by dividing ancient and modern up across a real/ideal divide. It is especially moral idealism that suffers by this break. Ancient ethics positively builds on the irrational, on the acceptance of undeserved affliction. And in what amounts to a critique of Kantian practical reason, Schelling shows modern ethics suspended over a chasm between finite and infinite it can never livingly bridge. But then, the modern is precisely the age of the irrational, ever tempted by its own demise in the infinite, which Schelling might well call with Rosenzweig "the gruesome capacity for suicide" (SR 4) and which painfully inverts antiquity's already painful enough inability to grant its heroes the peace of death (SR 79).

But the world, too, is split in two by the divide between ancient and modern. Antiquity's world is an infinite-surpassing nature, and modernity's, a finite-subsuming history. Even God is, for the one age, gods, and for the other, Christ. Schelling, as we saw, refused to construct the third age that would heal these divisions, and left us no consolation but art. Has not *The Philosophy of Art*, too, shown the way to a thinking that takes multiplicity seriously?

But the irrationalities of *The Philosophy of Art* are, like Kant's, endpoints, not origins, of reasoning. Rosenzweig thanks Hermann Cohen for starting to philosophize anew from the point of the "particular Naught" (SR 21). Cohen, idealist that Rosenzweig concedes he was, wanted by his logic of origins to deduce reality from nothing[14]; this is far from Rosenzweig's own project and he senses the confusion that might result from allowing such traditional phrases as "negative theology" to name his reasoning from the particular nothing of God. Negative theology culminates mystically in the vision of an absolutely predicateless God. By contrast, what Rosenzweig calls his metaphysical God is a pure conceptual abstraction, without reality. There is no living relation with it at all, mystical or otherwise. For the purposes of the protocosmos, the metaphysical God is nothing more than "ein methodischer Hilfsbegriff"[15] (a methodological helping-concept).

If reasoning is to proceed from a multiplicity of nothings, then reasoning, too, is multiple, for "he who denies the totality of being, as we do, thus denies the unity of reasoning" (SR 12). Three originary nothings ask for three different reasonings. Rosenzweig coins names for each of the reasonings, based on what they proceed without. Metaethics reasons about the human prior to its ethical nature; metalogic, about the world, prior to its logical nature; metaphysics, about God, prior to his having any nature at all. Together, these reasonings constitute the new philosophy of the first part of the *Star*.

In "The New Thinking," Rosenzweig calls the *Star* a system of philosophy.[16] Obviously, philosophy here cannot mean idealism. What it does mean comes into clearer focus when, in the same essay, he refers to the difficult constructive parts of the three books of the first volume,[17] or, within the body of the *Star* itself, to the "structured" meta-logic world (SR 53), which he has been hypothetically "constructing" by way of grounding our belief in the real world (SR 42). Construction here is opposed to creation, and constructions, to actual beliefs we hold. The connotation within construction of opposition to the actual asks to be paralleled with the connotation of potentiality within Schelling's construction of potences.

In her early commentary on Rosenzweig's *Star*, Elsa Rachel-Freund already noted the similarities between Rosenzweig's protocosmic elements and the potences of Schelling's late work, *The Ages of the World*.[18] Those later potences precede any actual being that they elucidate, but do not rationally necessitate it. The potences of *The Philosophy of Art* are more like mirroring shadows of the movements that cast them. They do not so much elucidate reality as ensure the ultimate identity of real and ideal. Rosenzweig does not put his protocosmic elements to any such purpose. But his constructions of them do bear several formal resemblances to these early Schellingian potences.

The protocosmic reasonings and the Schellingian potences are both movements in consciousness. Further, they are movements comprising dual components of finite and infinite, passive and active, content and form, necessary and free. Finally, they both yield abstractions that are matched to relatively concrete terms from ordinary language. The principal difference occurs at the concluding stage of the movements: Schelling's culminate in indifference, Rosenzweig's in relation. We have already once examined protocosmic reasoning for its role in inversion. Let us now consider it against the backdrop of the potences in *The Philosophy of Art*.

For Schelling who, in Rosenzweig's terms, grants only one element, namely God, a sequence of potences is determined within the absolute act of self-affirmation. There is first the affirmed, then the affirming, and finally their indifference. What corresponds in protocosmic reasoning to the affirmed potence is passive essence, the product of an affirming movement; what corresponds to the affirming potence is active predicate, which negatingly deflects from the essence all that it is not. The protocosmic negating movement depends on, though not by way of issuing from, a prior affirmation, just as the affirmed potence precedes the affirming in Schelling's system.

Rosenzweig's multiplicity of elements complexly reconfigure the dual determinations that are set in simple analogies with Schelling's affirming and affirmed—infinite and finite, form and content, free and necessary—but do not introduce any fundamentally new dualities. The single finite and infinite potences of God multiply into two divine infinities, two human finitudes, and one each of worldly infinity and finitude. The first of each pair is a passive essence: divine fate, human character, worldly kind, all of which are necessities; and the second is an actively negating movement: divine power, human will, worldly particular, all of which are free.

The origins of protocosmic reasoning in a triad of nothings reallocate as well the Schellingian form and content. Form and content have fairly simple applications in Schelling's construction. Forms are movements in consciousness between finite and infinite that yield the various contents—nature, knowledge, art—that Schelling discusses. Form originates in the absolute self-affirmation, where a division between affirmed and affirming is resolved in unity. In protocosmic reasoning, form originates in nothing. There is a logical

connection between the originary nothings and form. For a nothing cannot be fruitfully affirmed, but only left (SR 26). One can leave it in two ways: by affirming its negation, or by negating it directly (SR 21). These movements are the protocosmic forms. But one cannot begin by directly negating a nothing. For what results is a chaotic affirmation of everything, which is scarcely an improvement over affirming nothing. So the beginning must be to affirm the negation of the nothing. Such a movement "circumscribes as inner limit the infinity of all that is not Naught" (SR 27). Rosenzweig symbolizes this form by the letter x. Now it is possible to negate the originary nothing. For the non-nothing just affirmed provides a chaos-conquering direction in which the negating action can move. What is negated is everything that is not the non-nothing just affirmed. Rosenzweig symbolizes this form with the letter y. The equation $y=x$, read from left to right, symbolizes the defining action the negating form performs on what the affirming form has affirmed.

Now the values of universal and particular, or infinite and finite, symbolized by A and B respectively, come to fill these variables, and supply content to the purely formal $y=x$. For Schelling, and idealism in general, the affirming form is always infinite, and the affirmed form finite. For a presupposition of idealism is that what is affirmed is bounded, and that whatever affirms surpasses bounds (for otherwise it cannot encompass the affirmed, so as to affirm it). So the definitive equation of idealism is $A=B$, which shows an infinite negating activity affirming a passive finitude, precisely what happens in the absolute act of self-affirmation. A consequence of the multiplication of elements is that form and content now interact in more complex ways. Rosenzweig emphatically excludes the idealist equation $A=B$ from the protocosmos, but he admits the other three possible distributions of contentful A's and B's within the formal $y=x$, namely $A=A$, $B=B$, and $B=A$. These equations, resulting from interpenetrations of form and content, symbolize God, human, and world respectively.

The idealist $A=B$ ultimately becomes $A=A$, for the finite, having emerged from the infinite, is transposed back into it. So $A=A$ might symbolize the Schellingian equation of God with nature, or with the artwork, since both nature and art are absolute particulars that repeat the divine indifference. The equals sign in a Schellingian $A=A$ would stand for indifference. In Rosenzweig's protocosmos, the equals sign stands for a relation between two contentful forms that are equally grounded in the same nothing. Rosenzweig's emphatic denial that either contentful form emerges out of the other (SR 28) is

a direct rejection of Hegelian idealism, which phenomenologically traces the dialectical transposition of forms into contents and back into new forms. The grounding of the equated A's and B's in a shared nothing leaves their emerged equality free to take the form of a genuine relation, i.e., the spanning of a division between two separables. And that is just the form they take.

But Rosenzweigian relation, having pointedly distinguished itself from idealist identity, now begins to articulate itself in familiar, idealist terms. The old vanishing movement of idealism is performed once again, only now under the cover of differential calculus. Calculus is the perfect language for protocosmic reasoning because, as Hermann Cohen showed, it offers passage from nothing to something. The concept of the differential spans the divide between nothing and something. It is "the dimension as this loses itself in the immeasurable" and the "infinitesimal [with] all the characteristics of finite magnitude with the sole exception of finite magnitude itself" (SR 20). The differential is a finite nothing that indicates something, rather like a Schellingian potence that emptily occupies a just vacated space. The difference between the potences, and the dimension just about to lose itself in the immeasurable, is that the first merely traces what was, while the second still is. It is as though potency and differential are two different points on the same road of vanishing. The potency occurs after the endpoint of the vanishing, and the differential at any point before. Rosenzweig himself suggests this image when he adjures us to "capture" the negating form "short of the end of the movement" it undergoes (SR 31). Schelling and Rosenzweig are watching the same movement, only Rosenzweig stops it sooner. To some extent, Asian spirituality holds the place of idealism in the protocosmos. The idealists were familiar with the Asian religions which, in "The New Thinking" Rosenzweig dismissively dubs "the darlings of the moderns,"[19] and which in some points their idealism resembles. Within the protocosmos, Rosenzweig locates the Asian religions in the same place idealism would hold there, at the end of the vanishing. But, for Rosenzweig, there is no reason to privilege that place. The unvanishing (*Unvergehendes*) remains just where it was captured.[20]

What remains unvanished within the protocosmos are the contentful products of each component of the protocosmic reasonings. God's essence remains distinguishable from his capricious freedom, the human character from human will, worldly kind from worldly particular. But though the endpoints of the two poles of each of the protocosmic reasonings do not vanish into the other, they do

effectively alter each other in reciprocal relation. Each begins to resemble the other, to such a degree that the space between them takes on a single, determinate character. The relations that hover between their so anti-idealistically separable poles begin to show some familiar Schellingian shapes.

This very manner of presenting a determination recalls Schellingian construction, which understood all determination as reproduction of relations between the points of absolute self-affirmation. But the mutual borrowings between the contentful parts of each pair of protocosmic forms is another instance of inversion. For the two forms, if not always the two contents, that constitute each protocosmic element are opposed, as negative to positive, or active to passive. The relations between these active and passive poles are passive activities, or active passivities that are, furthermore, nameable. The passive activity of God is his vitality; of the human, his defiance; of the world, its individuals.

Schelling too constructed new contents out of inversive relations between old forms. Nature was the absolute self-affirmation's affirmed component, which inversely subsumed its own affirming opposite as light. The concept of vitality was not, to be sure, central to *The Philosophy of Art*. Schelling does construct the idea of life as "the joining of something infinite in itself with something finite" (PA 197), which would enliven all indifferent things, including God himself. It is, perhaps, striking that Schelling and Rosenzweig take liveliness for a composite of opposites of finite with infinite, or active with passive, suggesting a common insight between them that true vitality comes from a directed, and so circumscribed, freedom. But any tracing to Schelling of the importance of vitality to Rosenzweig, would have to pass through Schelling's late work.[21]

The defiance of the human has more palpable precedent in *The Philosophy of Art*'s figure of Prometheus. Rosenzweig constructs human defiance as willed finitude. Finitude is the essence of human being; human freedom that affirms it defies the very conditions of finitude, i.e., powers greater than its own, chiefly death. Death is not the power greater than Prometheus; Zeus is. But Prometheus, also, affirms finitude when, in defiance of Zeus, he affirms human beings. Schelling himself asserts that Prometheus represents "the whole human race" (PA 55)—an anticipation of Rosenzweig's own defiance-defined humanity.

But the most extended anticipation within *The Philosophy of Art* of a protocosmic relation pertains to the protocosmic world. For here, Rosenzweig stops the formal movement of negating in three

places before it expires in the universals of the world, namely at the point of the particular, the individual, and the category. The particular is the negating emergence from the nothing of the world. Its negativity is in its blind, chaotic directionlessness. It is only by moving towards the worldly essence of universals that it acquires definition. It is just this movement of the particular towards the universal (not from it, as in idealism) that substantiates the worldly equation, read from left to right, of $B=A$. Contra idealism, reason, symbolized in the equation by A, can only construct a world because the particulars it receives are already ensouled (SR 50).

Schelling and Rosenzweig employ the particular (*das Besondere*) to precisely opposite effect. Here they address each other over the divide of idealism. For Schelling's particular is an indifference, and these do not occur in Rosenzweig's system; and Rosenzweig's particular arises out of the world's nothing, which does not occur in Schelling's. But as Schelling's particular descends out of indifference, and as Rosenzweig's rises to receive "the criteria of the universal on its body" (SR 48), the two meet in the concept of the individual (*das Individuum*). In both systems, the individual incorporates the universal, but incompletely; in Rosenzweig's, as a means to self-awareness merely, when it wakens to its own difference from the universal; in Schelling's, by failing to unite indifferently with the universal. The two individuals reflect each other across the idealist divide. Rosenzweig's individual, gazing into Schelling's system, finds himself reflected in the modern artist, that sentimentalist who is so acutely self-aware. But Schelling's individual is reflected in the whole of Rosenzweig's anti-idealist program, whose primal threesome of individual elements has shattered ("zerschlagen"[22]) the indifferent All of idealism.

In "The New Thinking," Rosenzweig responds to what he clearly sensed were difficulties in the protocosmic reasoning. He advises the reader of the *Star*'s first part to let these pass for now; the real significance of the protocosmic elements does not appear until the end of the book, anyway, or, at the earliest, at the close of the book's first part.[23] That short section, entitled "Transition," prepares the way for the protocosmic deductions to unfold their contents into the wider world of reality. What will define that world are relations that are no longer self-enclosed, but that now extend between what were hitherto the separate elemental individuals. The power of that unfolding, the miraculous nature that Rosenzweig will want to claim for it, depends in part on the airtightness of the self-enclosures that precede. And now we can see that, to this end, Rosenzweig has applied

a duo of concepts that has already once been aired in *The Philosophy of Art*, namely the self-enclosed and the presupposed.

Idealism had presumed to presuppose nothing. But only the presupposition of thought's identity with being allows passage from self-conscious reason to being. And once that presupposition is exposed, the passage is blocked. If there must be presuppositions, says the new philosophy, then let them be nothings, for out of several nothings something can arise. But by the end of the protocosmic reasonings, it is clear that the nothings serve less to generate our concepts of God, human, and world, than to enclose the concepts of them we already have in on themselves. It is only when the reader takes the protocosmic reasonings for presuppositionless demonstrations, presuming, like idealism, to conjure up contents out of the contentless, that he agonizes over the steps on the way. Let it be granted from the start that something "slumbers in the lap" of the nothing (SR 20), as Rosenzweig concedes when he admits that in reasoning to the completed three elements he was conducted by the belief in their factuality (SR 88), and we do no more than finish where we began. But that is just the point of the seeming reasonings—to separately encircle each of our concepts of God, human, and the world.

Of course, Schelling's system is rife with presuppositions that contain conclusions. The originary act of self-affirmation enfolds the entire universe within itself. But does anything enfold that originary act? With this question, which *The Philosophy of Art* does not ask, we draw nearer the nothings that Rosenzweig presupposes. The *System of Transcendental Idealism* does ask it, in its concluding pages on art, and responds, somewhat hermetically that, prior to that self-divisive act, there is nothing to query.[24] Could this be the early Schelling's anticipation of what Rosenzweig would say about his own nothings, that they are unlocatable unnameables, to be positioned, if anywhere at all, "before every beginning" (SR 26)?

The Philosophy of Art lays out two oppositionally identical self-enclosed worlds of real and ideal. But within the self-enclosures, it allows for fractures that take the form of contingency and incompletion. Rosenzweig systematizes fracture in the form of the three elements, and then encloses each off perfectly within itself. Now it is not just God who is enclosed within his own self-affirmation (as in Schelling), but the world, too, is "inspired within its own spirit" (SR 61), and the human, unable to register anything other to itself (SR 82). Unlike the Schellingian particular within the absolute, the three elements are separate from and oblivious to each other. And

yet they mimic the identity that serves as the only relation between Schellingian particular and absolute. For each element claims for itself the definitive characteristic of the other two: human and world claim the divine vitality; human and God, worldly individuality; and God and world, the defiant selfdom of the human (SR 84). The protocosmos begins to resemble a Schellingian comedy. Fractured as it is, its sporting of idealist traits reads like parody. But then, it was Baeck who proposed a superscription for the *Star* of "the poetry which remains."[25] And all modern art is essentially comic.

Art and the Protocosmos

It might surprise first-time readers of Rosenzweig that he discusses art at all; what need of esthetics to a star of redemption? Idealist philosophy blocks a proper figuring of redemption, and so it, as pretender to an office it cannot hold, must be addressed at the start. If art must be addressed as well, the reason owes in part to Schelling. For it was *The Philosophy of Art*, among other works, that helped forge philosophy's link to art and a series of links, constituting a tradition of art-oriented philosophizing, that continues up until today. Apart from that, the tradition is very old, and precedes Schelling. The ideas of beauty and truth have been vying, now amicably, now quarrelsomely, for intellectual preeminence ever since Plato. Rosenzweig was drawn to the arts. His mother, reports Glatzer, "had a lively enthusiasm for art, for music, and poetry,"[26] and, towards the end of his life, Rosenzweig himself was writing reviews of musical recordings.[27]

Art first enters the German edition of the *Star* under the heading, "Aesthetische Grundbegriffe: Aussere Form." The succeeding sections, subtitled "Innere Form" and "Gehalt" complete the protocosmic esthetics, which copies *The Philosophy of Art*'s presentation first of art's general form, then its general content. Curiously, and no doubt due to sheer proofreading error, the first section, on outer form, goes untitled in Notre Dame Press' English version, though a blank space holds the place of the title. Art enters this English version surreptitiously and unannounced. It is not obvious that this is not, in any case, what Rosenzweig might have preferred, at least if we are to take seriously his resistance to naming the most recessed

of presuppositions. For this short, highly abstract section on art's outer form is the most outwardly removed from the discussions it helps ground, in the book's next part, on the living arts. But Rosenzweig's express publishing wishes were not always honored.[28]

Outer form may be the outer limit of realized art's presuppositions, but it stands face to face with Schelling and reflects his views precisely. Here, at art's first entry, is the first statement of its link with religion. For Rosenzweig shares Schelling's view that art is essentially mythic. And if mythology was the content of Schellingian art, it is, for Rosenzweig, the protocosmic content of God. That God was a vital self-enclosure, divorced from world and human. But this is just what the ancient Greek gods were: "a life purely unto itself" (SR 34). The gods of ancient Greece live the construction that emerges out of the divine nothing. They personify the suspensions between caprice and necessity that constitute vitality. Because both the mythic and protocosmic god are self-containedly vital, neither is subject to death (SR 34). Schelling's gods too had self-contained vitality. As absolutes in limitation, each was an unrestricted whole among wholes, living out its "particular and free life" (PA 37). They were alive precisely because they were oppositionally absolute and limited, sustaining a self-enclosed tension of contraries. Despite its demise in the protocosmic reasoning, the old Schellingian absolute opposition echoes in the connection Rosenzweig also draws between contradiction and self-enclosure: the enlivened contradictoriness of the gods is a function of their self-enclosure.

But on one crucial point, Rosenzweig differs from Schelling: mythology is not the content of art, but a contributing factor to its form. Forms are movements, and the movement myth performs on art's behalf is precisely to conceal from view all that is not art. Such a formative function resembles the y-symbolized movements of protocosmic reasoning that negate all that differs from their corresponding x's. Outer form negates what is outside the artwork. But just as the negatings within protocosmic reasoning have their own contents, and do not convert, contra Hegel, into the contents of what they implicitly affirm, so mythology, as the outer form of art, fails to become the content of art. Art must mediate "something like a breath of that 'easy life' of the Olympian gods," but need not objectify it. Quite the contrary, the actual existence art mirrors is just as likely "want and tears" (SR 38).

Rosenzweig anticipates the outer form of art in the *Star*'s introductory pages, where he compares the contentful world of multiplicity to a painting hanging on a blank wall (SR 13). In that

context, the wall is self-enclosed reason. Both the wall and reason support without generating the things they bear. The painting, for its part, excludes from itself the wall that bears it. As complete within itself, the painting becomes, with respect to the wall, "an excluding All." Mythology, as art's outward form, holds the place of the wall: it is the blank space within which the artwork may show as exclusive and self-enclosed. Mythology is another nothing. It stands to art as the protocosmic nothings of the elements to their realized relations. The gods of art do not wait upon it for their realizations—they exist, rather, to die in the twilight Rosenzweig assigns them to, so that in the emptiness they leave behind, actual artworks can hang.

The works themselves have an inner form that Rosenzweig discusses in the next esthetics section. Schelling did not distinguish between outer and inner form. For him, the universal form of art was uniform: the real indifference of real and ideal within the ideal. But Rosenzweig's dual artistic form mirrors the duality of each of the protocosmic reasonings. If outer form does the work of the y-symbolized components of protocosmic reasoning, inner form does the work of the x-symbolized components. And if the universally negating movement of the divine freedom set the tone for outer form, the affirming passivities of the metalogic universals set the tone for inner form. These were the universals into which the world's particulars moved for definition. The individual was the particular that a universal had begun to define. If each universally defined individual makes a distinct figure, then all the world's individuals, individually defined by the universals that exclude, intersect, and subsume each other, make a configuration. This is the inner form of art: "the thoroughgoing interconnection of every part with the whole, of every individual detail with every other" (SR 60).

If ancient mythology supplied a content for the protocosmic God, the ancient polis supplies one for the protocosmic world. The member of the ancient Greek city-state was also subsumed by a complex of universals, which took the form of powers, classes, or castes. Like the particular within the metalogic world, his meaning ended in a universal that located him within the whole, without reproducing the whole within him. Such a universalized individual, who failed to repeat the whole and who was indeed prone to "disappear" (SR 55) within his community caste, resembles, for all his antiquity, the modern Schellingian individual. And it is this individual that Rosenzweig takes in analogy with art, not the Schellingian particular. The ancient polis has "evoked the comparison with a work of art" (SR 55).

It has done so because the inner form of art configures individuals as the polis did, in subordination to wholes that surpass and even swallow them, rather than wholistically instating them. The details of the artwork vanish in their interconnections, just as the exterior of the artwork had vanished on account of outer form. And so it now appears that if outer form creates an emptiness without, inner form creates one within.

It is tempting to relate the dual emptiness of protocosmic esthetic form to indifference, as Schelling relates identical opposites. Indifference was, after all, an emptiness to the understanding. But Rosenzweig would remind us that by succumbing to the temptation of indifference, we forfeit the content that emptiness already holds in store. If we ask after the content of art's formal emptiness, we will not at first receive much help from Schelling, since his own candidate for that office, namely mythology, has already been left behind. But the use Rosenzweig has made in his esthetics, of ideas previously developed in metaphysical and metalogical reasoning, leaves the metaethical to supply the final component of art, its content, namely the defiant self.

The individual of the world was a stage in the development of a previously undefined particular. It is the *B* of the equation *B*=*A*. But the individual reappears in the metaethical equation of humanity, *B*=*B*, as the right-sided *B*, i.e., as a passive stasis. And this stasis undergoes a development of its own. It begins like a worldly individuality, as a member of a universal, here, the human species. As a member of the species, its point is to reproduce the species. So, at the onset of eros, and the completion of that function, individuality begins to die. If the human were merely worldly individual, this would begin the end of its life, as it does indeed do in so many animal lives. But the human persists beyond reproductive function. It persists in the service of nothing but itself. It is just this persistence that defines the self, as distinct from the individual.

Rosenzweig further defines the self as the relation between defiance and character. Character is what the individual becomes after it has succeeded the significance of itself to the universal, and has transformed to "Eigenheit,"[29] which Hallo translates "peculiarity" (SR 68), but which might be better rendered "ownness" (unbeholdenness to any other, including the species). Defiance is what emerged from the finite human will's affirmation of its finite individuality. The defiance that persists in affirming what succeeds the individual, as character, creates the relation of the self. Now the affirmation is no longer simply in defiance of finitude; it is additionally in defiance of meaninglessness. For it was the species that endowed the individual with meaning.

Rosenzweig's specific notion of character may echo what Schelling wrote about this idea with respect to Shakespeare, that "greatest creator of character" (PA 270). The Shakespearean character is also an individual who fails to carry the imprint of the whole. But what produces a so much more striking congruence when overlaid the Rosenzweigian self, is the whole idealist notion of self-constituting self-reference. For, as already once noted, the Rosenzweigian self *is* its self-consciousness (SR 68).

And now it appears that precisely this self, hovering between character and defiance, is the content of art. Rosenzweig defines content in this context as "something immediately equal, something which men do not share with one another like the common world, but rather something which is equal in all" (SR 80). It is as though a shared esthetic content, like the world, would produce a mediated equality, rather than an immediate one. And the forms of art have created a space that precludes mediation. A mediator connects separable units. But the outer form of art has blocked the path the artwork might have had to its exterior, and the inner form has swallowed up the artwork's units of separate detail into relation. So the content of art must present itself immediately, through nothing but itself.

But then, an absolute incomparable is incomprehensible. If art is to be humanly comprehended, its immediate content must be communicable across distances; but not through a mediator; which is to say it must somehow already exist in whomever is receiving the communication. Not only the artworks themselves, but human beings must bear the content of art within them. But the only content all human beings equally bear is their own self, honed to an ownness that precludes all others. If art is to have an unmediated, communicable content, it can only be this. The human self, as content of art, suspended between two forms of nothing is indeed, as Rosenzweig calls it, "a straight line leading from one unknown to another" (SR 72), an image that recalls the two chance points of beginning and end, between which Schelling locates all epic narratives (PA 215).

Rosenzweig's concept of a self that is "condemned to silence in man and yet is everywhere and at once understood" (SR 80) has deeper roots in Kierkegaard and Kant, than in the early Schelling. Kierkegaard had described human knowledge of original sin in

similar terms, as something that "each man understands solely by himself."[30] And Kant characterized religious mystery as that "which may indeed be known by each individual but cannot be made known publicly, that is, shared universally."[31] Such similar phrasings apply to such disparate objects—mystery, sin, and self. Art is eerily illumined by such darkly lit companions as these.

The contentful precedent of Rosenzweig's artistic content is the hero of ancient tragedy, whose self was the self-enclosed content of art (SR 73). It was this self, depicted on stage, that woke the spectator to his own self-awareness, by stimulating feelings that drew attention inward. But the dramatic actor addresses only himself, not the spectator. And the spectator is alone with his own feelings. "Everyone remains by himself, everyone remains self" (SR 81). And so the understanding that occurs "at once" is occasioned but not mediated by the artwork of the drama.

For Schelling, all artworks are, by their indifference, self-enclosures. But the hero of ancient tragedy further enclosed the action of the drama within his own character (PA 258), as occurs, too, in Rosenzweig's account. Ancient drama occupies a middle ground between the contentful realizations of art's form—Greek mythology and the ancient polis. For, from Rosenzweig's standpoint, as against Schelling's, in no sense did the gods ever really exist, while the polis was peopled by real living beings. Drama, on the other hand, realistically represented what Rosenzweig would consider unreality. Reality is relation, and it was precisely the aim of ancient tragedy to depict its absence. This it accomplished superbly, or at least the works of Aeschylus did. Rosenzweig shares Schelling's lower opinion of the later dramatists, especially Euripides, though not, with Schelling, because they depicted character feelingly, but because they depicted it relationally (SR 77). But these playwrights and the actors who performed their plays, as well as the spectators who in watching them knew self-enclosed selfhood, were all members of the polis, too. They had a real life of relations outside the world of art. At this point, Rosenzweig's rejection of Schelling's idealism shows up most importantly. For in Schelling's scheme, ancient art was precisely real world. It was the unique assignment of all antiquity to realize the ideal realistically, but mediated through the ideal, and this it accomplished by its artworks. These artworks, in their congruence with the ancient movement of being, expressed that world perfectly. Monism obstructs Rosenzweig's quite different definition of reality as relation; within monism, ideality is as much relation as reality is—or as little, since both are swallowed up in the single absolute act of self-affirmation.

When the Schellingian actor of antiquity removed his mask, he stepped out of a perfectly realized relationlessness into an imperfect one. If anything, the drama he momentarily lived was realer. But the same actor, through Rosenzweig's eyes, stepped from perfectly relationless unreality into relational reality. Antiquity is not the realized real, confronting an oppositionally modern ideal. Modernity crossing backward to antiquity does not cross any boundary of the real at all. Modernity and antiquity are equally and uniformly real. The ancients knew the reality of relation; for example, the relation with God when they tremblingly approached him "on the trails skirting Olympus."[32] All that they lacked was an adequate construct or figure of relation. The pagan rites were truly "nothing but stupendous error."[33] But what paganism did have, in its mythology, was part of a construct that effectively predicts reality. For reality is grounded in self-enclosure. And all the ancient Greek expressions of the forms and content of art—myth, polis, drama—perfectly figured self-enclosure, that bifurcating equality of two separables in one.

It is not only the protocosmic nothing whose significance is first revealed only after it has been introduced, but art's too. Art, like the three unreal elements, takes the prefix "proto-". By the unmediated understandings it occasions, it is protolanguage. If the protocosmic elements become relational in reality, then art becomes the language through which they relate. Art predicts the language of reality.

But from what vantage point does art predict? Art's vantage point is unreality. And that location, prior to the real, is only visible as such from the standpoint of the real. The inhabitants of reality, Rosenzweig and his readers, project back from reality to an antecedent. Rosenzweig names this antecedent the protocosmos, but this says no more of it than that it precedes the cosmos. Here Schelling's movements of potences may help illumine the world of art. For though Rosenzweig cannot relate the ancient to the modern across a divide between the real and ideal, he can relate reality to philosophy across a divide between the relational and nonrelational. The manner of relating across the divide is the same for both, namely inversion. Art belongs to the world of philosophy, or ideality, as Rosenzweig might admit in agreement with Schelling, but from this vantage point it simply predicts the real, by its inversive relation to it. Once again Rosenzweig stops the same movement Schelling follows earlier than Schelling does. One half of a divide moves towards the other by the same inversive track, but is arrested before the point of identity is reached. This Schelling might say yields an "unchangeable objective view of things," or even, in Baeck's words, a "frozen"

view, for it stops philosophy's natural course short of its natural end. It yields what Schelling would call, descriptively—but which Rosenzweig would call, pejoratively—religion. In fact, says Rosenzweig, the halt to philosophy preserves reality. A freezing does occur, but precisely in the place where it belongs, in the place of presupposition to reality. Philosophy and art, considered for themselves, are both frozen in permanent states of presupposition. The climactic peaks of Schelling's system are presuppositions in Rosenzweig's. Philosophy and art are potences to the real, and can themselves become real only by groundfully vanishing into it. Everyone should once philosophize, says Rosenzweig.[34] But having done so, they must realize that the product of their thinking is at best merely ("bloss") a system of philosophy.[35] If Baeck's superscript to the *Star* fits—"the poetry which remains"—then Rosenzweig might equally have said, the product is merely a work of art. What dwarfs these achievements into merenesses? Simply, the real world of the cosmos.

Philosophy and the Cosmos

Though the inversive passage from protocosmos to cosmos is not necessitated, it does not go unheralded. For all its abstractness, or perhaps, because of it, the whole of the protocosmos evokes in those whom Rosenzweig has brought to see it, the terror and compassion generally reserved for observers of its dramatized metaethical element. It is not simply the imagery of death and darkness that has this effect. "Protocosmos" is perhaps not so innocent a name after all. The German "Vorwelt" may also be translated as primeval or antediluvian world, a setting that has sometimes served the horror genre of art. Rosenzweig evidently aims for this effect when he shows his metaethical hero confronted by a strange, Munchlike world in which screams alternate with silences (SR 77). Part of what troubles about the protocosmos is its ambiguous status. Rosenzweig somewhat airily allows that we may take it either for a world of "mysterious . . . occult powers" or as a context for "stages on the road of . . . cognitive construction" (SR 88). Prior to the presentation of the cosmos that it grounds, the protocosmos is open to being taken in any of several ways.

But it is not just the obscurity of the protocosmos that asks for a complementing and clarifying cosmos. Rosenzweig virtually animates his protocosmic elements with the psychology of a self-defeating megalomania. "Each part posits itself monistically as the whole" (SR 84). But none are in fact the whole, so all the positings fail. The elements seem to know this. The world set free from reason's all-generating domination, for instance, suddenly finds its body exposed "to whatever may have happened to it," without "protection" against the God who, it transpires, will providentially create it (SR 15). The elements are vulnerable, and here the terror felt on their behalf becomes compassion. They affect a self-sufficiency they do not really have. It is as though each of the elements, disemboweled of the aspects of the other two it had once unhealthily consumed, and closed over its own true shape, recalls a former largeness, and wants to find some, now, healthy way back to it. But separated now in their own spheres, they do not know how to relate to each other. Rosenzweig paints a frightful picture of chaotic vyings for "the gigantic proportions of the All" (SR 87), of bloated and blurred boundaries (SR 84), of rotating wheels (SR 85) that never come to rest, as if the protocosmos were a supernatural game of chance that holds its players in a warped eternity of unresolved suspense.

Not only do the elements not relate to each other; they do not understand the concept of relation at all. How could they, when the philosophical masters of their fate, from Thales to Hegel, had forced each, alternately, to know the other only by consuming it? The terrors of the protocosmos effect a necessary purge. The passage from protocosmos to cosmos is a passage to relation.

The Schelling who lies behind this dramatic picture of primeval striving is several years older than the author of *The Philosophy of Art*. Schelling's late work, *Ages of the World*, describes a chaos of potences much like Rosenzweig's chaos of elements, even down to the image of the "rotating wheel" of possibility (SR 85).[36] Rosenzweig uses Schelling's image, but sparingly, for Schelling's chaos presumed to more ontological status than it deserved (SR 26). The late Schelling's location of the competing potences in God's eternal past evokes a theosophical tradition that does not directly serve Rosenzweig's purpose. That purpose, in part two of the *Star*, is to do for relation what the early Schelling did for indifference in *The Philosophy of Art*: explicate and apply it. But where Schelling's explication is philosophy, Rosenzweig's merely presupposes it.

Rosenzweig states explicitly that "the science we are practicing" (SR 140) in part two of the *Star* is theology, not philosophy. In time, some thinkers would use the phrase "dialogical philosophy." But Rosenzweig is still too close to the old philosophy, namely idealism,

to be able to regard genuine relation as anything but nonphilosophical. He does not title his commentary on the *Star*, The New Philosophy, but, more boldly, "The New Thinking," as though all philosophy belongs irrevocably to the old. Perhaps he is bolder still to deem the new thinking a theology. God is after all only one of the partners in the relations that part two narrates. But it is not because of God's part in relation that part two is theology: it is because all genuine relation is miraculous, and miracle is theology's, not philosophy's, "favorite child" (SR 93).

Philosophy is not thereby banished from the cosmos. The new philosophy had reasoned three ways to separation. Philosophy passes into part two as the presupposition of theology. For the relations of theology presuppose an unsubsumable (but bridgeable) separation. Against the backdrop of idealism, the logical problem of relation reverses that of change. It was a philosophical conundrum how sameness could occur over difference; while relation presupposes difference across the sameness of connection, a difference that the idealism of indifference (but also of Hegelian dialectic) ultimately sacrifices to monism. But if, behind the connections theology articulates between the elements, the separations philosophy constructed are still visible, then the problem of relation is solved.

The separate elements remain visible beneath their relations because the relations are themselves composed of the elements' own components. Those components were oppositional movements of passive affirmation and active negation, that met in parity some distance short of identity. The same components constitute the relations, only inverted and reconfigured. What was passively affirmed in God by his own negating movement, now actively seeks affirmation from outside. What within the human element actively affirmed the human's own passive character, now passively affirms an object outside. The active need of God matches what the human passively supplies. But beneath God's need, his self-contained essence is visible. For the need is the essence, turned inside out. The same is true of the human. Beneath the face it passively turns to God, its active denial of all outside itself is visible. For the turning is the denial in reverse. The inversion of the affirmed divine and the negating human, reconfigured together in a parity that stops short of identity, is the relation of revelation. The distance between the protocosmic components of God, that previously allowed for an encircled self-enclosure of God, now repeats as the distance between the divine need and human supply that, brought together, constitute revelation.

Creation and redemption are similarly reconfigured inversions. What negated in God, on behalf of himself, now affirms on behalf of another. What was affirmed in the world, by its own negating movement, now seeks affirmation from outside. That meeting of need and supply is creation. What was affirmed in the human by its own negating movement, now seeks affirmation from outside. What negated in the world, on behalf of itself, now affirms on behalf of another. And that meeting is redemption. As before, what was given within now seeks to be supplied from without. What supplied itself, now supplies another. What was positively valenced within, by the rest it enjoyed, is negatively valenced without, by the need it has. What was negatively valenced within, by its self-distinguishing from all otherness, is positively valenced without, by affirming the other. Through each relation, one component from each of two of the former self-enclosures is visible. Relation is the joint product of inversion and reconfiguration. The remapping of the component movements of the elements outward creates connection. The identity through inversion of each remapped movement with its protocosmic predecessor reveals the separate elements beneath the connections. And the connecting of the visibly distinct is relation.

The star of redemption is the climactic presentation of the elements beneath their relations. The points of the upright triangle are the protocosmic elements. The relations between them are figured by the inverted triangle whose corners occur between the protocosmic points. The inverted triangle of relations is superimposed over the upright one of the elements, but the elements are clearly visible beneath.

Rosenzweig's tripartite construction of relation might draw from the Baeckian observer the same forthright "Fantastic!" that Schelling's construction of art did. Evidently, Rosenzweig himself continues even after the end of part one to hear enough echoes of idealism in his work to pointedly distinguish the two. The most important of these differentiations is surely between relation and Hegelian synthesis, which makes of two relata a thesis of subsequent synthesis, and so continuously undercuts the separation within relation (SR 230). But "no dialectical process is arrived at" within the new thinking (SR 230). In another contrast, Rosenzweig notes that idealism's only content is its own form (SR 105); while for the new philosophy, content, which is differentiably finite and infinite, is fashioned to differentiably positive and negative forms. Finally, for idealism, the world is "rationally comparable to its origin" (SR 136) while for the new philosophy, a gap unnegotiable by sheer reason separates the

real world from its protocosmic origin. Though it is Hegel whom Rosenzweig overtly distances, Schelling's idealism falls equally within range of these critiques. Indifference undercuts relation as much as Hegelian dialectic does, albeit less elegantly and persuasively. Form and content name, for Schelling as for Hegel, two sides of the same ultimately reunited absolute act; and the world is, simply, the rationally comparable, indeed rationally identical, content of that act.

But Rosenzweig, who understood the impact of perspective on the appearance of truth, might well grant that outside his own anti-idealist perspective, his differences from idealism are overshadowed by the similarities. *The Philosophy of Art* and *The Star of Redemption* both build on tripartite inversive movements. Inversion functions the same way for both, to found difference in sameness. It is simply that in one case, the difference is taken seriously, and in the other case not. Both systems offer up structured placements that receive, hopefully illuminatingly, a host of imprecise but humanly important ideas. Where these placements are analogously situated within the system, the ideas that fill them are set in analogy, too. For example, natural organisms and artworks are analogously related in Schelling by their placements at nodes of indifference. And these placements speak to the puzzle of art's provocative similarity to nature. Rosenzweig's divine and human love are both momentary externalizations of a passive self-containment that, externalized, must fall without the support it inwardly enjoyed, but that, successively whole in each moment of falling, never ceases to fall, whether or not received by an other and borne. That both loves proceed by retraction, supporting through the act of seeking support, may point up an essential feature of love.

Schelling's system is closest to Rosenzweig's, however, in the place it assigns to unsubsumed contingency, that is, contingency that is not converted to necessity. Schelling's concern with freedom does not burst unannounced into his late work. *The Philosophy of Art* already anticipates that turn. The anticipation does not occur in the place Schelling specifically constructs for freedom, as the potence of the real within the ideal. For this freedom is ultimately sacrificed in the artwork. It occurs in the unnecessitated but perfect matching of need and supply between mythology and art.

Rosenzweig considered it an idealist ploy that "in the process of being thought about, the contingent changes itself into something necessary" (SR 12). He especially guarded against it in his own system, insisting that, though the shape of relation is grounded in the

protocosmos, the fact of relation is not (SR 255). Relation itself is groundless. That it occurs at all is miracle. Once the miracle has occurred, it shows itself as the fulfillment of a promise. The components of the protocosmic elements bore the promise in their self-enclosed relations of divine vitality, human defiance, and worldly individual. But the promise the components carry is not revealed as promise until they reappear, inverted and reconfigured, in the relations of reality. Before then, the protocosmos is enigma. This is why, before the revelation of part two, Rosenzweig could indifferently allow for different viewings of the protocosmos.

Schelling, too, allows for miracle. But for him, the meaning was different. Indifference itself was miraculous for uniting opposites in one. But indifference effaced all contingency in its neither/nor of freedom and necessity. And it seems to occur almost in defiance of prediction, rather than fulfillment of it. That certainly holds true for the sacramental miracles of Christianity, which unexpectedly preserve the finite in the infinite, when Christianity itself would sacrifice all finitude to infinity. It is not Schelling's miracle that anticipates Rosenzweig's, but his magic. The meeting of art and mythology in the real potence of indifference within the ideal owes to the magic of the system, which erects a place for both to fill together, without compelling either to enter it. Magic is the unnecessitated meeting of need with supply in a space constructed by concepts. A reciprocally matched need and supply is something like a fulfilled promise. The shape of the need predicts the supply that will meet it. That the meeting occurs is fulfillment.

Rosenzweig disparages the idea of magic. But what he means by magic is much closer to Schelling's miracle. Islam affirms magic when it exults in the inexplicability of the Koran (SR 116). So magic is inexplicable, just as indifference is, at least to the understanding. Insofar as explanation situates effects within chains of causes, indifference cannot be explained. It can only be intellectually intuited. So indifference may well stand with Islamic magic outside Rosenzweig's cosmos. But Schellingian magic may be at least partially admitted. For its matchings of need to supply resemble the miraculous, because unforcedly predicted, matchings of divine need to human supply, human need to worldly supply, worldly need to divine supply in Rosenzweig's system.

A curious feature of Rosenzweigian miracle is that it cannot be hoped for. It could be hoped for only if its prediction were known before its fulfillment. But the fulfillment shows its predictive ground only after it has occurred. Thus we begin within the miracle and only

retrospectively project back its ground. The protocosmos is enigmatic only to those who linger there. In philosophical books, especially, earlier sentences depend on later ones for their meanings.[37] This is why Rosenzweig encourages his readers to rush, uncomprehendingly if need be, through the *Star*'s first part.[38]

But the impregnability of the protocosmos from a standpoint within it, and the clarity it attains from a standpoint without, points up another anti-idealist feature of the new thinking: it is unsublatedly perspectival. Hegel initiated humans to the one absolute viewpoint or, what amounts to the same thing, a single absolute finally knows itself. For Rosenzweig, there are not only three vantage points on cosmic reality—the divine, the human, the worldly—but three tenses in which it occurs—past, present, future. Thus each participant in the three relations of reality perceives them differently. A striking instance is the case of worldly redemption. God as creator endowed the world with laws of growth. These are the universal categories of the protocosmic world, turned outward and supported by God's now other-directed care. But it is only the kinds of things that receive the divine assurance of growth, not the individuals within them. The human act of love towards the worldly individual is, for the world, the "great surprise" that, once experienced, constitutes a law of growth in its own right: to "move towards man's act of love" (SR 240). What the world receives as surprise and incorporates as law, the loving human offers spontaneously on command—God's command to "Love me!"—and unconscious of its effects. It is as though the relation of redemption is pieced together from its two poles which, looking down the line of the same relation from opposite ends, see different views. The human soul cannot see the law of growth it inspires and that moves the world its way, and yet it must unconsciously presuppose it. For the soul "demands" that its love ensoul, for which purpose the world supplies a body. If love, which is all self-denial, demands, it must be from channeling the divine love that occasioned it. It is only God, whose creative provision for the world includes the human love he revealingly commands, who sees the redemptive relation whole, from the middle outward to the poles. But then, he does so by virtue of not directly participating in it.

We, Rosenzweig's readers, are ourselves assigned a place in the construct of the star that fixes our perspective. We are beloved souls, stationed, opposite God, at a pole of revelation but, as instances of the human kind, also components of the very creation we are directed, through revelation, to redeem. We experience the fullness of revelation in the divine command to love, but only parts of creation and

redemption. These whole and partial experiences constitute our experience of time. They can do so because they unfold for us in a sequence. Rosenzweig pointedly distinguishes creation, revelation, and redemption as sequence from the same relations as categories (SR 189). The category, at least in its descent from Kant, presumes a schematic connection to experience by which to order it. But creation, revelation, and redemption already *are* experience. The event of ordering is no imposition on experience from without, but a necessary unfolding from within as experience emerges from its protocosmic moorings. Once revelation has occurred, creation necessarily falls into place before it and redemption after, as we saw in chapter two.

Revelation defines the present, which is the vanished distance between love and its expression that occurs in God's love command. Creation defines the past, which is the presupposition philosophy takes for its task to construct retrospectively out of the present. Redemption defines the future, that hovering-over-the-present of creation's anticipated completion. The past, like prediction, only comes to be from the perspective of the present. The protocosmos cannot know itself as past. Part of the chaos of the protocosmos was that, from within it, there was no temporal orientation. The protocosmos becomes past in light of the present that succeeds (SR 133). From within the present, it would be positively wrong to take the elements of the protocosmos for mere "conceptual elements." They are rather "immanent reality" (SR 108), that is, conceptual presuppositions of reality. The elements themselves change appearance in passing from protocosmos to cosmos. From a protocosmic standpoint, God is simply one among three self-contained elements, with as much, or little, right as the others have to claim the whole for itself. From a pagan's point of view, which is as protocosmic as a human viewpoint gets, God's self-enclosure is not fundamentally different from his own and so is, in a sense, "visible" through his own (SR 158). But from within the cosmos, a self-contained god is simply unknown. The protocosmic construct now appears in precisely the opposite light, as a construct of the invisible, the unknown. What is known to the beloved soul, namely the revealed God, is concealed from the tragic hero. What is known to the tragic hero, namely the self-enclosed god, is concealed from the beloved soul (SR 158). And that does indeed match fairly well how the God of Judaism and Christianity has been portrayed: knowable in act, but not in essence.

As against idealism, it is not thought that effects the most important change, but temporal crossings. Schelling anticipated as much. Christ marks the boundary between modernity and antiquity

across which the picture of reality changes, from gods to Christ, nature to history, particular human to individual. Across this boundary, the revealed and concealed switch contents. In antiquity, under nature's dominion, nature was immediately visible and history concealed. In modernity, under morality's sway, history is visible and nature concealed. Modernity combs nature for secrets (PA 77) that it would not have occurred to antiquity to seek.

Schelling's perspectivism serves the interests of his monism. It owes to different perspectives on the absolute act of self-affirmation that antiquity and modernity exist at all. Schelling's perspectivism is a way of discounting difference, while Rosenzweig's is a means of instating it. Rosenzweig is so committed to multiplicity, he pays perspectivism as the price for it, rather than marshaling it as a solution. The problem is not to efface perspectives, but to fix them in a single structure. And this is precisely the role that philosophy plays to theology in part two of the *Star*. It was the experiential theology of Schleiermacher that rested content with the private, subjective perspective, and renounced all grounding in objectivity. Philosophy comes to show that experience is a structure of perspectives, grounded objectively in a knowable past. For the lines of relation that constitute experience lead back to the self-enclosed protocosmic objects that, having successfully predicted experience, now appear as both past-constituting and knowledge-conferring.

At the end of part two, in a difficult section entitled "The Eternal God," Rosenzweig considers God's perspective on creation, revelation and redemption. For God, these do not define tenses, for they do not sequentially unfold for him, but he knows them all at once. Further, unlike human and world, God perceives these relations as identical with his role in them—"for him, the creation of the world means becoming the creator" (SR 258)—as though to undermine the very partnership of two on which relationship depends. Finally, God both processively becomes creator, revealer, and redeemer, for there is a sense in which the work of these relations is incomplete and ongoing, and occupies the point of completion at their end. That divine straddling of becoming and being underlies the paradoxical claim that "this Becoming of God is, for him, not a changing, growing, augmenting" (SR 258).

With these paradoxical assertions, Rosenzweig moves back towards the definitively idealist space, where two vanish into one. And Schelling's own articulation of that space, as the trace of two movements that have just vanished into absolute identity, may helpfully illumine Rosenzweig's intent. The three lines of creation, revelation,

and redemption may be set in analogy with the two lines of the potences, the affirming and affirmed, that vanish into absolute self-affirmation. The vanishing is the mirroring divide, through which the absolute act of self-affirmation, itself wholly one, casts a reflection of two. The inversive identity across the divide, of two with one, enables a host of paradoxical assertions, such as that the potence of affirming, or of the affirmed, both relations, are simply the absolute identity itself; that these unipolar relations are unique to God, who simultaneously becomes by affirming and already is wholly and restfully affirmed. Humans largely inhabit the world of the potences, and see them from within them. But God, who is the absolute identity, always sees them as the trace of something just vanished. They are, to build on Rosenzweig's use of "proto-", a protodivinity, through which divinity understands itself.

This Schellingian overlay on Rosenzweig must not be pressed too far. For Schelling, the divine perspective on multiplicity is available to humans through philosophy and art. For Rosenzweig, the human perspective irremediably colors human assertion. Any human attempt to speak from God's perspective strains language to the breaking point and ultimately reduces to silence. But the mere fact of a divine perspective tempts to speculation about it, to which Rosenzweig partially succumbs. Perhaps it is not so surprising that Rosenzweig sounds so idealist here. He himself allows that the philosopher's error was simply one of placement: the All is not presupposition but result, "indeed the result of a result" (SR 258). And he thereby invites a Schellingian interpretation of God's perspective, in which all three lines of relation vanish into God. The vanishing occurs hypercosmically, beyond human experience, in what from the human perspective is always future. But we can only speak from out of the present. To speak from out of the future requires a mode of communication that stands to language as language does to art. And this Rosenzweig finds in what Schelling deemed a living work of art, namely the liturgy.

Art and the Cosmos

Within part two of the *Star*, Rosenzweig's reflections on art take the form of a theory. The three subsections on art, dispersed over the three books on creation, revelation and redemption, are all titled

"Theorie der Kunst." And yet such a title, which might suitably name a full-length treatise on art, such as Schelling's own *The Philosophy of Art*, names within the context of part two of the *Star*, in Rosenzweig's words, "a mere episode" (SR 198). If the casual reader asked why art was introduced at all in part one, he might wonder even more why these openly episodic insertions occur in part two; and Rosenzweig responds, precisely to identify art as mere episode (SR 249).

If art must be explicitly identified as episode, it must presume to much more. In the first part of the theory of art, under the subsection "Idealist Esthetics," Rosenzweig states art's presumption to be

> at once confirmation of the method of reasoning—"organon", that is—and visible manifestation of an "absolute" (SR 147).

The second presumption, to manifest the absolute, is central to *The Philosophy of Art*; but the first, to be organon, surely alludes to the sixth part of the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, where Schelling calls art, "the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy."[39] In the works of Aristotle, the organon comprises the treatises on logic.[40] These construct the repeatable forms of reasoning, that is, of moving from premise to conclusion. In the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, art is organon because by means of it philosophy passes from the protracted premise of its subject-object divide, the necessary premise of all knowledge, to its desired conclusion in divisionless knowledge. Schelling explains that consciousness, in its capacity as knowing subject, repeatedly outstrips itself as known object, so that part of it is always unconscious. What philosophy "cannot depict in external form" is "the unconscious element in acting and producing."[41] It cannot make the unconscious fully conscious. But this is just what happens in artistic activity. The artist consciously produces an unconscious product that wholly reflects or externalizes his conscious activity. Consciousness and unconsciousness attain what in *The Philosophy of Art* would be called indifference.

For Hegel, art was not the organon of philosophy, but a station on the way of the organon, which was dialectic. But the Schelling of the *System of Transcendental Idealism* fits Rosenzweig's account of idealist esthetics perfectly. By the time of *The Philosophy of Art*, Schelling had somewhat modified his claims for art. By the identity philosophy of that time, natural philosophy and art constituted parallel, oppositionally identical avenues of indifference. But Rosenzweig's critique applies just as well to both of Schelling's

works. For they both understood the universal as the product of a movement of infinite and finite, or free and necessary, forms towards each other. And yet idealism could doubt its own pretension to generate reality out of these movements. Art reassured it that the meeting of freedom and necessity did indeed generate something real. For it was just in the undeniable reality of art that the meeting most patently occurred. The trouble with this assurance was that it rested on a self-deception. For the human had to double as both generator of the art product and appreciator of its "nature-like reality" (SR 147). Though, for Rosenzweig, language, like art, offered a vanished distance between opposites, it was not, as art was, a generatable product. And so idealism could not properly assimilate it. For Rosenzweig, the price of an idealist assimilation of language would be the end of idealism. For language culminates in a very different "conclusion"—not subject-object unity, but an expression of love across distance.

Rosenzweig allows that Kantian idealism stood on the brink of acknowledging genuine separation. Kant did so when he took the *Ding-an-Sich*, or noumenon, for the outer limit of reason's reach, and further understood a noumenal human character to share with it a "'common obscure root'" (SR 142). For the equation of these two particulars, by means of the common root, would have yielded the idea of a self-enclosed, rationally unassimilable particular. In Rosenzweig's philosophic algebra, it would be symbolized $B=B$, precisely the symbol of one of the pre-real, protocosmic elements. If post-Kantian idealism had taken the common obscure root seriously, instead of attempting to generate it out of self-consciousness, as Schelling himself did in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*,[42] the concept of genuine relation might have surfaced all the sooner.

And yet, for all the magnitude of idealism's oversight, "the idealist mode of thinking" (SR 189) is still partially applicable. Its application is precisely to the theory of art. From within the context of the *Star*, it is just because art does not serve as organon that it can be theorized about (SR 150). If art were organon in the *Star*, then it would lead to one of the desired conclusions of that work. Within the context of part two, it would lead to relational reality. And reality is not theoretically explicable. By its miraculous nature, it surpasses theory. Reality shows in narrative, imperative and choral forms of language, not in the theoretical language, that bypasses experience, of idealism. But the artwork truly is what idealism would make of all reality, namely a product. It appears during the course of a genuinely self-enclosed process, which subsumes, in addition to art, the creator-artist and the

appreciative spectator. These are not three self-enclosures between which meetings occur, as in genuine reality, but "segments" or "members" of a continuous movement, as in idealist thinking.

But it is not idealist dialectic that can any longer construct a theory of art. Rosenzweig has already rejected the linchpin of both Schellingian and Hegelian idealism, that subject and object are indifferently subsumed under the relation that connects them, to create a differentiably new subject-object. But the generative powers of idealism do in any case stop short at the miracle that conditions, indeed constitutes, Rosenzweigian reality. Now, unexpectedly, it is just this reality that obliges the nonreal world of art with the constitutent parts of a theory. For reality has at hand just the set of categories by which a theory of art might be constructed, namely creation, revelation, and redemption. These constitute the sequence of reality. But they are prefigured in the prerelational world of the protocosmos, where art also dwelt. It dwelt there as the occasion of a common understanding that arose, unmediated, among separate and uncommunicating individuals. In that capacity, art prefigured language, which miraculously appears in the real world as the sign to art's prediction. But language is the organon of reality, the medium through which creation, revelation, and redemption occur. So art, in predicting language, must contain some prefigurements of these as well. At least these three reality-constituting movements may be abstracted out of their living world and refashioned as categories. As categories, they do not accompany reality on its miraculous emergence, but assert "something that already is 'in existence'" (SR 189). The quotation marks imply that the existence available to be asserted prior to the emergence of the real is not real existence. Rosenzweig might call it preexistence. From the perspective of the *Star*, all the categorial thinking of idealism is preexistential. But art is a preexistence that genuinely remains even after idealism has passed. And so "the idealist mode of thinking" may model the application of the categories of creation, revelation, and redemption to a preexistential theory of art.

Rosenzweig distributes these three categories over the three stages in the genesis of an artwork. He applies the creation category to the creator-artist, revelation to the artwork itself, and redemption to the appreciative awareness of the spectator. Beneath these applications are visible both Rosenzweig's own observations on the unfolding of these categories in the real world, and Schelling's much earlier reflections on genius, the universal and particular, and the forms of art. Certainly Rosenzweig follows Schelling's division of the arts into music and fine art on the one hand, and poetry on the other.

The first two constitute the real arts for Schelling, the sensual arts for Rosenzweig; the second is Schelling's ideal art, Rosenzweig's conceptual art. But let us begin at the beginning.

Art begins in genius. Rosenzweig characterizes genius as "an inner diversity, a world of creatures, insights, ideas, which nevertheless are held together in an intrinsically harmonious juxtaposition by the personal style, the internal way, of the artist" (SR 149). The characterization recalls the creation of the world, wherein God's providential caring meets the creaturely world's own need of provendure. And genius is indeed created, "does not fall ready-made from heaven" (SR 149). Genius is a sudden and unexpected surprise. Rosenzweig sees it conditioned by the emergence of the self, that personality-succeeding defiance that endures in growing isolation after the needs of the species have been satisfied. That self, too, appears in the course of human development as a surprise, an "assault" (SR 71) not to be predicted by the laws of the world. Rosenzweig also calls the human self a *daimon*, as though to register its supraworldly status, taking the human out of the world and constituting it a separate element on its own. If genius is conditioned by the self, then it must be born in solitude. Romantic visions of the solitary artist aside, self-enclosure seems a necessary condition of genius. The artist needs self-enclosure to nurture the world of creations within him. For the world of real relations cannot be trusted to harmonize with his own inner harmonies.

Rosenzweig quite openly invites idealism into this discussion. For the artwork's creation "takes place in the author," quite apart from any authorial effort. The creation of the work is its location in the artist's inner world. The artist simply receives it there. It is the sheer givenness of creation, prior to conscious effort, that constitutes its unconscious component, so "rightly emphasized by idealism" (SR 148). Certainly Schelling would insist on the unconscious component of artistry. Its indifference with the conscious is just the miracle of art. Schelling would also applaud Rosenzweig for the central role he assigns genius and the daemon, only he identifies the two, and puts the daemon to different use. The daemon of genius connotes not its supraworldly nature—a God-identified world is after all exhaustive—but its divine provenance. Genius is the "eternal concept of the human being in God as the immediate cause of his productions" (PA 84). Rosenzweig could never reduce the human to a concept in God. Such attempts simply underscore how much the self was a "matter of indifference" to idealism (SR 145). But across the two different views of genius, it remains a matter of "harmoniously juxtaposed"

concepts or ideas. Here, Kant's infinitely interpretable esthetic idea is the not so obscure common root. For both Schelling and Rosenzweig, genius must draw from an inexhaustible well. Within the confines of his "personal style" or particular concept of himself in God, the artist must be able to draw on an infinity of ideas. If not, says Schelling, he will be less productive (PA 84); never "more than a 'frustrated' genius at best" (SR 150) says Rosenzweig.

There is some correspondence between artistic creation and what Rosenzweig introduced as the outer form of art in part one. The outer form of a work locates it in a larger world by differentiating the two, the work from the world. Artistic creation assigns a work its artist's inner world, "the common character and the family resemblance" (SR 192) it shares with all the works born of that world. As bearer of his own created world, the artist in Rosenzweig's account receives a distinctive name: poet. It is the poet whose artistry moves out of an inexhaustible world of creatures, insights, and ideas. As "mere" artist, the poet simply executes his ideas. Both Schelling's and Rosenzweig's discussions of genius are followed by accounts of the relation between poetry and artist, or poesy and art. Here, too, Rosenzweig follows Schelling. Schellingian poesy is also a movement from infinite world to finite, executed work (PA 85). But perhaps the most striking parallel between the two is what Baeck might identify as both the presuppositional and passive nature of their accounts of poetic genius. The artist does not create his world, but receives it preconsciously or divinely. For Rosenzweig, the poet is simply the first stage of a creative process that subsumes him. For Schelling, it is actually the concept of the poet in God that produces. Schelling might well regard Rosenzweig as a companion theorist of modern esthetics. For Rosenzweig's poet, like Schelling's modern artist, must create out of his self-contained world. There is no overarching mythology to supply the content; there cannot be, after the shattering of the All, and the restriction of God to one of three. Rosenzweig identified the self as the condition of genius; but it is also, from part one, the content of art. Under the circumstance of the shattered All, this might not sound so strange to Schelling. For the poet's inwardly diverse world reads a little like the mythology Schelling's artist creates. If so, the modern artist might step back and forth quite comfortably between Schelling's and Rosenzweig's pages; for he is equally well shielded in both from their very different outside worlds. The outside world is in Schelling's case a vexed oscillation between infinite self-loss and loss of the infinite, and in Rosenzweig's case, the real world of creation, revelation, and

redemption. It is true that the artist is closed off from the first to his salvation, and from the second to his destruction, but self-enclosed he remains in both.

It might seem that the category of revelation, which actually opens up the real world of relations would, applied to art, redeem the artist from his self-enclosure. But it does not. It simply replaces one enclosure with another. Even so, it is in revelational terms that Rosenzweig describes the passage from creative genius to artistic execution. The analogy is explicit. So, for example, what harmony does for rhythm in the musical work is "quite like revelation which endows the mute self with speech and soul at once" (SR 198). Rosenzweig develops the revelational passage from genius to executed work over three ever narrowing stages: first from genius to artist, then within the artwork, over its epic and lyric qualities, and finally between fine art and music, over their specific differences.

What defined real revelation was love. And love was the repeated outpouring of the whole into each successive moment, heedless of consequence and of the demise it suffered over and over again. Love was one of Rosenzweig's translations of Baeckian romantic self-sacrifice. And now this love repeats within the self-enclosure of art, as genius giving way to artistry (SR 193). To begin with, the genius has already sacrificed his humanity. For his self-enclosure already separates him from human life in its God- and world-related richness. This sacrifice was indeed necessary for the benefit of the rest of humanity. For if there was no art, there would be no prediction of language, which could not then be received as the miracle it is. And humanity could not appreciate how much the "Love me!" it receives from God attests to the love of God, which allows itself to be truthfully foretold. The artist lives ongoingly in the prediction of language, at the cost of his own real involvement with language, like Moses who, having led the way to the Promised Land, is denied entry into it. Already the artist begins to take on tragic hues. The Rosenzweigian artist, like the Schellingian tragic hero, willingly accepts the affliction of genius. But now, as though the affliction of his self-enclosure is too great to bear, he pours it out into his artwork. In artistry, a piece of nature is formed esthetically. Each detail of esthetically unformed nature that will constitute the executed work is stamped with the idea of the whole work that precedes in genius. If genius corresponds to the outer form of art, artistry corresponds to the inner. For each of the details, so enlarged by the whole, assumes the status of the whole, without relation to the others (SR 194). The details vanish into the whole, in

conformity with the detail-subsuming work of inner form. The details of the artwork are also like the objects of real, revelatory love, which "passionately unmindful of self . . . immerse[s] itself into whatever detail confronts it" (SR 193). The artist's informing of his genius into the detail is an act of love. But the love is not relational. It moves not by connecting the separate, but by reconstituting the whole in the part. The whole sacrifices itself to the part, "into complete oblivion" (SR 194). And now the part enjoys the same self-enclosure within the whole that was formerly confined to genius. But then, there is no real sacrifice after all. The creative genius has, for the duration of his artistry, sacrificed his genius. But he gains it back in the details that have absorbed his genius. In them, he sees himself. Far from losing himself in his artistry, "his self-revelation takes place [there] for him" (SR 193).

The creative genius is in a sense one with his work. The passage from genius to artistry is a relation that, monistically and idealistically, subsumes its poles. It is an extension of self-enclosure, not a bursting of it. Schelling's esthetics resounds throughout what Rosenzweig has described. Artistry proceeds from the infinity of genius to the finite detail of the artwork. The detail is only seemingly separate from the genius that confronts it. Genius "does not consider [the detail] to have proceeded from within it" (SR 192), any more than the Schellingian infinite, in affirming the finite, knew itself, prior to indifference, to be affirming itself. The work of artistry proves to be just as much a self-affirmation as Schellingian indifference is. The detail serves the genial whole as self-reflective mirror. Rosenzweig's detail is a Schellingian particular.

Rosenzweig has described an informing of the infinite into the finite without loss of the infinite. And this is Schelling's definition of art. But there is a small discrepancy. For Schelling, it is by one continuous movement that the infinite informs the finite. But Rosenzweig distinguishes between the outward movement of genius, and the detail-inspiriting work of artistry. The first is genial inspiration proper; the second is diligence. And genius cannot generate diligence. When Rosenzweig says that genius sacrifices itself to diligence (SR 193) he suggests the one movement picks up where the other leaves off. If the two movements are distinct, then the diligently executed detail need not mirror the genially inspired whole, and whatever mirroring occurs takes on the flavor of miracle. Schelling had of course called all art miraculous for unaccountably finitizing a perduring infinite. But Rosenzweig's separation of diligent from genial movement allows him to construct within the domain of

art a categorical copy of his own understanding of miracle. And this indeed he does. For he pointedly ascribes to the genial whole that attribute so redolent of actual miracle, namely prediction (SR 196, 197). But he will not complete the image. The executed detail is not "sign." For the prediction occurs within a self-enclosure after all. The detail does not answer the whole over a genuine distance. Genius and diligence simply name two segments of a unified process, as Rosenzweig indicates when he concedes that genius "must become diligence, must turn itself into diligence" (SR 193). The contingency of the mirroring is illusory, "there is simply no such thing as a 'frustrated genius'" (SR 192), and merely foretells the real contingency that occurs outside art in the genuine miracle. But miracle is virtually synonymous with revelation in the larger sense. If "revelation as esthetic category" (SR 191) unfolds a prediction of miracle, this might have been predicted, as perhaps Rosenzweig himself does in part one of the *Star* when he exclaims that "only the magic flute of art could bring off the miracle of making the unison of human content resound in discrete selves" (SR 82).

If in the creative process, the wholeness of the artwork genially precedes the executed detail, then in the completed artwork the wholeness only follows. Each detail is a microcosmic whole. But only the sum of executed details reconstitutes the whole macrocosmically. The whole of the realized artwork Rosenzweig designates its epic attribute. The repetition of the whole within each detail is its lyric attribute. The epic and lyric as attributive content of art simply repeat the constitutive forms of genius and artistry. The mirroring that occurred between the genius and the executed detail of his creation now repeats within the artwork itself, between whole and part. The self-reflective self-enclosure of the artistic genius now animates the artwork too, which Rosenzweig invests with a soul of its own (SR 195). Schelling had done the same, more dramatically. His "completely self-enclosed" (PA 206) artworks were nothing less than realized gods. The lyric and epic as universal contents of all art follow on the division Rosenzweig made, and Schelling did not, between the two segments of the movement from genial infinity to finite detail. Schelling took the lyric and epic for "individual poetic genres" (PA 201) within the verbal arts alone. Over their differences, Rosenzweig and Schelling contrast the lyrical and epical in similar ways. Rosenzweig's contrast between epic whole and lyric part resembles Schelling's between lyric particularity or difference and epic absoluteness or unity (PA 208, 212). Both contrasts point to the dramatic as conjunctive third. If Rosenzweig fashions two distinct

Schellingian genres as attributes of all art, he is only exploiting the suggestive interchangability of parts within Schelling's monistic whole.

Rosenzweig takes quantitative differences in the relative proportion of epic and lyric components within the arts to explain qualitative difference between them. Thus epic dominance yields the visual arts which, extended in space, show their wholeness at a glance, while lyric dominance results in music which, extended in time, shows each of its detailed parts in succession. Schelling too associated the lyric with music, the epic with painting (PA 208, 214). But Rosenzweig's reductive proportionalism follows more closely on Schelling's explanation, in *Bruno*, of difference as such. There Schelling states that what distinguishes determinate individuals from each other is the difference in the way they establish "the opposition of the real and ideal."[43] A series of analogies might well connect *Bruno* through *The Philosophy of Art* to the *Star*: real is to ideal, as particular to universal, as lyric to epic. The very attempt to explain qualitative difference quantitatively is idealist. All difference in *Bruno* is fundamentally a product of long division; Rosenzweig's spatio-temporal expressions within the arts of different lyric-epic proportionalities is a kindred piece of thinking.

To complete his discussion of the artwork, Rosenzweig examines the different ways the fine arts and music realize ideas of genius. In fine art, the genial idea precedes the executed detail as a vision of the whole. The vision may be stimulated by natural impressions, but ultimately removes itself from nature entirely. From that purely ideal height, it pours the whole of itself, successively, into each natural detail of the material it confronts. The vision cannot serve to guide the self-pouring, for it, itself, is poured out in it. And so the pouring is as unpremeditated and blind as love, that sacrifices itself to its object. The movement of the vision into the detail occurs feelingly, without vision, like the blind, feeling movement of actual love. When it has finally come to rest, the natural detail has been rendered as ideal and natureless as the original vision. It has been vitalized with the protospeech of the art that magically effects a common understanding across silence. Music, as extension through time, cannot be previewed in a single moment of vision. But the rhythm of a musical piece does function like the artistic vision to predict the completed whole. Harmony fills the role in music that the vitalizing detail does in fine art. Where rhythm fashions a succession of differently extended moments, harmony makes them resound. The rhythmic moments are the details that harmony, blindly

accepting whatever durations it confronts, inspires with pitch. And now comes the analogy with revelation already cited, of harmony to rhythm as soul to self (SR 198).

The sharp contrast Rosenzweig draws between the artistic vision and nature recalls Schelling's oppositional identity between real and ideal. The two cannot be identified until each has been isolated in its own exclusive purity. This occurs for Schelling in the original act of absolute self-affirmation. But Rosenzweig, who has banished all such acts, must first purify the ideal of the real with which it is originally given in experience. The product of the purifying division is projected backwards to the creation of the artwork, which occurs in the genial mind, prior to execution. So purified of nature, the vision's inversive transformation into nature foretells all the more powerfully the miracle to come. Rhythm, too, predicts. And here the tie to Schelling is closer. For rhythm also served Schelling as the beginning of music, its first potence of the finitized infinite. In Schelling's monism of multiple embeddings, rhythm microcosmically encompassed the whole of music, and constituted "the music within music" (PA 111). For music as such is the formative art in which the infinite informs the finite and, within its own potences of rhythm, modulation and melody, it is rhythm that microcosmically repeats that movement. But then rhythm, for Schelling, was the universalizable esthetic potence that assured not only music but all the verbal arts their temporal self-enclosures.

For Schelling, the artwork constitutes a climactic completion of embedded self-enclosure. There at the node of indifference within the ideal potence occurs that redemptive rest from movement that reproduces the inner quiet of the natural organism and of the absolute identity itself. But for Rosenzweig, the creative process shifts self-enclosure to one last location, where it must occur before the artwork concludes, namely the place of the appreciative audience. Here is the last application of reality to art: "redemption as esthetic category" (SR 242).

Like the Schellingian artwork, the completed artwork in Rosenzweig stands enclosed within its own vitality. But unlike Schelling's artwork, Rosenzweig's stands on an outskirts. There are no outskirts in monism, or true empty spaces in which to hover. But in Rosenzweig's prereal world of three, there are bounds that might be crossed. The finite self-enclosure of the human establishes potentially crossable bounds around every human. The completed artwork has absorbed the genius of the creator. But then it has been reflected back to him and left the artwork bereft. The creator has no

more eyes for this work; he has moved onto the next, to which he once more offers himself a sacrifice. The artwork has been empowered with speech but, exiled to the outskirts of the creator's self-enclosure, like art itself from the Platonic state, it has no one to address.

Only Rosenzweig's artistic world, not Schelling's, allows for a space across which art can project an unfulfilled need. Here the artwork resembles a beloved soul who, empowered with love, turns to express it to a space bereft of world. But in reality, the world is there to receive the love. And in the prereality of art, a receptor stands there too. It is the spectator. The spectator fills the creator's role in reverse. The life of the creator poured into his work now animates the viewer. If the idea of the work emerged a distinct whole out of the infinity of genius, and passed into the details, it now reemerges in an appreciative consciousness, where it once again assumes a place among an infinity of like ideas, all "collected and lovingly arranged in the course of a long life" (SR 48). The viewer who studies the work's detail is mirrored there, a connoisseur, just as, in the fashioning of the same detail, the creator had first known himself an artist. The two self-reflections reflect each other without bridging any distances. They serve rather to augment the traveling self-enclosure, now enclosing the viewer with the work at the end of the creative process. The work which was the creator, externalized, is now internalized in the connoisseur. The line from creator to connoisseur extends continuously over the segments that successively bear the self-enclosure. It is no real miracle that a spectator stands at the finish of the work, to receive it. If there were no viewer, there would be not frustrated, needy art but, no art at all.

There is no real redemption in self-enclosure. But across the mock distance of the artwork from the spectator, a mock redemption occurs. The reaching of the artwork for an audience is like the cry of redemptive love for the world. The viewer who supplies the audience is like the world that grows towards love, its store of lovingly ensouled detail organically expanding. The mock redemption predicts the reality. The connoisseur, "inwardly full of form" (SR 48), stands on the brink of that other fullness, the beloved soul's, which passes into redemptive love. But before the world of art is edged over the brink, and takes on the work of the real world, it must complete the dangling ends of its own prereal redemption.

Under the aegis of revelation as esthetic category, epic and lyric emerged as attributes of art; and fine art and music, as their respective exemplars. Now the dramatic effects a balance between the epic

attribute, that would rest in its wholeness, and the lyric attribute, that impulsively presses forward each detail, one after the other, as equal to the whole. The dramatic is the third attribute. It distributes the lyric immediacy simultaneously over the whole epic scope of the work, rather like what redemptive love has accomplished after wending its way through the whole world. The art that exemplifies the dramatic is poetry. Poetry is dramatic by uniting in itself the epic scope of fine art with the lyric immediacy of music. For it is both visionary, or pictorial, and rhythmic. It is not that fine art and music do not possess a drama of their own. Fine art's dramatic attribute is its structure, which emerges after each of its details has been successively imprinted with the visionary whole; and music's is melody, which, superimposed over rhythm and harmony, unites the encompassing of the first with the individual sounding of the second. What distinguishes poetry from these is that it begins in the conjunctive work of drama, not in the epical vision of the artist, or the lyrically anticipatory rhythm of the composer. It does so by taking for its medium neither space, like art, nor time, like music, but "conceptual thought" (SR 245). Thought is the medium of drama because only thought subsumes both the epic scope of space and lyric immediacy of time. For thought is "the common inner source of both" (SR 245).

Here, at its climactic finish, the theory of art confirms the impression of its idealist base, if this were not sufficiently confirmed already. For who but an idealist would locate the common source of space and time in thought? Kant had already pointed this way when he presented space and time as the forms of sensible intuition, the first of outer sense, the second of inner. But Schelling, in the *System of Transcendental Idealism* quite boldly deduces them, transcendentally, from the absolute act of self-positing,[44] and in *The Philosophy of Art* they are assigned locations related to the absolute act of self-affirmation: space to the real or finite potence, time to the infinite as it moves towards the finite (PA 109, 119). Thought is the conjunction between space and time but, more idealist still, it is ideas. Poetry is the only art that turns on ideas which, transcending the wholeness of poetic tone and the particularity of poetic diction, "infuse the poem with life" (SR 247). The idea of a poem is virtually sensible. Feuerbach too had taken ideas for sensible.[45] The poem's idea corresponds to the visible structure of a painting, and the audible melody of a musical composition (SR 248). It is "the effective and affective reality of the work" (SR 247).

Layers of idealist thought underlie these few remarks on poetry. Under the canopy of this single art, Rosenzweig has arrayed the

whole Kantian sequence of representations as they appear in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, from sensible intuition to conceptual thought to climactic idea. The Kantian sequence moves from least to greatest universality. But, though the ideas crown the sequence for generality, they do not do so for reality. Kantian ideas have no objects. At best, they guide the understanding in exploration of its own objects. Rosenzweig has marshaled the Kantian idea for its perfection of universality, just as earlier, in connection with artistic vision, he had purged the ideal of all naturalness, but he will not deprive it of an object. The idea within the artwork *is* the reality of the artwork as much as for Schelling the ideal *is* the real (PA 35). Kant had anticipated this move in his *Critique of Judgment*, when he defined the esthetic idea as a noncognitive reference to an intuition.[46] But both Schelling and Rosenzweig indicate by their language more than a mere reference of idea to intuition. The idea is actually "within" the poem, not "somewhere behind it" (SR 248). Rosenzweig comes as close here as anywhere to speaking in Schelling's voice.

But then, the whole theory of art could pass for a Schellingian construction. It is a continuous passage in thought through repetition of the same tripartite construction of concepts. This is why Rosenzweig can construct his theory "on the analogy of a family tree" (SR 198). The same relations between endpoints repeat, and so relate the endpoints analogously. The theory turns on the distinction between the universal whole of a work and its inspired particular. By a three-step movement, the whole becomes the particular and then whole again. The agents of each step are, respectively, the poetic genius, the diligent artist, and the appreciative spectator. The work itself reflects the contribution of each agent through its epic, lyric, and dramatic qualities. Finally, the genres of art divide by which of the qualities is definitive for them: epic for art, lyric for music, dramatic for poetry. The overarching movement of the theory, from whole to part to whole, mirrors the same act that inaugurates Schelling's system, the absolute act of self-affirmation. For this, too, proceeds by dividing a presupposed whole, and reuniting.

The Schellingian system had fissures. One occurred at the point of the modern; and at the same point a fissure occurs in Rosenzweig's theory. For if a discussion of modern tragedy is to occur in the *Star*, it ought to fall at the point of the theory's climax, where the spectator, the dramatic, and poetry converge. Instead, modern tragedy escapes the confines of the prereal theory and precedes it, headed by the reality-defining section title, "The Act of Love." Here, Rosenzweig presents the modern tragic hero, so definitively distinct

from the ancient one, by his vexed enmeshment in relations, including those with the spectators. Having turned toward relation, the modern hero, like the beloved soul, escapes self-enclosure. But he does so at this price: others turn to him as well, and so generate with him a cacophony of perspectival readings of reality. The modern hero's perspective is ever only one of many. The monologue form, so essential to the ancient hero's self-enclosure, reappears in modern drama as a context for the hero's approach of a perspectiveless or absolute view of his world. And indeed the modern dramatist bends all his efforts to guide his hero there, and sometimes succeeds, as Shakespeare with Hamlet, or Goethe with Faust. But it is not enough merely to be guided to the absolute view. The ancient hero dwelt from start to finish in the absolute, albeit the enclosed one of himself. Correspondingly, the high point of modern tragedy would be a relational hero who overcomes perspective and "lives within the absolute" (SR 211). But at this high point, tragedy would outdo itself and produce a saint. For the saint is "the perfect human being, the one, that is, who lives absolutely in the Absolute" (SR 211)—not his own absolute, but God's. The tragedy is outdone because at this point there is no character to move the definitively modern tragedy of character. Character has been converted to absolute love. This is why modern tragedy falls under a section headed by love; but it is also why it falls outside the theory of art. A modern tragedy that attained its goal would cease to be tragic, would cease to be art at all. For the goal that is the saint "lies at a distance that tragedy cannot traverse" (SR 211) and remain within the bounds of art.

Rosenzweig's discussion recalls the critical studies of Dostoevsky's *The Idiot*, and of the extent to which this work succeeds in artistically portraying the tragic saint.[47] But it recalls much more immediately the whole plight of the Schellingian modern who cannot humanly reach the goal of infinity without dissolving as human. Of course, it is only Rosenzweig's dramatic artist who is tempted by his own demise, not the human as such. At this juncture, Rosenzweig inverts the redemptive power of Schellingian art. Schelling's modern artist saves the human from dissolving in the infinite, where religion would lead him. Rosenzweig's artist is saved by the absolute when it takes him outside art and into the human, under the aegis of revelation. But salvation is not the artist's lot. Instead, he launches a course of self-enclosures, that proceed from himself through the artwork to the connoisseur, and that all along the way foretell a redemption others are to know. The artist is a kind of living fossil; he inhabits the real world of relations like a Schellingian potence, a

trace of what has always just vanished. But without the potences there would be no world; and without the artist, there would be no miracle of reality.

Philosophy and the Hypercosmos

By the time of the *Star*'s third part, the explicit challenge of philosophy, in the form of erring idealism, has largely spent itself. There are no section headings that name idealism here, as there are in the second part. In the last book of part three, the ghost of idealism is explicitly raised once more in order to receive one last, overt banishing—"to reject here for the last time the blasphemy of philosophy" (SR 392). The blasphemy of philosophy was that no truths lay outside itself (this had been Schelling's claim for philosophy) so that whoever philosophizes finds truth within himself. It is rather the reverse, that we find ourselves in the truth, which we cannot encompassingly live. We behold truth. But what we behold is outside us. If we find ourselves in the truth, it can only be by way of reflection, pointing us back to our own necessarily perspectival, and so only partially true lives.

But before the final banishing of idealism, it performs some constructive reflecting on its own. It reflects an erring incompleteness in the second, epochal form of Christianity, namely the Pauline (SR 281). Petrine Christianity was all outward conquest. The early and medieval church of St. Peter turned in love towards the conversion of the whole pagan world. It wanted the outward, bodily signs of obeisance to Christ. In its zeal for the outward, it ignored the inward. It even devised a means of protecting itself from the awareness of the danger posed by the inward pagan. By its doctrine of the two truths—one for faith, one for reason—it clothed the inward pagan in a veil of respectability. Pagan reason did, after all, know a truth of its own, however limited. But pagan reason was never so tame as to rest content with second place, as the Reformation would reveal. For the Reformation church, which inaugurates the Pauline era, now abandons the outer Christian and looks solely to the inner. It takes upon itself the work of conquering the inward pagan. Its *sola fides* makes spirit, which hitherto was nothing, virtually all. The world and all Christian forms indebted to it are banished. Idealism now arrives as the reductio ad adsurdum of Protestant Christianity. For idealism, not satisfied to banish the world, insists on consuming it and disgorging it whole. It is an unattractive office but an instructive one. For, by mirroring the excess of Pauline Christianity in its worst light, idealism turns Christianity off that track and onto a new one that sanely links what Peter and Paul had jointly sundered. In the new, Johannine Christianity, an inwardly Christian soul lives its bodily life within the world and so accomplishes the world-loving movement of faith that unfolds out of revelation into redemption.

The trouble with revelation passing into redemption is that it is blind. The Johannine Christian needs eyes to guide his worldly way. And this is what prayer supplies. If love only reaches as far as it can touch, which is always only so far as the nearest neighbor, prayer extends to a vision of what lies at the end of love's groping way. In fact, the world is already pushing forward to receive the human work of redemption. The Johannine Christian prays for the completion of his meeting with the world, for that portion of the world that he will have ensouled by the end of his course. But this prayer is strangely dual. It enfolds a bridge over genuine distance, between human and world, in self-enclosure. For the face of the world the human meets in this prayer is his own, enworlded.

Rosenzweig anticipated Johannine prayer in his account of artistic genius. For the genius ensouls his artwork with a whole-embracing part of himself. But unlike the artist, the Johannine Christian reaches across a distance that remains, despite the self-enclosure that is constructed over it. In effect, the Johannine Christian inverts the movement from protocosmos to cosmos. That movement constructed relation over enclosure; this one constructs enclosure over relation.

The prayer of the human to his own enworlded self courses through the relation revelation opened up between soul and world; but he who prays this prayer, unconscious of the revelation that grounds it, prays in unbelief. The Johannine prayer is essentially individual; it is of the individual and to the individual, that is, to his individual embedding in the world. The individuality and unbelief of the prayer are related. Belief was the province of the theologian. His was the belief in the miraculous acts of creation, revelation and redemption. What distinguishes these acts from the protocosmic thought courses is that they were acts of genuine relation. The theologian prays, in belief, from a stance

that is self-consciously relational. And, correspondingly, the prayer prayed, in unbelief, from the stance of individuality falls precisely to the philosopher.

If the prayer of unbelief were not oxymoronic enough, the praying philosopher is even more so. Philosophy comes in answer to Boethius' "quiet thinking,"[48] not his prayers; and even the thinking is directed more toward death than toward philosophy (though the distinction is fine in Rosenzweig's eyes). But philosophers do pray. Socrates' prayer at the close of *Phaedrus* succinctly seals what philosophy has led him to believe about beauty:

> Socrates: Beloved Pan, all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as a temperate man and he only can bear and carry. Anything more? The prayer I think is enough for me.
>
> Phaedrus: Ask the same for me, for friends should have all things in common.
>
> Socrates: Let us go.[49]

Socrates' prayer is peculiar, in part, because his self-conscious reflection on the prayer, at the end, is barely distinguishable from the prayer itself; as though, for philosophers, prayer and self-examination are the same. Socrates' prayer is a paradigm of philosophical prayer as Rosenzweig understands it. Socrates prays for individual unity. He asks for a particular station in the context of the world. And he prays in the exclusive first person singular. The very last line of the dialogue is almost comically heedless of Phaedrus' request. But that only shows how much philosophical prayer fails to include the friend, much less the community.

The self-enclosure of philosophical prayer walls it up within unbelief. But in a more conventional sense of unbelief, it is unbelieving for bypassing God and passing directly to the world. Pan is, after all, a god of nature. He who prays to his self-objectification in the world prays to part of a genuine other. The world offers itself to receive the human's imprint. And from the world's viewpoint, this is no loss of itself to the human, but its own growth in essence or redemption. Creation and revelation condition the mutual approach between human and world, but they are not the channels along which philosophical prayer passes. It is the prayer of belief, which the theologian prays,

that follows the paths of all three relations. The grounding role that philosophy plays to theology appears once more, but in the context of prayer. For Rosenzweig insists that believing prayer is a "supplement to the prayer of the nonbeliever . . . and is effective only as such a supplementation" (SR 289). It is as though Rosenzweig is formulating, in a very abstract way, one interpretation of the injunction from Leviticus 19:18, or Matthew 19:19, to love the neighbor as oneself, namely that no one can love his neighbor without antecedently loving himself. But his thought here is much more definitively and exclusively Christian. The Christian must pass through the Petrine conversion of the outwardly other and Pauline conversion of the inwardly same, i.e., he must become the object of his own conversion, before he can truly pray the Christian prayers of creation, revelation, and redemption—the prayers that link him to the whole of reality and not just to his own part in it. Christianity is definitively conversive. It always addresses the pagan. But in a world from which official, institutional paganism has long been banished, the pagan must be individually created anew. The prior Christian ages work paradoxically to that end. They create the conditions for the prayer of unbelief, of the individual to himself. It is just that self-enclosure of confirmed individuality that Christian teaching presupposes, addresses, and opens to relational life. All Christians must be philosophers first.

In a provocatively inverted anticipation of this view, eight years before publication of the *Star*, Rosenzweig wrote to Rudolf Ehrenberg, explaining his disavowed decision to become a Christian: "I could turn Christian only qua Jew—not through the intermediate stage of paganism."[50] It is as though Christianity is only accessible through some opposition to it, whether pagan (and philosophical) or Jewish. The same might be said of the new philosophy, which is so very long in rejecting the blasphemies of the old. The new philosophy, whose portion was to reason a rationally unsubsumable separation of elements, lays methodological ground for the definitive role of opposition. Each element included a negating movement that, acting on behalf of the affirming one, raised all opposition for the sheer sake of denying it. Negation shaped the affirmed essence more definitively. It was the later Schelling who, especially in his *Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom*, understood freedom as the overcoming of a prior resistance. And this idea surfaces again in Rosenzweig's understanding of temptation's role in prayer life, the introductory topic of part three. But theological prayer is not to overcome philosophical prayer. The two are to

unite in one individual, who prays with both hands, one philosophical, one theological, entreatingly extended.

The author of *The Philosophy of Art* is not among the small company of praying philosophers. There is hardly need for prayer when the absolute already shows itself finitely in a myriad of accessible artworks. Prayer is of much less interest than liturgical rites, which are less important for the prayers they contain than for the public artistry they constitute. In one passage, where Schelling does consider individual prayer, he identifies it with mysticism. For the inward prayer that takes no outward form foregoes all grounding in the finite, and bears its speaker, sacrificially, into the infinite (PA 65). Self-affirmation is surrendered to self-loss. It is art that, by holding the finite to finitude even as it attains the infinite, repeats the absolute self-affirmation that inaugurates the whole *The Philosophy of Art*. And here a harmony with Rosenzweig sounds. For the philosopher's prayer is also a self-affirmation. The absolute self-affirmation might be taken for prayer, too, if the distance across which it reached were not so short-lived, having always just vanished, rather than an enduring distance of the kind that separates the praying philosopher from his worldly image.

But even if the absolute self-affirmation were taken for prayer, it would have to share pride of place with theological prayer, a caveat from Rosenzweig that, however acceptable to the rabbinic mind, which pictured God studying Talmud, is simply inadmissible to philosophical science. Ultimately, philosophical prayer must remain an absurdity to the early Schelling who, in turn, must illustrate for Rosenzweig philosophy at its blasphemous worst. It is perhaps all the more surprising, then, that as Rosenzweig moves beyond philosophical prayer, to its theological mate, he sounds still closer to a philosopher with whom the early Schelling was, in his time, sometimes explicitly identified, namely Plato. If the so inescapably theological concept of miracle offered passage out of the philosophical protocosmos into the theological cosmos, the corresponding passage out of the cosmos is offered by a concept definitively shaped by the works of Voltaire and Kant, namely Enlightenment (SR 261). Only Hallo's translation conveys this suggestion, for it renders both *Aufklaerung*, which Rosenzweig discusses in the early pages of part two, and *Erleuchtung*, which begins the passage to part three, "enlightenment." It is a happy accident of translation. All the *Aufklaerungen* Rosenzweig discusses in the section named for them "represent . . . that knowledge with which it [belief] must contend" (SR 97). And the *Erleuchtung* of part three is about nothing if not truth, for which all the knowledge-hungry *Aufklaerungen* labored. Plato, who critiqued the mythology of his own culture, belonged to the first *Aufklaerung*. But surely no philosopher is more identifiable with *Erleuchtung* than he, whose image for reason was the sun. The star, whose light is only visible in darkness, is a more suitable image for Rosenzweig's truth, which is so explicitly wedded to images of darkness and to language that, in the third book of part three, is scarcely pellucid. But Rosenzweig leaves no doubt that the hypercosmos is an "ocean of light" (SR 80) that, like those by now oft-cited waves of Baeckian romanticism, engulfs all life. Like the Platonic soul, one perceives (SR 394) this light, but does not continuously dwell within it. The "mysterious-miraculous light of the divine sanctuary" (SR 424) does not support human life. We descend from this light back into life, just as Socrates descends from the summit to which he has guided Glaucon in book seven of the *Republic*. Human life transpires in part two of the *Star*, which is the world of revelation, whose organon was language. The return to life and language is a return from silence. Silence is the extended accompaniment, through part three, of the vision presented there. Vision supplants language (SR 295) in the hypercosmic "leap beyond the world of words" (SR 385). In this "redeemed world above-and-beyond" (SR 418), revelation ceases. That the revealed name of God is so bounded by strictures on its pronunciation, at least within Jewish tradition, already anticipates the final end when it is altogether rescinded (SR 383–384). The points of climactic silence within the Jewish and Christian liturgical cycles—at Yom Kippur (SR 323–324)[51] or during the mass (SR 370)—are further anticipations.

A contrast sometimes heard of the ancient Jews with the Greeks is that the first were foremost aural, and the second visual. The one was naturally attentive to language, the other to vision. Certainly Plato located his highest visions of goodness, beauty, and truth in a world beyond words. Socrates seems to plead for silence when he "recalls," with Phaedrus, the pre-ensouled vision of ideal beauty.[52] In a striking parallel with Rosenzweig's claim about eternal truth, that it assumes an imagable configuration (the star) (SR 422), which is beyond, but related to, the real world, Socrates tells Glaucon, in the *Republic*, that at the height of dialectic he would "behold not an image only but the absolute truth . . . [which] would have been something like reality."[53] Socrates is skeptical that words could ever express what is seen there for, "I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the word express more than the

fact, and must not the actual . . . fall short of the truth?"[54] Rosenzweig also devalues language before vision, since language gives itself away in speech: "a word forgets itself and is to be forgotten" (SR 372); while light, as neoplatonists have always observed, is not reduced by shining but "is visible by remaining wholly in itself" (SR 295). Even the ascending Platonic sequence of fact, actual/language, truth, could be taken in parallel with the protocosmic, cosmic, and hypercosmic sections of the *Star*. Truth is the climactic height for both.[55] Both describe the dangers of scaling these heights—the "noxious weeds" of improperly applied dialectic,[56] the excess of emotion and self-enclosure that threaten Christianity and Judaism, respectively, at their farthest outward and inward reaches; so much so that Rosenzweig is prompted to warn his readers, in one of his few direct addresses to them, to "be very careful for the sake of your souls" (SR 418), an admonition that raises the tremors associated in rabbinic Judaism with the study of esoteric lore.

The comparison with Plato cannot be pressed too far. Socrates was after all a major contributor to the philosophical cult of death,[57] which Rosenzweig takes such pains to undermine. But Plato proves a suggestive meeting ground for *The Philosophy of Art* and the Platonically resonant sections of part three of the *Star*. One contemporary of the early Schelling called him "this second Plato."[58] Plato appears very early in *The Philosophy of Art* as "the divine Plato" (PA 4), whose banishment of poetry from the ideal state is a serious challenge indeed. Schelling explains that troubling exile, decreed in book ten of the *Republic*, on grounds that ancient art necessarily privileged the finite, or real, towards which the infinite moved, while Plato instated the infinite as determinative goal centuries before its time. If Plato had lived to see the aspiring infinity of Christian art, just finite enough for the sake of art, he would never have banished poetry from his state. Plato, the idealist, was a modern, as are all who pine for the infinite. This is already an affinity with Schelling. For both, the infinite is disclosed in vision. For neither, is the vision primarily sensual. It is no accident, surely, that Schelling's reflections on Plato follow immediately on a paragraph in which "the sensual eye" is deemed wholly useless to philosophy (PA 4). The Schellingian vision is an intuition in the Kantian sense, of an immediate representation; but, as against Kant, it is not confined to sense, and is not determined by universal concepts. Purely sensible intuition is only comprehensible through the mediation of concepts. So the conceptually unmediated must be nonsensuous. Kant would restrict these representations to the pure forms of sensual intuition, space and

time, and to the ideas, the objectless ones of theoretical reason and the esthetic ones of judgment. But for Schelling, there is one conceptually unmediated representation that is neither objectless nor exclusively esthetic, and this is indifference. As formulated in *Bruno*, indifference is precisely the identification of objective sensations with subjectively imposed concepts. In the collapse of that separation there is no longer a distinction between givenness (of sense) and determining (by concepts), or between known and knower. The knower, become knowing, is simply knowing knowing.[59] That is his intellectual vision.

But at this juncture, Schellingian and Platonic vision part ways. They part over a division within vision itself, which can be either the act of seeing or the object seen. Schellingian vision subsumes the object under the act. But Platonic vision does not. Plato sets up a correspondence between knowing and known: the act of knowing can only be of being, which are the ideas.[60] Socrates describes a "drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with being,"[61] but the movement of this subsumption is, if anything, of the act under the object, the direction neoplatonism would follow and that German idealism would reverse. But certainly two of the most memorable metaphors from the *Republic*, the cave and the divided line, work to accentuate the distance between subjective act and object. "In the world of knowledge the idea of the good appears last of all and is seen only with an effort."[62] It is "the fragility of goodness"[63] that drives the threefold Platonic denial—of the world, for the sake of knowledge of the good; of the body, for the sake of the happiness of the good; of tragic literature, for the sake of the beauty of the good. The vision of the good is never assured; it hovers above the highest act philosophy can commend, namely dialectic. The vision begins where dialectic, so inseparably bound to language, ends. Part of the poignancy of the Platonic dialogues is that, by committing Socrates to so much dialectical discourse, they allow him so few occasions for actual vision. Only the silences that sporadically occur, in fits of solitary abstraction, in the places where Glaucon cannot follow, in "memory of scenes which have passed away"[64], open a space for it.

Here Rosenzweig is the truer Platonist. For the truth perceived in part three of the *Star* is emphatically only perceived, and not incorporated under any vital human act. All that is vital and active is confined to part two. If anything, Rosenzweig's drift in part three follows Plato's towards an act-encompassing truth, except that the truth points back to acts, like the vision from which philosophers descend back down into the cave. Both Plato and Rosenzweig deny the

unfigured immediacy of truth. Rosenzweig shifts immediacy to divine love (SR 392), which is one with its linguistic expression. But truth, transcending language, must be mediated by figures. Socrates, too, has recourse to these—the winged horses of the soul,[65] the sun of reason—for the highest truths are "a theme of large and more than mortal discourse."[66] Rosenzweig's figure for the truth is, of course, the star of redemption. The content of the star is not new. Its content is the inversive meetings of part two, overlaid the protocosmic points of part one. What is new is the form of the presentation. The new form is signaled by the changes in the titles of the three major parts of the book, from Elements to Course to Structure (*Gestalt*) (SR 295). The elements were a chaos of self-enclosures competing for the position of the whole. The courses were the avenues of directed movement over which the externalized elements met in shared constitution of the whole. Directed movement succeeds chaos. In structure, rest succeeds movement. The structure is an end in which all coursing ceases, including life itself (SR 380). It is as though to see the whole of the course, which is identified with life, one must step outside it. The light of the hypercosmos ends revealed life in the double sense in which death ends created life. Just as death intensifies the direction towards individuality in which created human life moves, and so, in a sense, fulfills it in the very act of ending it, so the light of truth intensifies the direction towards truth in which the only partially true lives of revelation move, ending them in the very act of completing them. This is why the hypercosmos is simultaneously life and a "view beyond life" (SR 384, 416), a paradox that follows the idealist logic of vanishing, by which two sides of a vanished space can take the same, or opposing, predicates. So Rosenzweig can say, in addition, that the life of revelation is transformed into hypercosmic light (SR 380).

If life moves upward, vanishingly, into the figure of the star, God moves downward, revealingly, into it. God "gives himself figure" (SR 422) in the truth of the star. God is doubly related to the star. He constitutes one of its three points, and from that station coursingly meets both human and world. This is how human and world know God in their own life courses. But the revelation of God in the course is simultaneously a self-concealment. The revelation of God projects, backwards, a veil of concealment over the protocosmic God. That God now shows itself for a construct of nonknowledge, that predicts the creating, revealing God of the cosmos. The hypercosmos is a complementary presentation of divine concealment, projected forward

from the present, instead of backward. The end it shows of the coursings is concealed from us who livingly inhabit them. It shows what from within life defies presentation, namely our own ends. The difference between God and us is that he experiences the star, as we do the course, while we only catch it in a vision. It is the culmination of our moment of philosophizing, which Rosenzweig says everyone should do just once. The "millennial secret of philosophy" is, after all, that death is its "musaget" (SR 5), the conductor of its multiple voices not only from "Iona to Jena" (SR 12) but beyond also, to Frankfurt and the new philosophy, which once again teaches the fulfillment of ends; except that now, philosophy should bare its secret and retire. We are not to long for our deaths, but return to our lives, and leave the vision of the star to a future that is always just ahead.

It was the burden of the Schellingian modern to long for an infinite he could not livingly attain. Only modern art, which miraculously infinitizes the finite, could offer moments of fulfillment. Rosenzweig, too, will accommodate the visionary moment. But the figure of the star wakens no longing to dwell in it. Rosenzweig imposes upon the figure of the star the secondary figure of a face. Because the star is fixed by God's position at the top, it exhibits a hierarchy that can be interpreted after the model of a human face. The upright triangle of protocosmic points provides structure for the face: God, the forehead; human and world, the cheeks. The inverted triangle of coursings provides the two active organs: creation and revelation, the eyes; redemption, the mouth. Schelling had also singled out eyes and forehead as "the most significant features" of the head (PA 187). The human form is "an image of the universe" and the eyes, the organ through which "the innermost light of nature looks out" (PA 187). If Rosenzweig's imagistic face is superimposed on Schelling's, then the eyes of creation and revelation do not so much see as mediate a light that looks out through them. Rosenzweig does indeed build on this image: the eyes shine, the one evenly, the other flashingly—the one continuously, in support of the world's need, the other discontinuously, in need of human support. Rosenzweig differs from Schelling in drawing attention to the mouth. If the mouth is redemption, it speaks no words. For God does not directly address either the human or world in redemption. But like the prophetic images of the word that is not heard but seen (Amos 1:1, Isaiah 2:1), a visible but wordless communication shapes itself on the mouth: it is a kiss. An image of love is seen in the mouth. And this is the moment that the visible face vanishes into the audible

word of the command to "Love me!" The light of the hypercosmos turns back into the life of the cosmos and the lived course of creation, revelation, and redemption.

Towards the end of part two, in a section entitled "Relationship to the Protocosmos," Rosenzweig considers the relation of the cosmic coursings to the protocosmic points. The paths that connect the emerged points to the cosmos are the same as those that meet within the confines of each of the self-enclosed points of the protocosmos. It is on this basis that Rosenzweig connected philosophy to theology as the latter's predictor. If the hypercosmos, in turn, refers back to the cosmos, then it marks an area of inquiry that likewise stands to theology as philosophy does, only inverted, referring back to theology instead of forward to it. And this would suggest that philosophy, whose proper province is the protocosmos, is nonetheless precisely mirrored in the hypercosmos. Rosenzweig himself suggests the mirror when he names three major sections of the third book of part three after the sections of each book of part one. "God (Theology)," "Truth (Cosmology)," and "Spirit (Psychology)" in part three mirror "Negative Theology," "Negative Cosmology," and "Negative Psychology," in part one. This could explain the peculiarly philosophical tenor of the hypercosmic sections, harking back to Plato at his most visionary and to all who, like Schelling, follow in his train. An object and its mirror image reverse the sides of a common axis. From the vantage point of a line drawn down the middle of the object, what is rightward from there is leftward from the standpoint of the same line repeated in the image. And so if the hypercosmos mirrors the protocosmos, they must reverse each other over a common axis. But this is just what they appear to do. The common axis is a concept that applies to both the protocosmic elements and the structured star, namely factuality. The reversals are developed over a host of analogous oppositions: truth and nonknowledge, lightness and dark, wholeness and part, prayer and logic.

Both the protocosmos and the hypercosmos culminate in facts: the facts of the three self-enclosed elements, the fact of the star. Rosenzweig contrasts the factuality of the elements to the paths of reasoning that culminate in them (SR 63), and the fact of the star to multiple points of view (SR 422). It is as though factuality stands opposed to movement and possibility, which are, themselves, interrelated. Movement presupposes possibility. Both concepts are integral to the idea of change. Facts are contents at rest, as opposed to the realities of creation, revelation, and redemption, which are meetings of movements. So, for example, the reality of human nature exhibited

in revelation and redemption cannot be said to be "in fact at all" (SR 282); rather, it becomes.

Among the idealists, it was Fichte who elaborated the concept of facticity. In *The Science of Knowledge*, that "the self posits itself as determined by the notself" is both the result of a deduction and "a primordial fact occurring in our mind."[67] That is, the paradoxical act of self-determination through limitation by an other occurs both unconsciously and, in philosophy, as the conclusion of a conscious process of thought. The fact is both the unconscious (primordial) occurrence and the deduced thought that corresponds to it.[68] In philosophy, the primordial fact, "elevated by reflection into the consciousness"[69] becomes a proved fact that excludes all other possibilities. The Fichtean circle of facticity is fundamentally the same as the Schellingian circle of self-affirmation. For Schellingian self-affirmation is also an identification of unconscious and conscious activity. What affirms itself has transformed a noncognized beginning into a cognized ending. Both Fichte and Schelling are tracing the genesis of knowledge within monism. By employing the language of facticity, Rosenzweig situates himself in this heritage. But by breaking with idealism, he also fractures the concept of facticity. The identified unconscious and consciously deduced fact breaks in two along the seam of the meeting between conscious and unconscious, and all of reality intervenes between them. The unconscious fact falls back into a permanent presupposition of reality, incomprehensible apart from reality, while the conscious fact falls forward into a vision of reality that can never be vitally known (at least by us). Rosenzweig alludes in passing to the idealist backdrop of his discussion when he observes that "factuality is completed only in contemplation; now no more is heard of object and act" (SR 295). Rosenzweig retains from idealism the fixity of facts. By the completion of factuality, he means the transformation of the chaotically unrelated protocosmic elements into their unalterably fixed positions within the star. He also retains from idealism the culminating station of facts, at the conclusion of a movement, but it is no longer a movement of pure reasoning. The old idealist completion of factuality passed from unconscious identity of act and object, through conscious act, to conscious identity of act and object. But now a vast expanse of reality blocks these passages, and no more is heard of act and object. The three protocosmic facts are transposed to the one hypercosmic fact, not by way of the self-conscious play of object and act, but by the cosmic courses of revelation. The courses, exited and then contemplated as a unified fact in hypercosmic vision show the

protocosmic facts beneath them. The enigmatic facts of the protocosmos, which figure in reality as largely unconscious presuppositions, are mirrored in the consciously contemplated fact of the hypercosmos. It is the idealist heritage of factuality, lying beneath Rosenzweig's split application of this term to both protocosmic elements and hypercosmic star, that points to the axial role facts can play between the two nonreal cosmoses.

The oppositions that arrange themselves around this axis have already begun to show. The protocosmic elements are culminations of nonknowledge, products of reasoning from contentful nothings. The star is a vision of truth. Rosenzweig explicitly arranges the opposition of *das Nichts* and the truth around a common factuality: "The Nought, exactly like the truth, is not an independent subject at all. It is a mere fact . . . seeking the ground on which it stands" (SR 390). Here, factuality is what lacks subjectivity. Unlike idealist factuality, Rosenzweig's cannot produce itself as a product of an authenticating movement. It must seek its ground outside itself. The *Nichts* finds its ground in the cosmos, i.e., it becomes comprehensible as predictor (not producer) of the cosmos. When Rosenzweig applies the same lack of subjectivity to the truth, he undermines in a single step the whole idealist program. For what fuels idealism's conviction that self-authenticating truth may be found (SR 386) is the belief that truth may function as active subject, indeed, as subject of the sentence "Truth is God." By inverting this sentence, and locking it into its reversal, "God is truth," Rosenzweig reduces truth once more to the place of a mere factual object. It, like *das Nichts*, requires grounding outside itself. And this, says Rosenzweig, is God. If truth stands to God as protocosmic *Nichts* to cosmos, then God would seem shifted forward to a place beyond truth, like the cosmos that, from its place beyond the protocosmos, projects back onto it a meaning. And Rosenzweig does affirm that God is "'more' than the truth" (SR 386). But then, in an unexpected reversal, the position from which God authenticates the truth is shifted back to before the first appearance of truth, into the cosmos. For the star of truth is generated by the cosmic coursings. And, from a human perspective, these begin in the revelatory command to love, unfolding from there backward into creation, and forward into redemption. It is because God pronounces "Love me!" that the cosmic course, on which the star is built, exists at all. And so God does authenticate the truth; "God is its origin" (SR 388). But that hypercosmic stance of God towards truth precisely reverses his protocosmic stance towards *das Nichts*. The protocosmic God is nothing's product; the hypercosmic God is truth's origin. These two opposing locations of God exhaust the positions from which the question "What is God?" may be sensibly posed and answered: "God is the Naught" and "God is the truth" (SR 390).

That opposite answers may come with equal justice to the same question evokes shades of Schelling's indifference. But indifference would draw the two answers into a single truth, while Rosenzweig separates them over the divide of reality. The question of "what God is" cannot even be posed from within reality. For the question presupposes God's isolatability, a fact that reality denies. God is an isolatable fact only in his protocosmic capacity as nothing, or his hypercosmic capacity as truth. Even to ask what God is, one must have fallen backward into the protocosmos, or forward into the hypercosmos. Because protocosmic nothing predicts reality, and hypercosmic truth has its origin there, passage does lead forward from the fact of nothing and backward from the fact of truth into a common reality. But far from uniting these facts in a single affirmation, reality negates them, for it does not deal in the stasis of facts at all, but only in the reality of movement, and preserves them within itself only as separable traces, the one of a permanent past, the other of the future. Rosenzweig has turned indifference inside out. It was indifference that left behind the trace of reality. Now it is reality that conceals traces of a broken indifference.

The broken indifference extends over two other, familiar Schellingian oppositions: light and dark, whole and part. In the light of the hypercosmos there occurs "a direct view of the whole truth" (SR 416). In the dark of the protocosmos, the whole has been shattered into three unrelated parts. The parts are not particulars in Schelling's sense. None of them reproduces the whole within itself, but each remains separately by its own self. And yet, here again, through the shared axis of factuality, the unrealities of light and dark, whole and part, seem to mirror each other. The protocosmic elements, chaotically arranged, reappear permanently fixed in the hypercosmic star. Reciprocally, the light of the hypercosmos takes on some features of darkness. The God who originates truth does reveal himself in the love command, but simultaneously withdraws beyond the truth he shows, like the cosmos beyond the protocosmos, to a station "beyond all that can be imparted . . . above even the whole" (SR 417). And suddenly the hypercosmos is as much about concealment as the protocosmos, so much so that the light of the one "is the same as that which spent the night in God's bosom prior to all existence" (SR 417), i.e., in the protocosmos. Alternatively, from the standpoint

of the cosmos, the three elements constitute a "glowing tripod" (SR 257) in the protocosmic night, that lights the way in two opposite directions: toward their own origin in nothing, and toward the origin of their mirrored, hypercosmic projections in God. Over the separation of reality, the light reflects the darkness, and the darkness, the light, much like the Schellingian potences that subsume their opposites within them. In the end, both proto- and hypercosmos darken the view of God by offering walls behind which his essence may retire, and lighten it at the same time by the mirrored pointings they make to his cosmic reality.

In another redounding to philosophical origins beyond Schelling, in Plato, Rosenzweig casts mathematics as the organon of the protocosmos. For arithmetic was the first stage of education towards Platonic dialectic. In a highly unlikely pairing, prayer occupies the corresponding role or organon in the hypercosmos. It is hard to see how any mirroring can occur here; but it does, through silence. From the standpoint of spoken (dialogic) language, the organon of reality, the communal prayers of the Jewish and Christian hypercosmos are as silent as the algebraic equations of the protocosmos. Here again, the commonality is mirrored or inverted across the divide of the two nonreal cosmoses. Algebra is mute from lacking words; communal prayer, from surpassing them (SR 385). Words obstruct communal immediacy. Ultimately, prayer culminates in gestures that silently communicate the whole of their speakable content. Now it is no longer a private language of command that connects two, immediately, in dialogue, but a shared silence that connects many, immediately, in community. The communal prayer extends beyond the individual enworlding of philosophical prayer, to a vision of absolute completion. The object of prayer having expanded, the praying subject does too.

The premise of the hypercosmos is the six-part course of the cosmos. The desired conclusion of the hypercosmos is a vision of the truth, single and whole. Communal prayer is the organon of the hypercosmos because it is the means by which passage is offered from premise to conclusion. Part of the difficulty of the *Star*'s last part may owe to a mixing of genres it imposes on itself. Just as, if art is the organon of philosophy, Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* must eventually convert from philosophical exposition to art, so, if prayer is the organon of absolute truth, must the last part of the *Star* ultimately convert to prayer. It does take on the tone of prayer, especially in the final section entitled "Gate," where there erupts that singular admonition to take care for our souls, followed

by a passage from one of the most famous prayers of Jewish ritual, the priestly blessing of Numbers 6:25. But mostly, what part three offers is an interpretive exposition of prayer, culminating in expository remove, at second hand, in the desired vision. We have already considered the opening sections of part three, on philosophical prayer. These function as prelude to the two lengthy books on Jewish and Christian prayer. For, as Rosenzweig explains, "life . . . must first become wholly temporal, wholly alive [as it does in the self-affirming individuality of philosophical prayer] before it can become eternal life" (SR 288). Rosenzweig speaks loosely here, since it is only Christians who must first be enlivened to philosophical individuality, and only Jews who know eternal life. Still, between them, and their respective liturgical cycles, they exhaust all the truly communal prayer the *Star* acknowledges.

We have seen philosophy play the presuppositional handmaid to theology, as it does in the introduction to part three of the *Star*, on philosophical prayer, and we have seen philosophy mirrored in the final climactic approach to truth, as occurs in book three of part three, on truth. With regard to Judaism and Christianity, which are treated in the two intervening books, philosophy plays these roles again in different guises. Philosophy as dualistic paganism is the presupposition of Christianity; philosophy as monistic self-enclosure of opposites is the protocosmic mirror of Judaism.

Like the philosophy of art, which according to Schelling unites opposites in one, Judaism and Christianity are inherent self-contradictions. They are courses of liturgical acts that are nonetheless hypercosmically instated beyond the reality of courses. Alternatively, they realize the unlivable star in two alternatively livable ways, one facing inward towards the star, the other facing outward, and each is blind in the other's direction. The figure that allows for these living contradictions is the hour, which temporally translates a circle. The hour marks a passage with a distinct beginning and end, but it is stationary, since the end comes back to the beginning and recommences (SR 290). The repetition of hours, a concept that already evokes the monastic prayer day, is a figure of eternity. Eternity is the inversion of time, the end that precedes the beginning or, as Rosenzweig puts it, the moment whose perishing is a beginning (SR 289), and this is just what occurs at the boundary between hours. It is because the Jewish and Christian liturgies are built on the hour—on days, weeks, months, years patterned after it—that they can move those who practice them towards a vision of the eternal, perspectiveless truth. As it happens, only Jews, who face inside

their own liturgical cycles, attain the vision, while Christians, ever facing outside their sacred hours, to the inhabitants of profane, merely successive time, miss it.

If the common form of Christianity and Judaism, a static movement, is paradoxical, their contents too embrace explicit oppositions. The divisions within Judaism and Christianity owe to their respective inward and outward facings. Judaism is a religion of one, particular people who claim to bear an exhaustive religious significance for all peoples. Judaism oscillates between the poles of this particular and universal status. Christianity discounts the divisions of peoples entirely. The church, which a portion of the world's individuals have joined, claims to bear a message of exhaustive religious significance to all individuals. It is here that Christianity confronts philosophy in the form of protocosmic paganism. For philosophy had enclosed each of the protocosmic elements within an equation of its passive essence and active, negating movement. And these equations are the philosophical constructions of pagan divinity, humanity, and worldliness, whose historical paradigms are ancient Greek mythology, tragedy, and polis. It is the bearer of these protocosmic thought structures that Christianity confronts as it faces outward from its sacred hours.

But Greek mythology, tragedy, and polis belong to the ancient world. No one vitally inhabits these ancient protocosmic expressions anymore. Still, if Christianity is to operate as revelation, it must provide routes for self-enclosures to open towards each other in meeting. For this is what revelation, most broadly understood, is. And that presupposes self-enclosures to address. Since these self-enclosures are no longer given in vital paganism, Christianity, as we have seen, must recreate them, and does so, paradoxically, within the very confines of the church. The church carries within its embrace those who have been converted to its liturgical forms, but not its inward beliefs, and conversely, those converted to the beliefs, but not the liturgical forms. It is by the tolerant catholicity of the church, which is both Petrine and Pauline, that it admits so broad a spectrum. Christianity itself is much less tolerant. It counts for its own only those who know inwardly (experientially) the courses of revelation; and these it presents to be known only through the liturgy. So only the souls in which outward and inward conversion meet can claim to be true Christians. But it is just here that the paradoxical figure of the praying philosopher appears. For the soul may ride on the movements that converge within itself, of the outwardly and inwardly churched, but reject their churchly contents, and know their meeting

as a self-affirmation, rather than as affirmation of Christianity. This occurs when, as is almost proper, the merely churched individual wakens to the Christian inadequacy of the merely outward or inward turns and, abandoning the profession of either, takes their union within himself as a meeting of his own outward and inward self. This is what Goethe does when he prays to his own enworlded fate. And so a portion of the flock the church has nurtured becomes pagan, i.e., self-enclosed.

It was Maimonides who understood God's prolonged and seemingly pointless preparations of the Jewish people to receive his law to exemplify the divine category of the "gracious ruse."[70] But surely Christianity's use of the church to prepare its own true Christians surpasses in complexity all other instances of the divine use of ruse. For all their outward professions and inward confessions, the Christians of the Pauline and Petrine churches are pre-Christians at best. Unknown to themselves, they are trodding a long, slow path through Christian forms to a vibrant paganism. It would seem that the convergence of the outward and inward halves of pre-Christian life would culminate in the first full Christian. And, in a sense, they do. "Goethe," who for Rosenzweig typifies the praying philosopher, "is truly the great heathen and the great Christian at one and the same time" (SR 283). But his was a Christianity in form only, composed of the joint outward and inward movements, but not the contents, of Christian conversion. Now, however, at the Goethean summit of philosophical prayer, paganism is revived in its formal and contentful wholeness. The three self-enclosed dualities of the protocosmos repeat in his person and perspective. Rosenzweig explicitly presents only the human duality, which Goethe's prayer to his own fate illustrates. The fate, or enworlded completion of himself, is constructable as protocosmic human character; the prayer to it, as the protocosmically willed affirmation of character. Both together effect a human self-enclosure. But in any even superficial reading of Goethe's *Faust*, the divine and worldly self-enclosures of paganism may be read as well. Pagan divinity enclosed within itself anything of human or world it touched, and so inclined to pantheism. Pagan worldliness enclosed over the divide it suffered between ideal form and concrete reality. Faust exhibits both tendencies when in his first long speech of Goethe's play, he rejects his books (ideal form) for "nature's hidden powers," which encompass even him in their divinity ("Am I a god?").[71]

The church culminates in Goethe. And now, to complete the ruse, Christianity finally has its say. Goethe was exceptional in his

capacity to negotiate self-enclosure. It is a dangerous undertaking, bordered by abysses. Few can sustain the balanced tension of a vital self-enclosure, perfectly poised between an incompleted fate and the hope to complete it. The temptations are too great rashly and violently to force the fate, before its time, or abandon it altogether, on account of the anxious waiting it imposes, and presume oneself, falsely and capriciously, "free to entreat everything" (SR 286). By the title of the section that presents these dangers, "Goethe and Nietzsche," Rosenzweig indicates who he takes to warn us, by his example, against following Goethe. But there is no need to follow him. For once Christianity, via the church, has created self-enclosure, it was never its intention to linger there. Goethe, who did linger, is a worthy sacrifice to pay for all the others who, in his self-enclosed wake, are to be opened up to genuine relation.

Goethe functions as the modern protocosmos. Now that pagan pantheism, heroism, and worldly duality have been revived in him, Christianity comes with its threefold bifurcation: of God, between Father and Son; of human, between priest and saint; of world, between sacred and secular, to confront and eclipse the self-enclosed pagan dualisms. We have already seen, in chapter two, how this occurs. What remains to note is how explicitly Rosenzweig refers the Christian dualities back to those of the protocosmos. The "rays" of Christianity "burst visibly and divisibly into the night of the pagan proto- and hypocosmos" (SR 415). Christianity purchases its eclipse of paganism at the price of its own division into the Petrine, Pauline, and Johannine churches. The church can unite only "beyond the outer space of the protocosmos" (SR 398) when, as St. Paul says, "the full number of the Gentiles [have] come in" (Romans 11:25).

Of the three Christian churches, it is the Pauline one, or Protestantism, that Rosenzweig discusses under the headings "Modern Man" and "Modern Life in the Split Reality" (SR 280–281). The modern human is inward, fixed on the actions of his inner soul. The life he leads splits on the divide of the inner from the outward, which becomes the explicitly disparaged worldly. This is the sensibility for which church and world are opposites. But it is not as though division stops here, or even with the distinction from the two other churches, the Petrine and Johannine. Rosenzweig's analysis of Goethe, who culminates the Petrine and Pauline church, suggests that Christianity is to be further distinguished from these. Christianity merely builds on the self-enclosure jointly effected by Peter, Paul, and Goethe. Under the long section "Sanctification of the Soul: the Clerical Year," Rosenzweig traces the liturgical figurings of creation, revelation, and redemption that all completed Christians know experientially. These are the Johannine Christians who, grounded in the sacred hours of the clerical year, are the first Christians capable of redemptive love, always spontaneously and self-sacrificially whole, that Rosenzweig described in book three, part two of the *Star*.

Rosenzweig suggests that, if Pauline Christianity is modern, Johannine Christianity is the future church that succeeds modernity. It has already come into being. Indeed, all three churches, Petrine, Pauline, and Johannine, mark a succession more logical than temporal, present since the beginning of Christianity. Here, Rosenzweig is more sanguine than Schelling. For Schelling, too, intertwined Christianity with modernity. For him all Christianity was essentially modern (in Rosenzweig's terms, Pauline) by virtue of its divisive longing for the infinite. The Christian is divided not so much over inner and outer as over his paradoxical longing for what would efface him. The Schellingian Christian, like all moderns of nonmystical stamp, is divided from the whole by his own individuality on which, like the Pauline Christian of Rosenzweig's analysis, he is self-consciously (sentimentally) fixated. What corresponds in Schelling to the Petrine church is the church entire. The Schellingian church is what, by its concrete extension in history, its institutional and liturgical forms, guarantees a Christian art. A common division between Christianity and church runs through Schelling and Rosenzweig. Schelling's self-enclosed church saves an infinite Christianity for art. Rosenzweig's self-enclosed churches of Peter and Paul enable the salvation that occurs in John's, the final church of a genuinely relational Christianity. In *The Philosophy of Art*, Schelling offers no realized Christian analog to the Johannine church. If the Schellingian church is to offer any salvation other than the mystic's, it must be taken as art.

Rosenzweig will not take Christianity as art. However, he will allow Christianity to apply the arts to its liturgical figurings of creation, revelation, and redemption. Strangely and unexpectedly, it is Judaism that will go furthest to mirror the Schellingian self-enclosures of art. By the same token, it is Judaism that mirrors, rather than overcomes, the protocosmic self-enclosures. Judaism generates its own sets of balanced contradictions and these, says Rosenzweig, are "mirror-like" reflections of "all possible contradictions" (SR 402). The Jewish people, as the one people that claims to stand in for all peoples before God and world, microcosmically reproduces within Judaism the universal relations between God, human, and world, that are the subject of the *Star*'s second part. The God who creates and

reveals becomes the creator God of the biblical book of Genesis, the most universalistic of the five books of the Jewish Pentateuch, and the revealer God of Exodus, the book in which the Jews are constituted the people who particularly receive God's love. The universal human who receives revelation and redeems the world becomes the elected Jewish people and the expected messiah who will reconcile the nations. The world that receives creation and redemption becomes what the rabbinic literature divides up between this world, *olam haze*, and the world-to-come, *olam haba*. In the liturgical sequence of Judaism which, like that of Christianity, figures creation, revelation, and redemption in organically repeated successions, these oppositions are not felt in tension. Each aspect of the Jewish God, human, and world receives its liturgical focus. But considered in stationary isolation, as constituting the "Jewish essence" (SR 305), the bipolar God, human, and world are each suspended between a contradiction: God, between the justice of his creating and the mercy of his revealing; human, between the private relation with God and the charge to redeem the world; world, between Israel and the rest of the peoples. Like the protocosmic elements, each of which differently envalues the variables of the equation $y=x$, each of the Jewish contradictions particularizes a universal contradiction between the particular and the universal. Unlike Christianity, Judaism does not take its contradictions outside itself, but resolves them within itself. It is mysticism that, from within Judaism, bridges the universal-particular polarities. Mystical correspondences connect Jewish world to all the world; Israel to all the peoples; revealed God to transcendent God (SR 408–411).

From cosmic coursings to Jewish essence to mystical exegesis, Rosenzweig traces a movement from universal to particular and back again to universal. The freezings of the courses in which revealed God, human, and world flow, so as to extract out of these elements a static Jewish essence for each, is already a return to protocosmic factuality. As self-contradictions, Jewish God, human, and world lend themselves to mirroring the old protocosmic elements, for these were also self-enclosed polarities. A factuality is both a given and a conclusion of an authenticating movement. In the protocosmos, the nothing of each of the elements was both given and the result of a unique reasoning process. But the God, human, and world of the Jewish essence start and conclude a different movement, namely that which courses back and forth between universal and particular. Mystical exegesis is the movement by which the given, particular world of the Jewish

essence becomes, in conclusion, the universal world of nature. But the universal conclusions of the exegesis are still markedly Jewish. It is aspects of the distinctly Jewish world that show beneath the seemingly a-Judaic qualities of nature. In Judaism, the particular becomes the universal while retaining its particularity.

But this formula is already familiar from Schelling. It is the formula for indifference, applied outside the absolute act of self-affirmation to the determinations within the potences of real and ideal. The particular, as opposed to the individual, was the microcosmic repetition of the whole. The Schellingian idea, a paradigmatic indifference, anticipates the relation between Jewish essence and cosmic whole:

> Every idea has two unities: the one through which it exists within itself and is absolute—hence the one through which the absolute is formed into the particularity of the idea—and the one through which it is taken up as a particular into the absolute as into its own center (PA 35).

One could easily substitute "element of Jewish essence" for "idea" in this passage. God and Jewish God are the absolute and the particular. Mystical exegesis effects the forming of each into the other.

Overlaid the relation between the elements of the protocosmos and those of the Jewish essence, Schellingian indifference points up the mirroring between them. The protocosmic elements are parts that unsuccessfully strive for the whole of being. Protocosmic God, world, and human are constructed in complete separation from each other. From the point of view of any one of them, nothing else exists. But we who see the protocosmos in retrospect, from within revelation, know that each is only a third of the whole. As opposed to the protocosmic elements, none of the elements of Jewish essence presumes to exhaust the whole of being, but only the whole of its own part in the whole. The constriction of God, world, and human into Jewish God, world, and human opens a space that separates the universal God, human, and world from their particularizations. A kind of Schellingian indifference occurs across this space. The common axis of the mirror between protocosmic and Jewish God, for example, is their factuality. The opposition between them, which creates the reflection, is the location of the separating space they presume to span: unnegotiably outside the protocosmic God, negotiably within the Jewish one. Alternatively, the opposition is over indifference: the one attains it, the other does not.

If excavations in the *Star*'s third part uncover indifference in one place, namely at the center of Jewish essence, the curious seeker may well wonder whether this quintessentially idealist idea is not lurking beneath other surfaces there. This is especially so in light of the intimate oppositional parallels Rosenzweig draws between Judaism and Christianity. In the German edition of the *Star*, published by Suhrkamp, all the section headings of the book are gathered together in a long list at the end. Major section headings are capitalized, minor ones lowercased. So presented, the parallel development of books one and two of part three, on Judaism and Christianity respectively, is very plain to see. Especially revealing are the parallel, inverse headings of the opening and closing sections of each book. Sequentially presented, these are: "The Promise of Eternity," and "Eternity of the Promise," for Judaism; "The Eternity of Realization," and "Realization of Eternity," for Christianity. The promise of eternity is the election of the Jews as eternal people. The eternity of the promise is the persistence of the people's witness, against all who would tempt fate, that eternity is still to come. The eternity of realization is the Johannine Christian bearing of livable figures for creation, revelation, and redemption to all the rest of the world. The realization of eternity is the completion of that work. The sequence of headings effects a double mirror image. Each pair of headings is a self-contained mirror-image, but the pairs, juxtaposed, also mirror each other. This is, by now, a familiar device, from the mirroring across which the components of each protocosmic element (except the world's) emerge into revelation, or from the complex enfolding of mirror images within Schelling's absolute act of self-affirmation. We have already once encountered the multiple mirroring between Judaism and Christianity.[72] They are prime candidates for the absolute opposition that underlies indifference. For they do oppose each other. There is an "enmity between the two for all time" (SR 415), based on the opposing stations they take up on either side of eternity, the one heralding, the other realizing, its unfulfilled promise. Yet God "withal has most intimately bound each to each" (SR 415).

Rosenzweig states the intimacy most strongly over the two sections "Eternity of the Promise" and "Realization of Eternity." He follows an image of Judah Halevi's, whose concept of God's "secret plan for us" (SR 379) anticipates the Maimonidean God's gracious ruse. Halevi likened the Jewish people to a seed whose growth into a fruit tree both transforms it, unrecognizably, and prepares for its recognizable reappearance in the fruit. Halevi likens Christianity to the

tree, and the reappeared seed to the messiah awaited by the Jews.[73] By retelling the parable, Rosenzweig suggests that Christianity is more than the mirror image of Judaism, but its outwardly distinct transformation. In time, Christianity will unfold from within itself the very Judaism that gave it birth. The parable tempts the title of Hermann Cohen's book *Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism* to subtitle the *Star*, only altered to: "Idealism out of the Sources of Judaism." For what is Christianity, then, but a self-objectification of Judaism, a lengthy course away from Judaism, whose final return to it mimics the self-affirmation of the absolute. Rosenzweig's phrase for the Christian return to Judaism, "das Be-waehren der Wahrheit,"[74] the confirmation of truth, actually invites this comparison. Once the truth is confirmed, the confirming movement may vanish. Rosenzweig cannot resist a final inversion: because the end of Christianity's way is in eternity, "sein Ende in der Ewigkeit ist," it is indeed eternal. But because eternity is its end, "die Ewigkeit ist sein Ende," it vanishes there.[75]

In all fairness to this seeming subordination of Christianity to Judaism, the claim of St. Paul, who does after all define the modern church, must be recalled, that, at the end of time "the Son himself will also be subjected to him who put all things under him, that God may be everything to everyone" (I Cor. 15:28). But subordination is not indifference. And if Christianity is simply the course of Judaism's self-affirmation, the two are scarcely indifferent. But then, the Jewish people, who live the eternal life against Christianity's eternal way, also ends in eternity. "For not the way alone ends here, but life too" (SR 380). It is not so much that Judaism and Christianity attain indifference with each other as that they submerge in a larger indifference. Proto- and hypercosmos are divided by the great span of reality, which blocks their indifference. But now Judaism and Christianity, having instated reality beyond itself, appear to connect the two nonreal cosmoses across the real one, rather like the sacrament of baptism which "vouchsafes him [who is] in the minority of his life, the consummation of life" (SR 373), or even more, like Hegelian dialectic, which courses between the so outwardly similar but really oppositional worlds of sense certainty and absolute knowledge.[76] Judaism and Christianity jointly figure as the course that verges on uniting proto- and hypercosmos in indifference. For the two parallel section titles, "The Eternal People: Jewish Fate," and "The Way through Time: Christian History" (SR 298, 337) point back to either side of the universal protocosmic equation $y=x$, where x was fatedness and y was movement. On that analogy, the hypercosmos

simply repeats in unified sequence what the protocosmos accomplished in unordered and mutually exclusive simultaneity: the negating instatement of essence. Christianity is the active "*y*" that equates with the essential "*x*" of Judaism by negating all pagan-philosophical challenges to it. Now the common axis is "*y=x*." The opposition over proto- and hypercosmos is that the first can only instantiate the variables over a triad of mutually unrelated equations of *A*'s and *B*'s, while the second does so simply and singly with Judaism and Christianity. The three become one in the mirror. And then the components of the one vanish in the all-embracing scope of the equals sign.

Judaism and Christianity could easily pass for Schellingian moderns who are finally empowered to vanish in their own completions. And then the question arises of whether and to what extent the final vanishing instates the old idealist All. Rosenzweig himself invites such speculation. The dismembered totality of idealism, which he hoped at the very beginning of the *Star* to recover (SR 22) has by the end of the book "now grown back together again" (SR 390). The choice of words is revealing. Rosenzweig has not himself reassembled the All. He has simply followed a course along which the All reassembles itself. For all that he pointedly abandons the Asian religions early on the in the *Star*, Rosenzweig exhibits a paradoxical ideal at their center, to goallessly attain a goal. It is rather like the idealist passage through unconsciousness to consciousness. The difficulty with all explicit purposes is that they tracelessly disappear on attaining their ends (SR 269). It was love, which hoped to redeem the world, but which so wholly externalized itself in each successive moment that there was no distance through which to espy a goal, that remained even at the attainment of its goal. But the projected completion of love's work is not to be taken for fulfillment of a goal in any case, but for an existence "beyond any desire for or joy in realization" (SR 384). Love's work is a succession of ends that collapse the distinction between the sighting of a goal and its realization. In that, redemptive love prefigures eternity which, liturgically figured by the "boundary between two years," is the point where "all purposes become vain" (SR 325). Love at its end in eternity is what it has been all along. It vanishes as it has always vanished, but not tracelessly. The existence "beyond joy in realization," "where everything is sacrosanct" (SR 384) is its trace. Certainly Rosenzweig at this juncture is very close to the Schellingian absolute All, into which all determinations likewise goallessly vanish, but not without leaving the trace of the potences.

Rosenzweig distinguishes the All of the cosmos from idealism's All (SR 254–255). The cosmic All is the three relations that connect the three elements in a pattern that can be figured as a star. The passage from protocosmic All to cosmic All passes through experience, revelation, or miracle, all denials of idealist passage. But Rosenzweig does not distinguish the hypercosmic All from idealism's, except on the matter of placing. For the cosmic All becomes hypercosmic not through miracle, but through that term already so charged with incipient idealism, namely enlightenment. It is simply that this final All must be placed quite finally, not initiatingly. We do not force its being from the start, but only spy it at the end. Idealism is right, but only in the end.

Art and the Hypercosmos

"The shadow realm of art . . . it longs for life itself" (SR 249). Art inhabits the living world, but lifelessly. Art traces life to its origin in prediction, is itself the ongoing prediction of life in the midst of life, and so testifies to life's status as miracle. But if nothing else, Schellingian idealism testifies to how much art would play a grander role, would itself be life or the life beyond life. By confining art to the role of herald, Rosenzweig awakens longings in it for the heights it knew under idealism's patronage.

Rosenzweig knows art's allure for the human being. "Whatever he may desire he can, after all, find in museums and concert halls" (SR 360). The "whatever" here is not carelessly exhaustive. Stephane Moses observes that, for Rosenzweig, "art is for the individual a quest for salvation."[77] Creation, revelation, and redemption are repeated in the sequence of acts that produce art, from genial vision to appreciative viewing, only here they name not relations but stages in a continuum of self-enclosures. An artwork redeems by incorporating the appreciative viewer in the self-enclosure of the creative sequence, and by contributing to the growth of his own, self-enclosed store of esthetic ideas. But it does not redeem in the real sense of connecting him with the world. Moses' observation continues: art offers "a profane salvation, that is, a solitary one that does not care for communion with other humans."[78] Rosenzweig himself calls art the pagan god of the individualists (SR 421). He anticipates the pagan god of art very early on in part three of the *Star*, when, in connection with the

Petrine, medieval church, he likens the antique paganism that the church must, for conversive purposes, revive, to a mural, "at once uncannily elusive and most colorfully visible" (SR 280). Rosenzweig also suggests that the pagan god of art will "live on to the eternal end" (SR 421). He thereby implies that, despite all his efforts on art's behalf, it will not accept the merely predictive role he has conceived for it, but will continue, until the end of all viewpoints, to offer itself as end.

Art's view of the end of viewpoints translates, figuratively, as a rotation in the star of redemption, so that the human occupies "the supreme place in the All" (SR 421). For art is after all an individually human product. In art's vision of the end, it is a star of creation that appears. For it is now creation that holds the position opposite the reigning point of the star, and that indicates, as redemption once did, the climactic relation into which the other two move. Revelation, the movement from God to human must appear as inward and passive inspiration; redemption, the movement from human to world, as active and outward artistry. And creation is the climactic consequence of the two movements. If we would set the star of creation in analogy with its redemptive cousin, then we must also speak of human self-creation, just as we did of God's self-redemption. And that surely confirms the power of this star to figure the view of the esthetic pagan; for what higher act of pagan self-enclosure is there than self-creation? That is, after all, what the artist does when he recovers himself in the work to which he has sacrificed himself.

Schelling's own focus on creation seemed a challenge to Baeckian romanticism, until it appeared how much the very distinction between creation and redemption pales in the construction of art. Rosenzweig does not name the individuals who idolize art, but Schelling might be one. For Schelling, art constitutes the end of viewpoints, since as the perfect representative of philosophical monism, art is ultimately one. All the individual artworks of antiquity "were merely the different branches of one, universal, objective and living work of art" (PA 9). Schelling presents again the paradoxical pairing that so often appears in the history of philosophy, of universality with individuality. For though art is universal, it "can express itself only with the individual" (PA 94), for otherwise there would be no location for the indifference art attains between the universal and particular. If in addition all artworks are objective and self-enclosed manifestations of gods, and if all self-enclosure is pagan, then we have construed Schellingian art as, in Rosenzweig's terms, the pagan god of the individualists.

Schelling would deny that the star of creation, patterned after the star of redemption, could figure his esthetic theory. For the human is not, to begin with, an isolable element of the All that can be raised over the rest. Insofar as it is constructed out of genuine relations, no star is monistically admissible. But Rosenzweig might offer the star of creation as the reductio ad absurdum of idealist esthetics, just as idealism itself played that role to Protestant Christianity. Of course the star of creation is inadmissible. But this is not because of any fault with relationality, but because experience shows that humans are not ascendant. Redemption is the end of creation. The world experiences the beginning of creation but not its end; the human experiences both the beginning and revelatory midpoint of creation, but not its end. Only God experiences all three points along creation's way: beginning, middle, and end. It was for this reason, as we saw in chapter two, that the star of redemption is immovably fixed under God's ascendancy.

At the same time, Rosenzweig might agree with Schelling that creation's completion in redemption occurs only in art; it is just that, since art is prior to living reality, the redemption known there is unreal. But this does not disqualify art from playing out its reality-predicting role one more time. Insofar as art is pagan, it constitutes one more challenge to Christianity on its world-converting way. Since Christianity converts paganism by shaping itself to its self-enclosed structures, and then bursting these open in relation, it must shape itself, too, to the forms of art. But this it does at its very foundation. If Judaism is the particular religion of a universal people, Christianity is the universal religion of many individuals. Christianity's address to the individual is a function of its converting mission. It builds relation out of self-enclosed individuality. Where it cannot find self-enclosure, it fashions it itself. But art has been self-enclosed from long before Christianity began. Art is a ready-made candidate for Christian mission.

And now one of those mutual meetings of need occurs that Schelling called magic and that Rosenzweig, in other contexts, called miracle. Self-enclosed art longs for life. Relational Christianity longs for self-enclosures to instate in living relations. The two meet in liturgical art.

The Christian ritual, like its Jewish counterpart, instates the living reality of creation, revelation, and redemption in liturgical acts. These are the acts that burst the self-enclosures of pagan individuality and found relations. Thus they are decidedly not artworks in Schelling's sense. The liturgy founds relation in two ways: by

affording a performable vocabulary for the relational acts of creation, revelation, and redemption, and by uniting the individual performers in relation with each other, i.e., in community. But the passage from individuality to community does not necessarily come easily. Goethe, after all, held back from it, as do all who prefer the private redemption of the arts. But it is just these same arts that, by occasioning a common understanding of themselves without explicit communication, begin to forge a link between individual and community. And if the arts can be persuaded to sacrifice their purity of self-enclosed purposelessness, they can be applied to the task of founding community. In return, the arts receive a portion of that real life for which they have longed.

The Christian liturgy draws the individual practitioner of Christianity into community by incremental stages. The stages follow both the theory of art as presented in parts one and two of the *Star*, and the overall structure of the tripartite church. Just as art in general is first specified by outward form, and the first of the arts are the spatial ones; and just as the first Christian church is the outwardly and spatially expanding one of St. Peter, so the first community into which the individual Christian is initiated is a spatial one. It is the community of the assembled congregation. But the congregation is assembled in a specific place, namely a church. The applied art that serves this level of community-building is church architecture. Church buildings foster community by creating within themselves a single orientation: forward towards the altar, upwards to heaven (SR 356). Out of the univocally fixed spatial orientation of a church, only one room can arise. And so all those who enter find themselves placed in a common, divisionless space. Church music adds to the outward presentiment of community an inward dimension. Music functions here in analogy with the second or inward form of art, with the purely temporal expression of art, and with the inwardly turned church of St. Paul. The pairing of time with inward sense has, of course, Kantian precedent, but here Rosenzweig is interested in the inwardness of feeling. Music "arouses the assembled ones, each for himself, to the same feelings" (SR 362). Finally, just as poetry united the outward spatiality of the fine arts with the inward temporality of music, and just as the Johannine church sent inwardly converted Christians into the merely outwardly converted world, so does the liturgical expression of poetry, namely dance, combine space and time, body and rhythm, in gestures that silently evoke for the inner and outer Christian the deepest intimacy with his fellow worshippers.

Rosenzweig's interpretation of dance as an expression of poetry will win the ready assent of any balletomane. But for others, Schelling's *The Philosophy of Art* provides a helpful backdrop. Schelling understood dance as part of the reverse movement, back to the formative arts, that the verbal arts make after they have attained their highest expression. Drama, which unites the verbal forms of lyric and epic in indifference, completes the series of the verbal arts. If the artistic impulse would press further than drama, it must make new combinations with old antecedents. Song is the form of poesy that has recovered music, the first of the formative arts; theater, the form that has recovered the plastic arts; and dance is the form that poesy takes when it has recovered painting (PA 372). Rosenzweig's passage from poetry to dance omits the intermediate step of painting; what is more, by setting dance as the climax of a discussion titled "Sociology of the Dramatic Arts: Miracle Play," he conflates two art forms that Schelling pointedly distinguished, namely theater and dance, precisely by their different references in the antecedent arts. But even this blurring of esthetic categories is instructive. For ultimately, it is neither dance nor theater in their respective fullnesses that Rosenzweig wishes to marshal for service in perfecting community, but a small shared piece of them that indifferently reproduces each of them whole, namely gesture.

Rosenzweig does not explicitly claim for gesture what Schelling might call the reproduction in particular of the universal wholes of dance and theater. But the explicit claims he does make for it imply that it can bear within itself the whole power of these two arts to structure community around themselves. It is gesture that "perfects man for his full humanity," by reducing "the space separating man from man" to the space traversed by a single, even very slight motion (SR 322); so slight, perhaps, that the space itself no longer separates at all but is all connection, like the "Love me!" command that hones language to so narrow and concentrated a space, the words are converted by the sheer pressure of their confinement into the very act they command. Rosenzweig offers several examples of the power of gesture: the army salute between soldiers of equal rank, which evokes for them the whole history of "working and suffering together . . . and the danger common to both" (SR 322); or the "power of the glance," wholly unforgettable, of the goddess of love, who "danced at last only with her eyes" (SR 372).

But now it is no longer just balletomanes who understand what Rosenzweig means by the poetry of dance. All lovers of literature will, in response to Rosenzweig's discussion, recall their favorite

descriptions of sometimes very minute gestures that conjure whole worlds of connective feeling. There is, to build on Rosenzweig's example, the transvestite dancer whose artistic brilliance consists of "hardly moving at all" except for "very subtle movements, loose, relaxed, of the shoulder and hips";[79] the lost lady whose "glance . . . made one's blood tingle," whose charm was "in the quick recognition of the eyes," and who "had always the power of suggesting things much lovelier than herself";[80] and the sleepless little boy who prepares for the "volatile essence" of the nightly maternal kiss with the "punctiliousness which madmen use who compel themselves to exclude all other thoughts from their minds while they are shutting a door, so that when sickness of uncertainty sweeps over them again they can triumphantly face and overcome it with the recollection of the precise moment in which the door was shut."[81] The dance, the glance, the kiss may all transpire in that by now familiar infinitesimally small space where all distance vanishes.

But Rosenzweig weights the dancelike gesture with still heavier philosophical content. The glance, unlike the word, survives as vividly in memory as it was at performance. The break between performance and memory is a mirror in which the reflection shows as powerfully as the reflected. The reflective power of gesture that expands to dance may mirror a whole people in itself. This is precisely what occurs in "festival processions and parades" (SR 372) when, as spectators join the procession, the distinction between performer and reflective audience breaks down. The unity of performance and reflection is the old idealist self-consciousness revisited. By means of the dancelike liturgical gesture, church-going observance becomes church-constituting people of God.

This is most literally true for the part of the Christian liturgical calendar that the applied art of dance serves, namely the festivals of redemption. Redemption for Christianity is the conversion of the nearest neighbor to its livable figures of creation, revelation, and redemption. The figures of redemption are the secular festivals, like Corpus Christi, that spill outside the church building into its worldly confines. This figure of redemption merges with creation when the first pagan observer of the procession is moved to join in. The figure of redemption culminates for Christianity in the sacramental figure of its own creation and constitution, namely baptism. Ultimately, redemption is for the church what Schelling might call an act of self-affirmation.

Rosenzweig understands the incremental incorporation of the Christian into community as a continuum of rising self-consciousness. The applied arts contribute supportively along the way. Thus

the first awareness of belonging to one community reaches the Christian through the service of the word. This service unites the congregants in a silent space of communal attentiveness to scriptural reading or preaching. It was architecture that foretold this space. Next, the service of the Eucharist unites the congregants in a community of inward feeling, most literally figured by the ingested host. It was music that foretold this community of feeling, "but which now, in the partaking of the sacrament [which figures the body of both Christ and the church] becomes fully conscious" (SR 363). Architecture foretold community but did not create it, since the occupants of a church building could ignore each other, as they would if they were different groups of visiting tourists. If the tourists were persuaded to participate in the music that culminates in the Eucharist, then architecture's unfulfilled promise of community would begin to be realized (SR 361). Finally, if the tourists, now practicing Christians, accompany the congregation on its redemptive festivals out into the world, they participate in the church's own expansive self-affirmation.

Rosenzweig calls music, in its application to Christian liturgy, "the guide of souls" (SR 371). But all the arts are guides into the stages of the liturgical cycle they respectively serve. Perhaps part of the reason the individual must be guided into the liturgy is that, from outside it, it represents a loss of freedom. Between directives from the prayerbook and the clergy to rise, to bow, to sit, to listen, or to speak prescribed words, the individual who, before entering the course of completed Christianity is already a self-contained whole, must regard this sustained context of commanded gesture a confinement indeed. On a Baeckian reading, it is a confinement; on a Schellingian reading, it is not. Rather, the prescriptions provide the structure on the basis of which freedom can differentiate itself from caprice. Architecture already inaugurates this freedom by its ironic, nonpurposive imitation of purposeful spatial structure. Architecture, which begins Rosenzweig's sequence of the applied Christian arts, predicts a future freedom. The participant in choral song sacrifices the whim to speak what he will, in exchange for prescribed words that are, from the standpoint of language's living, dialogical use, "entirely free of purpose" (SR 362). It is just the structured purposelessness of liturgical acts that constitutes the freedom of which their performers partake. The height of freedom is reached in the applied liturgical art of dance, which Rosenzweig calls a "self-exposition" (SR 372). Prescription and performance merge, just as in the "Love me!" command. It is another vanishing of distance, such as Schelling saw

in intellectual intuition or, more appropriately in the context of this discussion, as the poet Yeats saw when he wrote:

> O body swayed to music, o brightening glance,
> How can we know the dancer from the dance?[82]

The liturgy is a structure with which one can merge, and emerge free. Certainly this is also how Rosenzweig understood the body of the Jewish commandments. But from what does the liturgy free us? The transcendence of purpose was a characteristic mark of eternity. The freedom liturgical observance confers is, in part, from time. This was also the freedom known in the Schellingian artwork, which mastered time. But the freedom is also from suffering. Both art and the Christian liturgy overcome suffering by structuring it. By giving figures for the contradictions on which the pagan soul is wracked—the fated and free God, the perduringly finite human, the incompletely reasoned world—the Christian liturgy consoles. But so does art. Rosenzweig's account of art's tragic content follows Schelling's depiction of the tragic hero, who freely accepts the affliction that is not his due. For Rosenzweig, as for Schelling, Prometheus is prototypical (SR 376). The artist is already tragic by accepting the self-enclosure that is imposed on him, not as any due punishment, but because the logic of miracle demands it. But his consolation are his artworks that, while he is creating them, figure for him his own self-enclosed world. "In the depiction he reconciles the contradiction that he himself exists and that suffering too exists at the same time" (SR 376). The appreciative viewer knows the same consolation, in reverse, as connoisseur. The same art that serves the liturgy, also declares its own self-sufficiency, and offers an alternative to Christian redemption. Rosenzweig does not consider the possibility that art, in a rebellious mood, might declare its own purposeless self-sufficiency within the very context of the liturgy, and inversely subordinate the liturgical forms to itself. Kant, that great depreciator of positive religion, pointed the way to art's rebellion against religion when he inadvertently linked esthetic ideas to ceremonies in analogy: esthetic ideas "quicken" and "animate the soul"[83] just as religious ceremonies "quicken truly practical dispositions."[84] The quickening is, in religion's case, an intensification of devotion to the moral law; and in art's, of the imagination as it searches the Understanding, unsuccessfully, for concepts that might be adequate to the infinitely interpretable esthetic idea. If religious and esthetic signals were ever crossed, the

liturgy might quicken in the manner of an esthetic idea, and invite the connoisseur's self-absorbed appreciation of it. Then the liturgy would be a stage in the self-enclosedly redemptive course of art. This would hardly disturb Schelling, for whom the liturgy already redeems precisely in its capacity as art. But Rosenzweig would have to concede, with Baeck, that the price Christianity pays for converting paganism is the ever present possibility of succumbing to paganism itself.

The heart of the enmity between Christianity and Judaism is over Judaism's unrelenting witness to Christianity against all self-enclosed paganisms of completed redemption. For Christianity is tempted to take the endpoints of its trifurcated way—wholly spiritual God, perfected human, completed world[85]—for self-enclosed achievements in the present instead of as, in the spirit of the Kantian ideas of reason, spurs to its work in the world. Judaism can stand guard against this for Christians, even over the church's protest, just because Judaism has no connection to paganism at all. The Jew is not the converted individual, who must first be a philosopher; he is converted before his birth by his incipient location in a community that already lives in and for redemption. Not individuality, but peoplehood pertains to the Jewish essence. And the people is a "self-contained whole into which the individuals have dissolved" (SR 343). The secular category that challenges the spiritual hegemony of a people is not art which, as Schelling said, is always of and for individuals, but the state (SR 332). The state, it is true, has esthetic pretensions, as Rosenzweig admits when he acknowledges the comparisons that have been made between art and the ancient polis. But within the context of the *Star*, the state is pointedly distinguished from art as both the opponent of art, and Judaism's particular challenge.

Art neither challenges Judaism nor serves significantly in its liturgical cycles as "guide of souls." Since Judaism addresses the Jewish people, and the people already constitutes a community, there is no need of a helping agent to negotiate the distance between the individual and community. It is precisely the givenness of the Jew's communal sense, which, howsoever unconscious, requires only a "gentle push"[86] to be restored to consciousness, that permits the "conspicuous lack of attention" (SR 358) of congregated Jews to scriptural readings or sermons, so essential to building Christian community. Nonetheless, Judaism does bear a relation to art very like its relation to philosophy. Judaism mirrors the self-enclosures of art. This already appears in the challenge the state poses to Judaism, to the extent

that the state is comparable to a work of art. Certainly the ethnic whole of the Jewish people, into which individuals may be seen to have dissolved, resembles the esthetic whole of the artwork, into which the details of inner form are dissolved (SR 55, 60). Judaism's liturgical structures figure the relations of creation, revelation, and redemption, just as Christianity's do, only not outwardly towards the non-Jewish world, but inwardly towards its own. The church stands in an ultimately all-encompassing expansion of brotherliness. The festivals of redemption carry redemptive love out into the world. But Jews stand in a self-enclosed temporal line of propagation (SR 305). Their world does not expand (SR 329). Instead, the universal is figured in liturgical acts that occur within the confines of the people, a particular that in Schelling's sense of the term reproduces the universal within itself.

If Judaism were the perfect mirror of art, it would not be relational. As against art, Judaism encloses genuine relations that expand, in figures, to the whole of humanity. But Judaism breaks with art in another way. Art is never hated, not even by Christianity, its spiritual rival. And yet Rosenzweig titles the section on the Jewish witness to Christianity, "The Eternal Hatred for the Jew" (SR 415). Perhaps the hatred the Jew receives can be read as an affliction that falls to him, as self-enclosure to the artist, or punishment to the ancient hero, by necessity's decree, rather than by any freely willed fault. As the artist must endure self-enclosure for the sake of miracle, and the hero, unmerited affliction for the sake of his freedom, so must the Jew endure hatred for the sake of the truth that the creation of the world is not yet complete.

In a section entitled "Modern Tragedy" within part two of the *Star*, Rosenzweig considers "the tragedy of the saint" (SR 211). The phrase may be read in two ways, as implying that saints are tragic, or that tragic dramas may have saints for heroes. The ambiguity suits Rosenzweig's remarks. For the saint, as we saw, is a border-figure, hovering between the end of modern drama and the beginning of modern life. Drama that attains the saint produces the saint, and ends. Perhaps the modern movie, "Jesus of Montreal," about an actor who, by playing Christ, becomes Christlike, illustrates.[87] Rosenzweig's suggestive title for the ensuing section is, "The Servant of God." It is God's servant who suffers so famously in Isaiah 49–53. On traditional Jewish readings, the Suffering Servant is Israel. The saint, like the servant, is "resolved on the sublime" (SR 211). If he is resolved, then he does not suffer inwardly, and can only "become the hero of a tragedy by virtue of his earthly residue of profane ingredients" (SR 211), i.e., by outward impositions of physical and social degradation that leave the soul untouched. Certainly this hero is "the exact antithesis of the hero of classical tragedy" (SR 211) who, as Schelling observed, attains his tragic heights precisely by accepting into his inward self-enclosure outwardly imposed afflictions. The modern tragic hero is anticipated by that ancient precursor of the modern, with whom Rosenzweig has already shown much affinity, namely Plato, whose Socratic hero is so resolved on the sublime that he dies inwardly unmoved by outward events. But if, as Schelling writes, "an entire people can be constituted an individual" (PA 215), then Rosenzweig comes within a hairsbreadth of suggesting that Israel is the art-ending hero of modern drama.

In that case, Judaism has its encounter with paganism after all, not as its rival, but as the barely visible end of the pagan's own deepest aspiration. "In the eternal people the nations experience that closed eternity for which they themselves reach out helplessly," not suspecting that in that people "they are presented with a picture of their universal future" (SR 378). Life imitates art here as closely as it ever could. For the peoples follow art into the end-fulfillment of Israel which, itself ever just vanishing, vanishes finally into the hypercosmic All.

Conclusions

It would simplify the romantic reading of Rosenzweig through Schelling if the philosophy of *The Philosophy of Art* could be identified with idealism, the art with romanticism, and the two separated over an irreconcilable divide. Then all Rosenzweig's explicit rejections of idealism, and all his overt acceptances of art, could be taken for at least implicit affirmations of romanticism. We could read the *Star*'s relation to idealism and romanticism along the lines of a protocosmic equation, where x was the passive affirmation of romantic essence, and y the active negation of idealist otherness. But idealism and romanticism are not so separable. The harnessing of idealist philosophy to the interpretation of art is a definitive mark of early German romanticism. The Schelling who inverts is as much idealist as romantic. *The Philosophy of Art*, though conceding the

oppositional nature of philosophy and art, argues for their ultimate indifference, not their separate locations on either side of an idealist/romantic divide.

But then, must the resounding sounds of idealism's rejection, which echo so loudly up until the last sections of the *Star*, be taken for a rejection of romanticism, too? They might have been, if we had not been able to uncover in the *Star* so many explicit and implicit congruences with Schelling's romantic idealism: the protocosmic elements, so like the Schellingian potences; the inversive passages across mirroring divides; the particular that is indifferently its universal (true of the Jewish people in Rosenzweig); the concessions to contingency and magic, and to fracture, over the issue of the infinite All; the perspectivism; the Platonism; the vanishing of separations; the idealism of art; the art of Christianity; and, perhaps most importantly, the shared testimony to the irresistible attraction of the All, even if all vanishings before it are postponed to the final end.

Rosenzweig's principal departure from Schelling is on the issue of indifference. Indifference is banished from the *Star*'s middle part, on reality, where relation functions in its stead. The central location of reality in the unfolding of the *Star* is not coincidental. It figures there the human perspective of the beloved soul, which must begin philosophizing, if philosophize it must, *in medias res*. It is only from the perspective of reality that protocosmic philosophy and its mirror image, hypercosmic prayer, can be understood. Schellingian romanticism figures in Rosenzweig's reality as presupposition, at least to the extent that the protocosmic thought courses copy the movements of the potences, and as prolepsis, insofar as in prayerful vision the All reinstates itself. But Rosenzweig explicitly subordinates these presuppositions and prolepses to the reality that gives them meaning.

Art's office in the *Star* repeats philosophy's. Art is either presupposition to reality, as in the first and second parts, or accompanist to a vision that succeeds reality, as in the third, but never, itself, wholly real. Philosophy and art preserve their intimacy across the passage from Schelling to Rosenzweig, but jointly surrender their pinnacle position for one subordinate to reality.

In a brief section of the esthetics component of the second part of the *Star*, Rosenzweig discusses the tone of poetry (SR 246–247). The tone of a poetic work, if not its diction, is always plain to the attentive reader (SR 249). *The Star of Redemption* and *The Philosophy of Art* may illustrate. Both are systematic works. In their evident comfort with system, both demote the merely "empirical" (PA 280, SR 190). And yet both are self-consciously aware that they are enmeshed in the empirical, and so are negotiating a contradiction. Schelling registers this very early on when he deems the very idea of *The Philosophy of Art* a contradiction (PA 13), and Rosenzweig, when in the extension of the *Star* into his own commentary on it, he names its philosophy, in the late Schelling's words, an "absolute empiricism."[88] For empiricism's tone is usually experimental and open-ended, not absolute. If the contradiction between system and sense restates an older opposition between ideal and real, then the affinity between the "idealist" Schelling and the "realist" Rosenzweig comes into clearer focus. For then as sensible systematizers both, they are both trying to negotiate the same real-ideal divide.

The tones of their negotiations are in several ways inverse. Schelling speaks out of what by his own reckoning is the age of the ideal. If he is himself an idealist, he ought to like his age. But life under the ideal is self-contradictory and self-divided. No wonder the tone of *The Philosophy of Art* is "muted and skeptical."[89] By contrast, the tone of the *Star* is, at least by the third part, after the rigors of the first part and the pathos of the second, unrestrainedly exuberant. Especially as it approaches its end, it increasingly exhorts, admonishes, and prayerfully exclaims. Rosenzweig can barely contain his enthusiasm for reality. He seems scarcely content merely to privilege the reality-defining relations of creation, revelation, and redemption within part two, but wants to send his readers off into the lived and *nichtmehrbuchlich*[90] experience of them. Rosenzweig's vengeance on the ideal, which as early as *The Philosophy of Art* had already begun to show a depressive affect, was to banish it from reality into the forward and rearward wings of the book.

But the banishing is reminiscent of the older Platonic banishment of poetry. Plato's own poetic gifts are too much in evidence for the exile to be taken very seriously. Rosenzweig does not so much demote the partnership of art and philosophy as leave them to their own unreal height, and diminish the importance of scaling it, or, if it must be scaled, let it be only once. The tone of Rosenzweig's, everyone should philosophize once,[91] is concessive, not hortatory. The trouble is that Rosenzweig's own scaling of the height is enthusiastic and triumphant, not concessive or resigned. It is true that the flag he plants on the hypercosmic peak of vision, where philosophy and art stand watching, claims it and them for the real world of the cosmos. But is it really back into the cosmos that Rosenzweig sends us when, in exclamatory capitals, at the close of his book, he bids us turn off the hypercosmic heights "*into life*"? We have been in life all

along; even the ancient pagans, who worshipped according to all the wrong figures were, unbeknownst to themselves, situated in relations of creation, revelation, and redemption. Our sole advance over them is that now, and even ever since the beginning of the second millennium BCE, there are habitable, performable figures that raise these relations to consciousness. These are the liturgical cycles of Judaism and Christianity. But these cycles belong to the hypercosmos. They inhabit the same rearward, unreal, height-scaling wing of the *Star* that philosophy and art find so congenial. Rosenzweig does not banish us from the heights; he instates us in a livable continuity of them.

Rosenzweig's enthusiasm for the real is not for the open-ended, unstructured love of part two, but for its Jewish and Christian instatings in part three. In his pioneering work on Rosenzweig, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*,[92] Nahum Glatzer portrays himself not as editor or author, but merely as presenter, as though the life and thought are already so organically intertwined, they have accomplished in advance, by themselves, all the connective work that usually falls to biographic authors and editors. Rosenzweig would appreciate this testament to his life's influence on his thought, for it locates him with Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche squarely within the tradition of the new philosophy. Rosenzweig's own life turned ever more deeply into the Jewish liturgical cycles, so much so that, across the broad spectrum of Jewish observance in the late twentieth century, he is still taken by many for the model *ba'al teshuvah* (returnee to Judaism). It is not as though Rosenzweig would have all his readers take up Judaism, or even choose between Judaism and Christianity. In "The New Thinking," he observes, with regard to the Jewish tone of the *Star*, that a Christian would have expressed the same ideas differently, and even a pagan, though he could not have used the relation-denying thought forms of any historical paganism, might have his own words for creation, revelation, and redemption.[93] What is important to Rosenzweig is that what he has expressed be somehow expressed, that is, that real life be faithfully figured.

But what is the point of figuring the real? Why not rest unconsciously in its embrace?; Why not, if not because the ideal itself compels? In the ideal the real is mirrored and knows itself for the first time. That, in simple sum, is the message of idealism. The idealist is a little like the music-lover who, untrained in musical notation and theory, exerts himself painstakingly to learn this, as Rosenzweig puts it, most difficult of the arts (SR 249). All who suffer over the intimations of chaos lying on the other side of consciousness, find comfort in idealism which, with the single axiom that a known limit is ipso facto surpassed, overcomes all limits. Indifference was the perfect expression of limit-banishing idealism. No enduringly unconscious reality can surpass the conscious ideal, since real and ideal are one. The trouble with indifference is that it does not sustain: the real and ideal come unraveled as, by the very admission of indifference's own theorist, Friedrich Schelling, they do in modernity, and leave even him prone to a muted and skeptical tone.[94]

The Jewish and Christian liturgical cycles are, for Rosenzweig, a more reliable idealizing of the real. It is just because reality is sustainedly idealizable that Rosenzweig is so enthusiastic for it. And now Baeckian romantic critique swells the stream of Schellingian idealism that feeds Rosenzweig's enthusiasm for reality. For the instatement of eternity was a Baeckian romantic goal. The realized ideality of the Baeckian romantic and the idealized reality of the Schellingian idealist mirror each across their common meeting ground in Rosenzweig's *The Star of Redemption*.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions

In large measure, Baeck's theory of romanticism fails the test of Schelling's *The Philosophy of Art*. Redemption is not clearly the determinative category of Schelling's *Kunstreligion*, nor is it unambiguously subsumable under experience, feeling, or passivity. Ethics is not dismissed from *The Philosophy of Art*, but receives two articulations there, one ancient, one modern. Darkness does not go unbalanced by light, and the seeming completion of the system is disrupted. Only Baeckian romantic inversion passes the test, though with two qualifications: what is inverted is not, as Baeck asserts, lost in the inversion; and the subject on whose behalf the inversion occurs is not us, but God.

This is not to say that Baeck has not offered a viable picture of romanticism; but simply that the romantic amalgam he constructs must draw from a broader range of sources. Schelling belongs to the early period of German romanticism. Later romanticism did indeed advance more deeply into darkness, so much so that in popular literature today, the romantic is identified with, among other things, despondency, insanity, and the occult. In these permutations of darkness, the reaching may well be for a redemption that bypasses moral considerations, and the hope, for a completion that excludes all fissure. Indeed, if St. Paul is admitted to the ranks of the romantics, as Baeck proposes, then we can just as easily turn backward from *die Fruehromantiker* eighteen hundred years, as forward two hundred years, to find aching in abundance for a completed redemption.[1]

Baeck offers a broad, generally unnuanced picture of romanticism that answers to some popular conceptions of it. It is as though Baeck and Schelling stand at opposite ends of the spectrum along which

romanticism has been conceived. Schelling, together with the other early German romantics, exemplifies the romanticism that is taken to continue, not disrupt, the rationalist projects of the Enlightenment. Irrationality, darkness, and feeling do not simply complete, but themselves take on the aspects of the opposites that ineluctably ground them, namely reason, thought, and light. Early romanticism longs for the very system it denies itself, and in the longing is the tribute to older Enlightenment ideals. Baeck, by contrast, has articulated some features of the romanticism that is taken to reject the Enlightenment sensibility in toto. The usefulness of the dichotomy between Baeck and Schelling is in the space between the poles they constitute, where the *Star*, so situated, may show its own romantic shades.

As Baeck would predict of a romantic work, the *Star* is a star of redemption, and not of the revelation that centers the book; ethics in the Kantian sense, *is* set aside; darkness *does* frame the experiential center, in the form of chaos on one side and blinding light on the other; and inversion is the means by which redemption is secured. Of course, the distortion in the fit is over the meaning of redemption itself. What Baeck calls redemption is closer to what Rosenzweig means by revelation. For Rosenzweig's revelation participates with Baeck's redemption in the same family of ideas: experience, feeling, miracle, and passivity. The Baeckian romantic relation with God, cut off from the rest of the world, translates into the *Star* as the presupposition of redemption, not its defining content.

But against Baeckian romantic ideals of self-enclosed remove, the *Star* does not present itself as a system in which the reader is invited to rest. Rather, Rosenzweig all too eagerly pushes the reader out of his book: he rushes us through a first part we can barely understand, past descriptions of experience he would rather we knew, firsthand, for ourselves, and on to a climactic vision from which we are summarily dismissed. Unlike the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which progressively absorbs us, the *Star* behaves like what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy call an exergue: a structure that exists to deconstruct, in testament to something else.

In that, the *Star* fails to meet the Baeckian romantic criterion of completion. But here is where Rosenzweig shows an affinity with the alternative romanticism that Schelling represents. In its movement toward self-destruction, the *Star* exemplifies the self-divisions that Schelling understood as definitively romantic or modern. In a characteristically romantic movement, the whole of *The Philosophy of Art* illustrates the modernity that part of it describes. Divided between ancient and modern, the work denies itself the construction of

a future reconciliation. *The Philosophy of Art* comes at the end of the first period of German romanticism. Its very form, of the lecture series, may itself attest to decline, like Hegel's owl of Minerva, and partially explain the tone of the book.

Rosenzweig took upon himself the inheritance of Schelling's incompleted task to systematize the relation between being and becoming. The systematic form of Rosenzweig's work, and its attention to philosophy and to a philosophically explicated art, are as close to Schelling's romanticism as they are removed from Baeck's. Even the buoyancy of tone that marks parts of *The Star of Redemption* may be read in inverse continuum with Schelling's maturing darkness. And yet, there is a point at which all three thinkers converge, namely at the concept of liturgy. This institutional structure that, for Baeck, typifies romantic authoritarianism, and for Schelling, the communally livable artwork, is at least one point that the otherwise so discordant Baeck and Schelling agree to take seriously. But if the authoritarianism of the liturgy feeds Baeck's polemical tone, and its status as a mere remnant feeds Schelling's skepticism, it is precisely the combination of sustainable structure, which Baeck takes for authoritarian, and communal livability, which Schelling takes for diminished remnant, that accounts for the enthusiasm it inspires in Rosenzweig. Liturgy is a romantic endpoint for all three thinkers. It is part of the final pieces that close the Baeckian romantic system in on itself; of the heritage of ancient, public drama that has, otherwise, largely disappeared for Schelling; and of the hypercosmic vision that Rosenzweig postponed to the end of the *Star*.

It is just the livability of the structured liturgy that resists the movement of "religion" to encase it. Among the many ways Rosenzweig descends from the early romantics are his suspicions of institutional authority. It is not self-perpetuating institutions, but the system of the *Star* that raises the liturgy to its high, hypercosmic office. But this must not conceal from less romantically attuned eyes that what Rosenzweig has crowned with the role of ending his system is more commonly understood as: religion, and that by taking time for explicit subordinations of philosophy and art, which nonetheless function in grounding ways, Rosenzweig has taken up, after the philosophy-privileging *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the art-privileging *System of Transcendental Idealism*, the third way of hierarchically arranging these three expressions of the highest-reaching German *Geist*.

The romantic reading of the *Star* is complicated by its in some ways so much more obvious debt to philosophical idealism. The rela-

tion between idealism and romanticism, of at least the early German variety, is a little like that between two very similar, close, and competitive siblings. Idealist systems like Hegel's can, by closing in on themselves so perfectly, close off the characteristically *fruehromantische* postponement of closure; or they can, like Schelling's, repeatedly miss the closure they seek or even systematize indefinitely enduring places of nonclosure.

The third book of part three of the *Star* presents a vision of final closure. But it is a vision ineluctably future, vitally God's alone. What is vitally accessible to us, now, from out of the vision is multiply divided: first between Judaism and Christianity, which are inimical, and then, within Judaism and Christianity themselves, between their respective self-divisions and bifurcations. Like the Schellingian modern, the Rosenzweigian Jew and Christian are suspended over contradictions which do not, now, resolve except, in imitation of the sporadic momentariness of Schelling's esthetic redemption, once annually, and for Jews alone, on Yom Kippur. Closure is otherwise future; the present is unresolved.

In this regard, a remark of Baeck's about Rosenzweig, and of Rosenzweig's about Schelling, may be instructively compared. Rosenzweig on Schelling:

> Vor lauter Programm kam er nie zum vollendeten Werk, vor lauter "Ideen" und "Entwuerfen", "Darstellungen" und "Nachrichten", Verheissungen und halben Erfuellungen nie zur ganzen Tat. "Ich werde" blieb sein letztes Wort, wie es sein erstes war.[2] (From nothing but program he never came to the complete work, from nothing but ideas and sketches, representations and reports, promises and half-fulfillments, never to the full act. "I will" remained his last word, as it was his first.)

Baeck on Rosenzweig:

> He had found his task: he had been able to begin a work. And he knew that no man can bring a work to an end; it is given him only to begin a work.[3]

Baeck may have had in mind a passage from Pirkei Avoth in the Mishnah: "You are not required to complete the work, but neither are you at liberty to abstain from it."[4] By applying this saying to Rosenzweig, Baeck means to claim him for the open-ended striving

of classical religion. But of course it is just the beckoning of the unfinished or infinite that differentiates *fruehromantische* sensibility from its idealist counterpart, that subsumes Schelling's esthetic idealism under the rubric of romanticism, and that invites a philosophical descendant, some one hundred years later, to take up the task again. The specific task to which Baeck alludes is the Bible translation Rosenzweig undertook with Buber. Rosenzweig died before it was complete. But one might claim just as much that he predeceased the completion of the *Star*. The *Star* itself hovers between the proleptic completion of Yom Kippur and the postponed completion for which the rest of the world pines. The hypercosmic vision of the end-completion exists to vanish in the incomplete reality of the present, a passage poignantly symbolized by Jewish ritual when it allows the fragile habitations of Sukkot to follow so closely on the day-long synagogue-enclosure of Yom Kippur. The ceasing of hypercosmic unreality serves to refocus attention on the incompletion of the real. The *Star*, too, left Rosenzweig with a feeling of incompletion. In later years, he observed that he would have written the book differently,[5] did indeed attempt a more accessible rewriting, but, unsatisfied with the results, withdrew it from publication.[6] If Schelling passed an incompleted work onto Rosenzweig, Rosenzweig in turn bequeathed to later generations the unfinished task of the *Star* to be interpreted.[7] We have attempted a contribution to that end.

Notes

Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Gershom Scholem, "Rosenzweig and his book *The Star of Redemption*," in *The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England for Brandeis University Press, 1987), 23.

2. Moshe Schwarcz, *Safah, Mitos, 'Omanut* (Jerusalem: Schocken Books, 1966), 333.

3. *Encyclopedia Judaica*, s.v. "Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph."

4. Hannah Arendt, *Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewish Woman*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (San Deigo and New York: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1974), xvii.

5. Siegbert Prawer, introduction to *The Romantic Period in Germany: Essays by Members of the London University Institute of Germanic Studies*, ed. Siegbert Prawer (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 4.

6. Hermann Cohen, "Deutschtum und Judentum," in *Juedische Schriften* (Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke & Sohn, 1924), vol. 2. Partially translated in Hermann Cohen, *Reason and Hope*, trans. Eva Jospe (Cincinnati, Ohio: Hebrew Union College Press, 1993).

7. Jacques Derrida, "Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German," *New Literary History* 13 (1991): 51–52.

8. Gershom Scholem, "On the Social Psychology of the Jews in Germany: 1900–1933," in *Jews and Germans from 1860 to 1933: The Problematic Symbiosis*, ed. David Bronsen (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitaetsverlag, 1979), 15, 27.

9. Raymond Immerwahr, "The Word 'Romantisch' and Its History," in *The Romantic Period in Germany*, 36.

10. Henry Chadwick, "Romanticism and Religion," in *The Future of Modern Humanity*, ed. J. C. Laidlaw (Cambridge, England: Modern Humanities Research Association, 1969), 18.

11. Anatole Broyard, "Can Art Make the World Safe for Romanticism," *New York Times Book Review*, 7 February 1988, p. 13; Jamie James, "Though This Were Madness, Was There Method in't?" *New York Times*, 7 August 1994, sec. 2, pp. 27–28; Jim Koch, "Transforming a Ghoul into a Leading Man," *New York Times*, 6 November 1994, sec. 1, pp. 59, 62; James Oestreich, "A Hit 1,000 Years in the Making: Atop of the Pop Charts Gregorian Chants," *New York Times*, 8 May 1994, sec. 2, p. 32.

12. Prawer, introduction to *Romantic Period in Germany*, 1–3.

13. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Literary Absolute*, trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 8.

14. Wilhelm Wackenroder, *Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar*, trans. Edward Mornin (New York: Ungar, 1975).

15. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *Literary Absolute*, 155–164.

16. Immerwahr, "The Word 'Romantisch,'" 44.

17. Novalis, *Henry von Ofterdingen*, trans. Palmer Hilty (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, 1964).

18. For example, Jean Paul, "Vorschule der Aesthetik," in *Werke*, ed. Norbert Miller (1967), 5:86, quoted in Ernst Behler, "Romantik, das Romantische," *Historische Woerterbuch der Philosophie*, 1976.

19. Novalis, "Christendom or Europe," in *Hymns to the Night and other Selected Writings*, trans. Charles E. Passage (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1960).

20. Prawer, introduction to *Romantic Period in Germany*, 4; Paul Roubiczek, "Some Aspects of German Philosophy in the Romantic Period," in *The Romantic Period in Germany*, 320; William Arctander O'Brien, *Novalis: Signs of Revolution* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1995), 216–271.

21. Chadwick, "Romanticism and Religion," 28.

22. Arthur Lovejoy, "The Meaning of Romanticism for the Historian of Ideas," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 2 (1941): 262–264.

23. Immerwahr, "The Word 'Romantisch,'" 35.

24. Ibid, 47; Prawer, introduction to *Romantic Period in Germany*, 6.

25. Novalis, *Henry von Ofterdingen*, 108, 110, 111, 156.

26. Lovejoy, "Meaning of Romanticism," 272.

27. Friedrich Schlegel, "Atheneum Fragments," in *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 24.

28. Friedrich Schlegel, "Brief ueber den Roman," in *Kritische Ausgabe*, ed. Ernst Behler (Munich: F. Schoeningh, 1958), 2:333, quoted in Behler, "Romantik, das Romantische."

29. Schlegel, "Atheneum Fragments," 32.

30. Theodore Ziolkowski, *German Romanticism and Its Institutions* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 329–333.

31. Library of Congress Subject Cataloging Division, *Library of Congress Subject Headings* (Washington, D.C.: Cataloging Distribution Service, 1988), 2:1961.

32. Henry A. Lea, "Mahler: German Romantic or Jewish Satirist?" in *Jews and Germans from 1860 to 1933*, 288, 299.

33. Arthur Lovejoy, "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms," *PMLA* 39 (June 1924): 235.

34. For example, Jacob Neusner, "Judaism," in *Our Religions*, ed. Arvind Sharma (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1993), 304.

35. Gershom Scholem, "Three Types of Jewish Piety," in *Sinn und Wandlungen des Menschenbildes*, ed. A. Portmann, Eranos Jahrbuch, vol. 38 (Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1972), 331–347.

36. Eveline Goodman-Thau and Christoph Schulte, "Kabbala und Romantik: die juedische Mystik in der deutschen Geistesgeschichte von Schelling zu Scholem," *Athenaum: Jahrbuch fuer deutsche Romantik* 2 (1992), 243–249; Scholem comments on affinities between Lurianic kabbalah and Schelling in *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1941), 409, 412; see also Novalis, *Werke, Tagebuecher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs*, ed. Hans-Joachim Maehl and Richard Samuel (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1978–1987), 2:499.

37. The rise of mysticism "coincides with what may be called the romantic period of religion." Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, 8.

38. Ralph Marcus, "The Hellenistic Age," in *Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People*, ed. Leo W. Schwarz (New York: Random House, 1956), 98, 102.

39. Abraham Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 161; also, David Rudavsky, *Modern Jewish Religious Movements* (New York: Behrman House, 1967), 190.

40. Rudavsky, *Modern Jewish Religious Movements*, 142, 220; Hans Liebeschuetz, *Von Georg Simmel zu Franz Rosenzweig: Studien zum Juedischen Denken in deutschen Kulturbereich* (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1970), 180–184; David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 164–171.

41. Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 96.

42. George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York: Schocken Books, 1981), 124, 183.

43. From Heine's notebooks, quoted in Michael Hamburger, *Contraries: Studies in German Literature* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1970), 146.

44. Guenter Oesterle, "Juden, Philister und romantische Intellektuelle: Ueberlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Romantik," *Athenaum: Jahrbuch fuer deutsche Romantik* 2 (1992), 55–89.

45. Ibid., 71.

46. Schlegel, "Atheneum Fragments," 31.

47. Michael A. Meyer, "Reform Jewish Thinkers and their German Context," in *The Jewish Response to German Culture*, ed. Jehuda Reinharz (Hanover, New Hampshire: Published by University Press of New England for Clark University, 1985), 70; Novalis, *Werke, Tagebuecher und Briefe*, 2:427, 2:764; Schelling, *The Philosophy of Art*, trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 58.

48. Schelling, *Ages of the World*, trans. Frederick de Wolfe Bolman (New York: AMS Press, 1967), 159; Novalis, *Werke, Tagebuecher und Briefe*, 2:776; Werner J. Cahnman, "Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling and the New Thinking of Judaism," in *German Jewry: Its History and Sociology*, ed. Joseph B. Maier, Judith Marcus and Zoltan Tarr (New Brunswick, New Jersey.: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 222.

49. Cahnman, "Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling," 215.

50. Otto Poeggeler, "Between Enlightenment and Romanticism: Rosenzweig and Hegel," in *The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig*, 122.

51. Dorit Orgad, "Jehuda Halevi ve-Rosenzweig: Re'ionot Choffim ve-Mishnoteihem," *Da'at: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah* 21 (1988), 115.

52. "Das juedische Denken hat in Rosenzweig seinen Pascal und Kierkegaard kongenialen Ausdruck gefunden." (Jewish thought found in Rosenzweig its equivalent of Pascal and Kierkegaard.) Albino Babolin, "Der Begriff der Erloesung bei Franz Rosenzweig," in *Der Philosoph Franz Rosenzweig*, ed. W. Schmeid-Kowarzik (Kassel: Verlag Karl Alber, 1988), 2:608.

53. Franz Rosenzweig, "Stefan Georg," in *Kleinere Schriften* (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1937), 503.

54. Scholem, "Franz Rosenzweig and His Book *The Star of Redemption*," 21.

55. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, *Literary Absolute*, 49.

56. Ibid., 11.

57. Franz Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, trans. William Hallo (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1985), 143. Further page references to *The Star of Redemption* are prefixed with the abbreviation, SR, and given, parenthetically, in the body of the text.

58. Paul Tillich, *The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling's Positive Philosophy*, trans. Victor Nuovo (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University Press, 1974), 40.

59. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 13, 26, 66.

60. Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?," in *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*, trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 286.

61. Friedrich Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1978), 231.

62. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, *Literary Absolute*, 122.

63. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 51.

64. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, *Literary Absolute*, 67.

65. Ibid, 48.

66. "The existentialists most of all seem perennially entangled with idealism." Robert Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 34. "The Romantics make it even more difficult to include feeling in philosophy. The task is left to the existentialists . . . ." Roubiczek, "German Philosophy in the Romantic Period," 318.

67. Franz Rosenzweig, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, presented by Nahum Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), 130, 174.

68. Leo Baeck, "Types of Jewish Understanding from Moses Mendelssohn to Franz Rosenzweig," *Judaism* 9 (Spring 1960): 163–168. Albert Friedlander, "Leo Baeck and Franz Rosenzweig," in *Der Philosoph Franz Rosenzweig*, 1:248.

69. Friedlander comments on the lack of "personal closeness" between Baeck and Rosenzweig. Friedlander, "Leo Baeck and Franz Rosenzweig," 248.

70. Rosenzweig, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, 117.

71. Glatzer, "The Frankfurt Lehrhaus," in *Essays in Jewish Thought*, 256, 264.

72. Albert Friedlander has compared them in "Die messianische Dimension bei Franz Rosenzweig und Leo Baeck," in *Aus zweier Zeugen Mund: Festschrift fuer Pnina Nave Levinson und Nathan Peter Levinson*, ed. J. H. Schoeps (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1992), 167–176; also in Friedlander, "Leo Baeck and Franz Rosenzweig."

73. Friedlander, *Leo Baeck: Teacher of Theresienstadt*, 141.

74. Franz Rosenzweig, "Ein Rabbinerbuch," in *Kleinere Schriften*, 43–49; partially translated in Rosenzweig, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, 120.

75. Franz Rosenzweig, "Apologetic Thinking," in *The Jew: Essays from Martin Buber's Journal "Der Jude," 1916–1924*, trans. Joachim Neugroschel, ed. Arthur A. Cohen (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1980), 265–266.

76. Ibid., 266.

77. Ibid., 272; cf. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 66.

78. Rosenzweig, "Apologetic Thinking," 272.

79. Franz Rosenzweig, *Briefe und Tagebuecher*, II: 1918–1929 in *Der Mensch und sein Werk: Gesammelte Schriften*, I, ed. Rachel Rosenzweig and Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinman (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 918, 919.

80. Ibid, 919.

81. Glatzer, "The Frankfurt Lehrhaus," 259.

82. Hermann Cohen, *Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism*, trans. Simon Kaplan (New York: Frederick Unger, 1972), 20–22, 202.

83. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, *Literary Absolute*, 40.

84. Friedlander, *Leo Baeck: Teacher of Theresienstadt*, 120.

85. The following summary account is abstracted from Ernst Behler, "Romantik, das Romantische," in *Historisches Woerterbuch der Philosophie*, 1976.

86. Carl Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, trans. Guy Oakes (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986), 29–30.

87. Friedlander, *Leo Baeck: Teacher of Theresienstadt*, 37.

88. Leo Baeck, "Romantic Religion," in *Judaism and Christianity*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1958; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1958), 232–233, 251–152. Further page references to "Romantic Religion" are prefixed with the abbrevation, RR, and given, parenthetically, in the body of the text.

89. Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, 56.

90. Fritz Strich, *Deutsche Klassik und Romantik; oder Vollendung und Unendlichkeit*, 4th ed. (Bern: A. Francke Ag. Verlag, 1949), 19–30.

91. Rosenzweig, *Briefe und Tagebuecher*, II, 1918–1919, p. 903.

92. Friedrich Schelling, *The Philosophy of Art*, trans. Douglas Stott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), xxvii–xxviii. Further references to *The Philosophy of Art* are prefixed by the abbreviation, PA, and given, parenthetically, in the body of the text.

93. Michael Ovsjannikov, "Die aesthetische Konzeption Schellings und die deutsche Romantik," in *Natur, Kunst, Mythos: Beitraege zur Philosophie F. W. J. Schellings*, Schriften zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, 13 (Berlin: Akademie:Verlag, 1978), 130; Jochen Schulte-Sasse, "The Concept of Literary Criticism in German Romanticism 1795–1810," in *A History of German Literary Criticism 1730–1980*, ed. Peter Uwe Hohendahl, trans. Franz Blaha and others (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 157.

94. Richard Crouter, introduction to Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, trans. Richard Crouter (Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 30.

95. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, *Literary Absolute*, 28.

96. Azade Seyhan, *Representation and Its Discontents: The Critical Legacy of German Romanticism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 18, 48.

97. Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, 55–57.

98. Franz Rosenzweig, "Das Aelteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus," in *Kleinere Schriften*, 249.

99. Ibid., 272–273.

100. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, *Literary Absolute*, 79.

101. Roubiczek, "Some Aspects of German Philosophy in the Romantic Period," 305.

102. A. R. Caponigri, "Romanticism, Philosophical," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*.

103. Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," in *Shorter Works*, trans. Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 168.

104. Friedrich Schlegel, "Atheneum Fragments," 24.

105. Elsa Rachel-Freund, *Franz Rosenzweig's Philosophy of Existence*, trans. S. L. Weinstein and R. Israel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979); Robert Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Stephane Moses, *System and Revelation*, trans. Catherine Tihanyi (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992); Xavier Tilliette, "Rosenzweig et Schelling," *Archivio di Filosofia* 53, no. 2/3 (1985).

106. Franz Rosenzweig, *Briefe*, ed. Edith Rosenzweig (Berlin, 1935), 299, quoted in Werner J. Cahnman, "Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling and the New Thinking in Judaism," 236.

107. Tilliette, "Rosenzweig et Schelling," 145–146.

108. Rosenzweig, "Das Aelteste Systemprogramm," 275.

109. Ibid., 263.

110. For a history of the interpretations, see Frank-Peter Hansen, *Das Aelteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus: Rezeptionslehre und Interpretation* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989).

111. Ibid.; also, Franz Rosenzweig, "Das Aelteste Systemprogramm." For English translation, see Friedrich Hoelderlin, "The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism," in *Essays and Letters on Theory*, trans. Thomas Pfau (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 154–156.

112. Hoelderlin, "Oldest System-Program," 154.

113. Rosenzweig, "Das Aelteste Systemprogramm," 240.

114. Hoelderlin, "Oldest System-Program," 154.

115. Rosenzweig, "Das Aelteste Systemprogramm," 245.

116. Ibid., 244.

117. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 231.

118. Ibid., 232–233.

119. Rosenzweig's interpretation is faulted here by Frank-Peter Hansen, *Das Aelteste Systemprogramm*, 20–44.

120. Rosenzweig, "Das Aelteste Systemprogramm," 267, 269.

121. Ibid., 273–277.

122. Rosenzweig, "Vertauschte Fronten," in *Kleinere Schriften*, 354–356.

123. Rosenzweig, "Das Aelteste Systemprogramm," 277.

124. Norbert Samuelson, *An Introduction to Modern Jewish Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); Shmuel Bergman, *Dialogical Philosophy from Kierkegaard to Buber*, trans. Arnold A. Gerstein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Julius Guttman, *Philosophies of Judaism*, trans. David W. Silverman (New York: Schocken Books, 1973); Nathan Rotenstreich, *Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times* (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1968).

125. Robert Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas*, 9. Gibbs comments on Rosenzweig's "idiolect" of German.

126. Samuelson, *Introduction to Modern Jewish Philosophy*, 216–217.

127. As Walter Benjamin appears to have done. Stephane Moses, "Walter Benjamin and Franz Rosenzweig," *The Philosophical Forum* 15 (Fall–Winter 1983–1984): 190–195.

128. Franz Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," in *Kleinere Schriften*, 374.

129. R. Horowitz, "Kavim le-be'aioth ha-safa ve-ha-dibur be-hagut Rosenzweig," *Da'at* 6:25, quoted in Dorit Orgad, "R. Yehuda Halevi ve-Rosenzweig," 115.

130. Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," 391.

Chapter 2: A Reading of The Star of Redemption *through Romantic Religion*

1. Franz Rosenzweig, "Apologetic Thinking," 272; Franz Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking," in *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, 201, 204.

2. Franz Rosenzweig, *Briefe und Tagebuecher*, II: 1918–1929, p. 903.

3. Franz Rosenzweig, "Apologetic Thinking," 271.

4. Franz Rosenzweig, "Apologetic Thinking," 267.

5. Uriel Tal calls it, "perhaps one of his [Baeck's] most important efforts" in *Religious and Anti-Religious Roots of Modern Anti-Semitism*, Leo Baeck Memorial Lectures, no. 14 (New York: Leo Baeck Institute, 1971), 3. Alexander Altmann calls it a "great essay" in *Leo Baeck and the Jewish Mystical Tradition*, Leo Baeck Memorial Lectures, no. 17 (New York: Leo Baeck Institute, 1973), 10. Samuel Sandmel notes that it is "among the best known of Baeck's essays" in *Leo Baeck on Christianity*, Leo Baeck Memorial Lectures, no. 19 (New York: Leo Baeck Institute, 1975), 12.

37. Peter Fenves, "Kantian Critical Tradition II," seminar lectures at Northwestern University, Winter 1992.

38. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 66.

39. Drama "does not merely mean or signify its objects, but rather places them before our very eyes" (PA 261).

40. Schelling, *Ages of the World*, trans. Frederick de Wolfe Bolman (New York: AMS Press, 1967), 142, 192.

41. Schelling, *Bruno*, 151.

42. Friedrich Hoelderlin, "Oldest System-Program," 154.

43. David Simpson, foreword to Schelling, *The Philosophy of Art*, xxiv.

44. Schelling implies that all modern art is comic when, in one passage, he defines modern drama as the "combination of opposites," i.e., of tragic and comic elements, in which "both are definitely differentiated," and then, in another, suggests that the "mixed nature" of *The Divine Comedy* is what entitles it to be called a comedy (PA 267–268, 240).

Chapter 4: A Reading of The Star of Redemption *through* The Philosophy of Art

1. Franz Rosenzweig, "Das aelteste Systemprogramm," 264.

2. Ibid., 265.

3. Robert Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992); Xavier Tilliette, "Rosenzweig et Schelling," *Archivio di filosofia* 53:2–3 (1985); Stephane Moses, *System and Revelation*, trans. Catherine Tihanyi (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992).

4. Rosenzweig, *Briefe und Tagebuecher*, I, 1909–1918, p. 701.

5. Schelling, *Bruno*, 138–140.

6. Shmuel Hugo Bergman, *Dialogical Philosophy from Kierkegaard to Buber*, trans. Arnold A. Gerstein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 201.

7. Schelling, *Bruno*, 158ff.

8. Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. V. E. Watts (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), 35.

9. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 327–328.

10. Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 33.

11. "If ethics is to include sin, its ideality comes to an end," i.e., it cannot be generated out of pure practical reason, but must presuppose something prior to reason. Soren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 17–18.

12. Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking," 192.

13. Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," 375.

14. Gibbs, *Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas*, 46–54.

15. Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," 377.

16. Ibid., 374.

17. Ibid., 379.

18. Elsa Rachel-Freund, *Franz Rosenzweig's Philosophy of Existence*, 103.

19. Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," 382.

20. Ibid., 391.

21. Friedrich Schelling, *Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom*, trans. James Gutmann (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1936).

22. Rosenzweig, *Der Stern der Erloesung*, 91.

23. Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," 377.

24. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 233–234.

25. Leo Baeck, "Types of Jewish Self-Understanding," 116.

26. Nahum Glatzer, introduction to Franz Rosenzweig, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, xxxvi.

27. Franz Rosenzweig, "Der Konzertsaal auf der Schallplatte," in *Kleinere Schriften*.

28. For example, Rosenzweig would have preferred the first edition of the *Star* to be published in three separate volumes, instead of in the single volume in which it appeared ("Das neue Denken," p. 375). Also, he did not wish his short work, *Understanding the Sick and the Healthy*, to be published at all, and it was, posthumously.

29. Rosenzweig, *Der Stern der Erloesung*, 72.

30. Kierkegaard, *Concept of Anxiety*, 51.

31. Immanuel Kant, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, 129.

32. Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking," 202.

33. Ibid.

34. "Jeder soll einmal philosophieren." Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," 397.

35. Ibid., 374.

36. cf. Schelling, *Ages of the World*, 119.

37. Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," 376.

38. Ibid, 377.

39. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 231.

40. Richard McKeon, introduction to "Logic," in Aristotle, *Introduction to Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 1947), 2.

41. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 231.

42. Ibid., 68.

43. Schelling, *Bruno*, 161.

44. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 140–145.

45. Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, 58.

46. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987), 215.

47. "Saints and martyrs have frequently been regarded as impossible subjects for true tragedy." Louis L. Martz, "The Saint as Tragic Hero: *Saint Joan* and *Murder in the Cathedral*," in *Tragic Themes in Western Literature*, ed. Cleanth Brooks (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 150.

48. Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, 35.

49. Plato *Phaedrus* (trans. Jowett) 279. Karl Jaspers also links philosophy to prayer. But prayer for him stands not at the end of philosophy, sealing it, but before it, on the "frontier" of it. Karl Jaspers, *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, trans. Karl Manheim (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), 82.

50. Rosenzweig, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, 25.

51. For Rosenzweig, the whole Jewish year is a "curriculum of communal silence" (SR 353).

52. Plato *Phaedrus* (trans. Jowett) 250.

53. Plato *Republic* (trans. Jowett) 533.

54. Ibid., 473.

55. "The view on the height of the redeemed hypercosmos" (SR 424).

56. Plato *Republic* (trans. Jowett) 492, 538–539.

57. Plato *Republic* (trans. Jowett) 387.

58. Johann Jacob Wagner to Andreas Adam, January 6, 1803, quoted in Schelling, *Bruno*, 100.

59. Schelling, *Bruno*, 140–143.

60. Plato *Republic* (trans. Jowett) 477.

61. Ibid., 490.

62. Ibid., 517.

63. From the title of a book by Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

64. Plato *Symposium* (trans. Jowett) 174; Plato *Republic* (trans. Jowett) 533; Plato *Phaedrus* (trans. Jowett) 250.

65. Plato *Phaedrus* (trans. Jowett) 246.

66. Ibid.

67. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge*, 196.

68. Ibid., 197.

69. Ibid.

70. Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed*, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 528.

71. Goethe, *Faust*, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), line 439, p. 99.

72. See the section "Romantic Completion" in Chapter 2.

73. Judah Halevi, *The Kuzari*, trans. Hartwig Hirschfeld (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 226–227.

74. Rosenzweig, *Der Stern der Erloesung*, 422.

75. Ibid.

76. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 58. Sense-certainty, which is actually the poorest kind of knowledge, gives the appearance of being the richest.

77. Stephane Moses, "Rosenzweig in Perspective: Reflections on His Last Diaries," in *The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig*, 198.

78. Ibid.

79. Andrew Holleran, *Dancer from the Dance* (New York: New American Library, 1978), 110.

80. Willa Cather, *A Lost Lady* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1923), 41, 70, 172.

81. Marcel Proust, *Swann's Way*, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff (New York: Modern Library, 1956), 31–32.

82. William Butler Yeats, "Among School Children," *The Norton Anthology of Poetry*, 3d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983), lines 63–64.

83. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 182.

84. Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, 189.

85. See the section "Romantic Redemption, in Chapter 2.

86. Franz Rosenzweig, "Towards a Renaissance of Jewish Learning," in *On Jewish Learning*, ed. N. N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), 65.

87. "Jesus of Montreal," directed by Denys Armand, was released in 1990. For a collection of reviews, see "Jesus of Montreal," *Film Review Annual* (1991): 776ff. David Denby is quoted as saying, "By the end of the movie, Daniel *is* Christ," *New York* (6 June 1990). Daniel Colombe, played by Lothaire Bluteau, is the actor in the story who plays Christ in a passion play.

88. Rosenzweig, "The New Thinking," 207.

89. David Simpson, foreword to Schelling, *The Philosophy of Art*, xxiv.

90. Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," 397.

91. Ibid.

92. Franz Rosenzweig, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, presented by Nahum Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1961).

93. Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," 391.

94. Ibid. See the sections, "Ethics," "Darkness," and Conclusions," in Chapter 3.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

1. For ancient anxiety and redemptive longings, see the short book by E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1965).

2. Rosenzweig, "Das aelteste Systemprogramm," 238.

3. Leo Baeck, "Types of Jewish Self-Understanding from Moses Mendelssohn to Franz Rosenzweig," 167.

4. Aboth 2:16. Translation from *Gates of Prayer: the New Union Prayerbook* (New York: Central Conference of American Rabbis, 1975), 20.

5. Rosenzweig, *Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and Thought*, 161.

6. Nahum Glatzer, "Introduction to Rosenzweig's *Little Book of Common Sense and Sick Reason*," in *Essays in Jewish Thought* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Pr., 1978), 244.

7. Scholem offers specific reasons why the Star did not, in Rosenzweig's lifetime, receive the interpretation it deserved. Gershom Scholem, "On the 1930 Edition of Rosenzweig's *The Star of Redemption*," in *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 320–324.